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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines competing explanations of the rapid 
post-war economic growth of the New Industrialising 
Countries of East Asia (Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and 
South Korea). It pays particular attention to the role 
of the state and to the state's changing relations to 
other major centres of power. The general approach is 
then augmented by a detailed exploration using a case 
study of economic development in South Korea. 
The new wave of economic development in east Asian 
countries' has stimulated an vast amount of research 
from a wide variety of perspectives. Many studies have 
focused single-mindedly on the central position of the 
state and its guiding role in economic development, 
rather than taking a more holistic approach by looking 
at the complex and evolving interplay between the state 
and other social sectors. 
However, this present work attempts to demonstrate the 
utility of a perspective that places the economic 
success of east Asian NICs through a detailed 
examination of the Korean case within a broader context. 
This context takes account of the shifting international 
environment and its impact and the cultural factors 
which these four countries have inherited. It also 
explores the actions of the state in relation to the 
responses and strategies of other key groups of actors. 
In summary, the feature of the actions of state and the 
state autonomy have been' diversified in accordance with 
changes of its components. This is even more so in the 
case of Korea which was once under the military regime 
but is now civilian controlled by a government. Korea 
took a specific path to achieve its economic development 
by creating the chaebols, family-owned conglomerates. It 
can be said, therefore, that over the last three decades 
the soil was prepared for the power shift among the 
power blocs including the state, the chaebols and labour 
group. The power of the chaebols has grown from being 
dominated by the state in the 1960s to being more 
symbiotic with state power in the 1990s. The chaebols 
have carefully prepared the ground for this new 
relationship by consolidating their social networks in 
society. 
The thesis also examines the mass communication system, 
concentrating upon the way that shifting relationships 
between the major power groups impact on the mass media. 
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Introduction 
INTRODUCTION: 
APPROACHING THE ASIAN ECONOMIC 'MIRACLE' 
Since the 1970s, the spectacular spurt of sustained 
economic growth in the Asian Newly Industrialised 
Countries (hereafter: NICs) has become a focus of 
concerted attention in social science circles, 
particularly among those interested in development 
studies. Tremendous efforts have been devoted to 
explaining their success. Nor is this simply an academic 
interest. Practitioners and policy makers in both the 
developed and developing worlds have become increasingly 
anxious to identify the motors of their dynamism and to 
apply the 'lessons' to their own economies. 
Research on the impressive economic record of the Asian 
NICs has proliferated in academic journals and in 
speeches to international and regional conferences. 
Despite sharp disagreements over appropriate 
explanations, there is little dispute over the basic 
descriptive facts of economic performances. Regardless 
of the principle indicators used for evaluation or 
comparison the basic narrative of success is broadly 
constant. Numerous attempts have been made to explain 
how these countries in fact achieved their success and, 
to lesser extent, whys. However, most previous studies 
have generally concentrated on one specific factor. 
1Robert Wade and Gordon White, eds., Developmental 
States in East Asia: Capitalist and Socialist, special 
issue of IDS Bulletin 15: 2,1984; and Roy Hofheinz and 
Kent Calder, The East Asia Edge (New York; Basic Books, 
1982). 
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In contrast, this present thesis attempts to develop a 
more holistic approach and to explore the interplay of 
various factors. It argues that there are a range of 
important ingredients which have intertwined and 
combined to create a distinct form of development. 
However as the study progresses, we will see that the 
differences between the four major Asian NICs - Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong - are as significant as 
the similarities. Nevertheless, at a general level we 
can identify three broad keys to the success of the east 
Asian NICs; (1) the shifting international environment; 
(2) a shared cultural inheritance and (3) the central 
role of the state. At the same time, these forces 
interact in specific ways in each country generating the 
different paths to development summarised in the 
synoptic chart at the end of Chapter Three. 
South Korea, (hereafter, Korea, for convenience) which 
is the particular focus of this thesis is no exception. 
Its particularities are rooted in the strong history of 
military regimes over three decades, coupled with its 
geopolitical position. The fact that it shares a border 
with communist North Korea placed it at the centre of 
the Cold War and imposed a substantial burden of defence 
expenditure on the Korean economy. In addition, Korea 
has managed its recent economic success without inviting 
direct foreign investment. Moreover, compared to the 
other Asian NICs, it boasts a particularly concentrated 
private sector dominated by a handful of large 
conglomerates known as 'Chaebols' who enjoyed a 'special 
relation' to the government. These became the central 
actors in economic development. The second, and major 
part of the thesis is devoted to a detailed exploration 
of the particularities of the Korean case. 
2 
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It opens with a discussion of the relations between the 
succession of military regimes and civil society, and 
then moves on to a thorough examination of the relations 
between the state and capital. This discussion is 
pivotal because for last three decades, the relation 
between these two sectors has been the main axis around 
which the economic development of Korean society has 
revolved and its evolving characteristics have also 
influenced the development of politics and culture. The 
final part of the thesis examines how this central 
relation has structured the operation of the cultural 
sector, and in particular, the mass media. The mass 
media have been chosen as an illustrative case study 
because, in the recent history of Korea, this sector has 
experienced the shifts brought about by changes in 
regime, and by political institutes, and by the 
relations between the state and capital particularly 
forcefully. 
DATA 
This study is grounded in various sets of empirical data 
drawn from a range of sources. They include the reports 
of the parliamentary inspection of the administration; 
newspapers and popular journals; the statistics 
presented in the annual series and the special surveys 
produced by government agencies; FKI (Federation of 
Korean Industries) documents and periodicals; and 
interviews with journalists. These materials were 
collected in Korea during the summers of 1991'and 1992 
(except the interview with journalists which was held 
between 1st and 5th of February, January 1993) . Each 
chapter of this study examines a different aspect of the 
central issue, based on appropriate sets of data. The 
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full list of the all the data sources used for this 
research can be found in the appendix. 
The first part of Chapter V, dealing with the national 
defence budget, relies on data collected mainly from 
newspapers, supplemented by conversations with people 
from military groups, economists, and researchers in 
international policies. As a secondary source, I have 
also drawn on other existing documents. For the second 
part of the chapter, I drew on data published by 
'Christian Society Research' which has been working for 
labour interests and the improvement of working 
conditions for more than 20 years and has established a 
reputation for the accuracy and objectivity of its data. 
Chapters VI and VII, examining economic growth and the 
rise of the chaebols, have relied upon various sources. 
Firstly, for the analysis of the conditions and 
processes which shaped the overall pattern of emerging 
capitalism, historical documents were used. These come 
from a wide range of sources, including; the Japanese 
government 'General Documents'; Korean government 
documents; and other historical writings. The 
discussions of state economic policies and of the 
concentration of the wealth are heavily reliant on 
documents from the Parliamentary Inspection of the 
Administration in 1990, together with supplementary 
material gathered from newspapers and other secondary 
sources. These sources include data collected from the 
Economic Planning Board(EPB), the Korean Industries 
Statistics(KIS), the National Assembly Library, the Bank 
of Korea, the Korean Development Institute(KDI), the FKI 
and the Citizens' Association for the Realisation of 
Economic Justice. I am especially grateful to the 
researchers from this latter body for their 
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encouragement and their help in locating data and for 
inspiring discussion about the consolidation of the 
chaebol in Korean society. 
Chapter VIII has drawn upon several sets of data. For 
the history of the Korean mass media, I have used 
existing studies, newspapers, and annual collections of 
statistics for the mass media and business associations. 
Much important material has come from the National 
Parliamentary Minutes for the Ministry of Culture and 
Information, the 144th Assembly, and the inspection 
paper for the special parliamentary hearing held in 1988 
for the "Rearrangement of Mass Media". On the recent 
situation within the mass media, I received invaluable 
help from a researcher from the Advertising Research 
Institute in KOBACO (Korean Broadcasting Advertising 
Corporation). This material was treated as confidential 
inside the institute. However, I was given the chance to 
access it and I owe my frienda debt of a gratitude for 
taking the risk to help me. To delineate the map of 
personnel flows, I used various directories and the 
Korean Who's Who (The Yeonhap News Agency, annual) . 
These data sets were utilised to analyse networks and 
personnel flow-inside both the mass media sector and the 
bureaucratic sector. Finally, I received great help in 
understanding conflicts between the owners of the mass 
media and the journalists through interviews with 
journalists and with the leader of the Dong-A Daily 
journalists' trade union. 
Finally, Chapter IX is heavily grounded in sets of data 
collected from trade journals such as 'Ad. Trends', and 
'Ad. Information', which-are read by most of the people 
working for the advertising industries. Again, the data 
from the National Inspection of the Administration and 
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other existing studies were also used. Finally I am 
grateful to the researcher who gave me important 
information about the Korean Broadcasting Commission and 
provided access to their monthly and annual reports. 
I am fully aware of the limits and potential dangers of 
using data published by various Departments and 
Ministries of government. In some areas, however, due to 
the monopoly control of information enjoyed by the 
government, they are the only resource available. 
However, in an attempt to avoid misperceptions, a 
critical attitude has been adopted throughout the 
thesis, and wherever official data was cross-examined or 
subjected to scrutiny or questioning by parliamentary 
hearings, the outcomes have been examined very closely. 
Approaching the Korean Power Structure 
Independent studies of the overall power structure of 
Korean society and the dynamics of power shifts are 
still rare. The common foci of past research can be 
summarised under two headings: research about state- 
power, and studies of the emerging power of the 
capitalist class. Research on state power generally 
presents Korea in the context of the rise of the East 
Asian NIC's as a whole. Most of these studies adopt a 
statist approach in which the role of the state is 
regarded as the major factor in rapid economic 
development (Koo, 1985). 
Recently however, increasing attention has been given to 
the major Korean capitalist groupings: the Chaebol. The 
most frequently cited reference in this area is to the 
study by Kyung-Dong Kim(1976) which focuses on how state 
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policies and political connections facilitated the 
economic expansion of big business. 
Hamilton (1986) also makes a valuable contribution to 
understanding the economic dominance of large scale 
capital. He focuses specifically on how state policies 
promoted industrial capital accumulation. His major 
purpose is to änalyse the industrialisation in Korea in 
terms of the transformation of the class structure 
presented as the product of state interventions. 
Eun Mee Kim's study (1987), based on Peter Evans' triple 
alliance model of the state, domestic capital and 
foreign capital, examines the evolution of the major 
chaebol focusing on their changing relationship to the 
state. It concludes that "the relationship between the 
state and the chaebol has moved from one of clear 
dominance by the state in 1961 with the rise of the Park 
Chung Hee regime, to a more symbiotic one in the Chun 
Doo Hwan regime in 1985" (pp. 2-3). This theme, of the 
shifting balance between state and capital over time, is 
one which we shall explore further in the present 
thesis. 
In contrast, the study by Jae Jean Suh (1988) is based 
on a conceptualisation of the Korean big business 
groups, the chaebol, as a capitalist "class". It 
elaborates the concept of social class along four 
dimensions - organisational, ideological, economic, and 
social networks - and then constructs a framework of 
capitalist class formation in terms of class activity 
and its interplay with prevailing conditions (the 
political regime, the state, the world system, and the 
subordinate classes). It emphasises the differential 
development between the economic and non economic levels 
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(or class organisational activity, social networks, and 
class ideology). In the economic sphere he argues, the 
capitalist class dominates other social classes and, to 
a substantial degree, even state economic policies. 
However, he also gives on to argue that it could not 
consolidate its power over non-economic spheres to the 
same degree and therefore, could not establish its 
hegemony. He attributes this 'cultural-lag' to the short 
history of capitalism in Korea (pp. 301-302). 
The research done by Janelli (1993) examines Korea's 
elite and new middle class as agents of the society's 
capitalist industrialisation and concomitant cultural 
transformation. He conducted research inside one of the 
chaebol companies using participation-observation 
methodology. According to his argument, the new middle 
class'do not choose between their cultural values and 
material welfare but between various interests, 
capitals, and alliances. Individuals pursue interests 
both alone and as members of families, classes, nations, 
companies, and other collectivities. Janelli argues that 
the state, by choosing to expand manufacturing through 
private rather than state enterprises, and by preferring 
foreign loans rather than foreign firms as sources of 
capital, created the conditions which allowed the Korean 
middle class develop their own position. This in turn, 
generated conflicts between the bourgeoisie and their 
white-collar employees. The extensive control 
mechanisms, surveillance techniques, and ideological 
mobilisation deployed by the conglomerates were met by a 
complex array of resistances, compliances, and 
countermoves chosen by the new middle class. Hence, even 
though there are clearly structural constraints imposed 
by the operations of the world system, Janelli's work 
suggests that both the Korean bourgeoisie and the new 
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middle class have been able to consider different 
possibilities, devise new options, and even to try to 
alter the conditions under which they make choices. 
A number of the propositions and themes announced in 
these various studies will be explored in the present 
thesis, as we develop our own account of Korea's post 
war economic development, of the role played by the 
state in securing it, and of the shifting power 
relations between state, capital, and labour. At the 
same time, because Korea is also part of the more 
general history of post war economic 'miracle' of the 
Asian NIC's, we also need to locate it within the wider 
contexts of regional development. This is the task of 
the first part of the thesis. 
The Present Study: An outline 
Chapter one examines the international environment 
which shaped the development of the east Asian NICS in 
the post war era. It includes a discussion of the impact 
of 'the Cold War', and of the role of foreign aid in 
'kick-starting' development. Also, as many commentators 
have pointed out, since four of the east Asian NICs are 
heavily reliant on an export oriented economy, their 
development cannot be understood independently of 
changes the world market in terms of the division of 
labour and patterns of global trade. 
Chapter Two focuses on the argument that the shared 
cultural background of the Asian NICs, and in 
particular, their common Confucian heritage has played a 
key role in creating the psychological dispositions 
necessary for economic success. However, as we shall 
see, this influence is by no means as straightforward or 
9 
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as uniform as some of its more enthusiastic advocates 
have argued. On the contrary, there is considerable 
variation among the four Asian NICs in the degree to 
which Confucianism has been promoted as an 'official' 
ideology as opposed to a vernacular tradition. 
Chapter Three pursues this theme of similarities and 
differences among the Asian NICs further. It begins by 
examining why they chose the path of export-oriented 
economic development, and goes on to compare the various 
policies planned and executed by the respective states. 
Chapter Four recounts my search for the most 
appropriate conceptual framework to apply to the case of 
the east Asian NICs and more particularly to the Korean 
situation. It begins with neo-classical theories which 
believe in the beneficial operation of the market. 
However, it is argued that these tend to ignore both the 
internal political situation in specific countries and 
the international economy. Pursuing this last point, we 
then turn'to the idea of 'dependent development' rooted 
in the South American experience. This position argues 
that the underdevelopment of Third World countries is 
the result of their structural position in the world 
capitalist system, and that as a consequence, even if 
they can 'develop', this may paradoxically aggravate 
their dependency. However, it is argued that the recent 
economic success of east Asian NICs demands a 
reconsideration of the generalisability of this 
framework. Finally, the chapter discusses the statist 
approach, in the light of models of relative state 
autonomy. The basic components of state autonomy in the 
east Asian NICs are explored with a particular focus on 
how the state has responded and changed in response to 
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the economic and political developments of the post-war 
era and how it might adapt in the future. 
From Chapter Five onwards, we focus specifically on 
the Korean case. In Chapter Five, we analyse the Korean 
political context looking at the influence of 
geopolitical factors, and at the relations between 
military and civil society. This will lead us to a 
discussion of state-capital relations, concentrating on 
the question of why the state created large 
conglomerates and how this relation has developed over 
time. 
Chapters Six and Seven delineate the process of 
economic development, and more specifically, the 
emergence of the major chaebol, tracing them from their 
origins within a favoured relationship with state power, 
through to their centrality to state guided economic 
development plans. One of the main aims of the thesis as 
it develops, it is to chart the changing balance between 
state and corporate power and the shift in the dynamics 
of this relation from state dominance to symbiosis. 
A study of the communications system follows in Chapter 
Eight. The mass media, and more specifically, the news 
media are at the sharp edge of the meeting between 
public communications and the interests of the major 
power blocs. This is true, not only because they 
constitute a key "discursive arm" (Fiske, 1993: 237), but 
also because they are one of the most lucrative business 
enterprises in the society. The chapter explores the 
ways the major power blocs have attempted to exert 
control over the mass media: from the control exercised 
by the state as regulator and owner; to the capitalist's 
desire to maximise profits; and the struggle for 
11 
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enlarged freedom of expression engaged in by labour 
groups, including journalists. This last argument will 
be supported by the interviews with journalists. 
Chapter Nine presents a discussion of the role of 
advertising as a key bridge connecting the three major 
social sectors and as a central site of struggles for 
cultural control. 
12 
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CHAPTER I. 
The International Environment 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
In work on the post colonial era, one of the criteria 
most often used to categorise countries is their level 
of economic development. Although studies have shown 
that the less 'developed' nations display wide 
variations in the pace and extent of economic change, 
even among the relatively privileged group of Newly 
Industrialising Countries, the four Asian 'Tigers' are 
unique in having achieved what many commentators see as 
an economic 'miracle' within a comparatively short 
period of the time. 
In searching for the keys to this economic success, it 
is useful to distinguish between external and internal 
factors. No nation's development can be examined in 
isolation from its international context. This is 
particularly so in the case of the countries in question 
due to their complicated histories and geopolitical 
location. 
Firstly, the general context of international politics 
since the World War II will be explored, paying 
particular attention to the importance of the Cold War 
and the central role of the United States. 
Secondly, we will focus down on the role of foreign aid, 
and in particular, aid from US. 
One further factor to be examined is the changing nature 
of international market as one aspect of the increasing 
globalisation of the world economy. 
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1.1. The Politics of the Post War Period: The 
Beginning of the Cold War 
The Cold War system that has now crumbled under the 
combined impact of internal democratic revolutions in 
the old Soviet empire and economic and technological 
internationalisation was the product of the sweeping 
changes in the balance of international power that 
followed the end of World War II. The United States and 
the Soviet Union were the only major nations to survive 
the war with significant residual power. Of the other 
pre-war powers, the other nominal victors, Great Britain 
and France, lay exhausted, their economies shattered, 
while the losers, notably Germany and Japan, were 
occupied and prostrate (Snow, 1995). 
The origins of the Cold War were multiple and continue 
to be a matter of controversy. But all writers consider 
the development' of Soviet-American conflict over the 
political future of Eastern Europe to have been a major 
contributory cause. Moreover, differences over the 
political future of Eastern Europe did not abate after 
1956 (L. E. Davis, 1974). 
On the far eastern side of the world, even though the 
1946-9 civil war led to China becoming communist, at 
first the rest of eastern Asia was largely uninvolved, 
mainly because most countries in the region estimated 
that Russia and People's Republic of China would grow 
steadily weaker (Staughton Lynd, 1976). The United 
States did, however, decide in 1949, to try to stop 
communism from spreading down into French Indo-China. 
The Korean War which broke out the following year, had 
the effect of extending 'containment' throughout East 
Asia. In Korea, as in Germany, post-war occupation had 
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hardened into the creation of a communist and a non- 
communist state. In 1950 the former (with Soviet fore- 
knowledge) invaded the latter in the expectation of 
securing rapid unification. This was prevented by US and 
United Nations intervention. The victorious UN forces 
overran North Korea, but were driven out by China, which 
itself sought to push south but was held roughly along 
the pre-war demarcation line. Fighting stopped in 1953, 
but the border has remained ever since, both tense and 
rigidly sealed. 
Although only Korea and Vietnam have experienced actual 
'east-West' armed conflict on their soil, the 
containment of China gave rise to two of the most 
alarming post-war crises, those of 1954-5 and 1958 over 
the offshore islands held by the US-supported Kuomintang 
'Republic of China', which had regrouped on Taiwan. In 
the first, there was a measurable chance of the USA 
using atomic weapons. It can, therefore, be argued that 
the Cold War was considerably more intense in Eastern 
Asia than in Europe (Dunbabin, 1994 pp. 5-6). 
American Policy and Militarisation 
The collapse of the nationalists in mainland China and 
the triumph of the communists had finally killed any 
notion of China acting as a regional surrogate, for the 
US. Only Japan seemed a likely role model to demonstrate 
to the rest of Asia the advantages of a pro capitalist, 
pro integrationist mode of economic development. In 
order to play this role effectively however, Japanese 
industry had to be organised along the same lines as in 
North America and the OEEC countries; with large-scale 
enterprises undertaking specialised production for the 
world market and reaping the profits of comparative 
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advantage and economies of scale. Japan's 
reindustrialisation was therefore focused single- 
mindedly on production for export. Not until 1960 would 
the Japanese home market receive equivalent stress. This 
orientation had profound implications for Japanese 
social and economic policy. Specifically, Japanese 
workers tended to be viewed as a cost-factor rather than 
as potential consumers, and this put a premium on 
keeping wage bills as low as possible so that Japanese 
exports could underprice competitors (McCormick, 1989). 
At the same time, outside Japan, there was a profound US 
led push towards militarisation to match America's new 
pivotal role in international politics. Militarisation 
addressed three policy considerations not wholly covered 
by economic diplomacy: national security, European 
integrationism, and Third World development. The stress 
on military capabilities was designed to facilitate the 
systematic development of Third World extractive 
economies, so that they might function more effectively 
as markets and raw material providers for European and 
Japanese recovery. Since much of the periphery, 
especially the Asian rimlands, had been destablised by 
war and revolution, military pacification and forced 
stabilisation seemed likely prerequisites for rapid and 
predictable economic growth (McCormick, 1989: 96-7). The 
US National Security Council adopted the militarisation 
option in early, 1950. It foresaw intense 'Cold War' 
competition for hegemony between the US. and the Soviet 
Union, picturing the latter as a revolutionary, 
fanatical power, driven to dominate the Eurasian land 
mass and ultimately the world. Faced with this imagined 
scenario it argued that only superior military force 
could act as a necessary deterrent. 
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Waged between June 1950 and July 1953, the Korean War 
was part of a twenty-year contest for the rimlands of 
Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and Taiwan. This 
Rimlands War was fought by American leaders for a series 
of interconnected reasons. At their most global, 
American motives reflected the newly-affirmed commitment 
to integrating the extractive economies of the Third 
World into the industrial core and to using military 
force if necessary to effect this. 
In Korea, civil war and insurrection had left one 
hundred thousand people dead and a divided nation 
paralysed. In Taiwan, the last remnants of the Chinese 
Nationalists (KMT) awaited the likely and perhaps final 
confrontation with the People's Republic of China (PRC). 
And in Indochina, especially Vietnam, the French had 
been waging a colonial war against radical and 
nationalist opposition since 1946. Relatedly, and most 
pressingly, the Rimlands War was fought to keep the 
Asian periphery open to the Japanese economy and thereby 
insure Japan's retention as a functioning member of the 
world-system and, conversely, preventing it from 
drifting into the Sino-Soviet sphere of influence. 
Finally, and more distantly, keeping Japan and the 
rimlands together as a regional component of the world- 
system might eventually act as a gravitational magnet to 
pull China out of the Russian orbit of influence and 
back towards an American dominated internationalism. 
The result was mushrooming US military spending that 
reached $53 billion annually by the end of the Korean 
War and remained in the $34 - $40 billion range for the 
remainder of the 1950s. The political purposes of this 
massive investment were to intimidate the USSR, reassure 
Europe and Japan of American protection, and to aid the 
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forces of capitalist order in a volatile periphery. The 
economic purpose was domestic and international pump and 
priming, or "military Keynesianism" (McCormick, 1989). At 
home, this meant using research subsidies and government 
purchasing to underwrite higher rates of profit in the 
short run while targeting aviation, electronics, and 
other high-tech growth industries for the long haul, 
thereby blunting existing recessionary tendencies while 
retaining America's comparative advantage in high-profit 
enterprises. Internationally, military Keynesianism 
offered a way to continue high levels of foreign aid 
under the political arrangements authorised by the 
Mutual Security Act. Aid averaged about $3 billion 
annually during the Eisenhower years. In addition, the 
special offshore Procurement Programme made it possible 
to subcontract a portion of domestic military spending 
to foreign corporations. Operative throughout the 1950s, 
this program was at its height during the Korean War. 
Its major beneficiary was the Japanese economy, 
especially in targeted industries like auto and truck 
production and in the high-value durable goods sector. 
For three years, that multibillion-dollar spending paid 
for the Japanese trade deficit, temporarily solved the 
Japanese dollar gap, and brought Japan its first post- 
war taste of prosperity. 
As Snow (1994) puts it; "the Cold War projected into the 
Third World was essentially a competition between two 
'developed' Northern blocs". They employed several 
strategies to cement their alliances and to maintain 
their political and economic power over their own sides. 
Giving aid to countries in need seemed to be 
particularly effective, in that it appeared to benefit 
both recipients and the donors. 
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1.2. The Theory of "Aid" and its Critics 
However, as critics have pointed out, this vision of 
mutuality is over simple. As one author puts it; 
"... to discuss foreign aid as an instrument of foreign 
policy implies that foreign aid programs are shaped 
with the interests of the aid-giving countries 
primarily in mind.... But the term "interests" covers a 
wide spectrum of concerns and, it does not follow that 
because the interests of the aid-giving countries are 
served, the interests of the aid-receiving countries 
are thereby denied" (Mason, 1964: 3). 
From the onset, US. policymakers linked the Second World 
War to the need for a new international order 
afterwards. During the war and the immediated post-war 
period, government officials reiterated the theme of 
finding a way to maintain a high level of US. exports as 
the key to avoiding a post-war depression. This, coupled 
with the recognition of a post-war dollar shortage, 
meant that the US. government needed special projects 
(Wood, 1986). Aid was an ideal candidate. 
As the Secretary of State argued in 1948 in an effort to 
justify the foreign aid scheme; 
The foreign aid programme also may promise an easier 
way of keeping US. business active and of getting rid 
of surpluses. Most industrial orders will be for heavy 
goods - machinery, trucks, tractors, electrical 
equipment -a sector of industry that the New Deal 
never could revive until the war. Foreign outlets for 
surplus gains and fruits and cotton may prove more 
effective that relief stamp programmes at home (US. 
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News and World Report. p. 21. February 27,1948. --- 
cited from Wood, 1986). 
The aid regime evolved during a period of undisputed 
American hegemony. The US. Agency for International 
Development was the largest source of aid until 1970, 
when it was overtaken by the World Bank, itself strongly 
influenced by the United States (Wood, 1986: 21). At 
first, aid was divided to two categories - military and 
economic. At first sight, military aid was aimed simply 
at military containment, but this needs more 
explanation. 
In its purest form, containment meant the geographical 
quarantine of the Soviet Union and other communist 
countries. The logic of this approach prioritised aid to 
countries bordering communist nations. However, it 
immediately became apparent that maintaining substantial 
military forces would require in many countries, 
"economic" assistance to compensate for domestic 
resources transferred to military purposes. If this form 
of aid, known as defence support, is classified together 
with military aid, the total sum constituted fully 95 
percent of total US. aid in 1954 and was still slightly 
over half of all aid as late as 1960. Border countries 
received 63 percent of US. military assistance and 54 
percent of "official development assistance" between 
1953 and 1961. By the end of this period however, the 
logic of geographical containment through military aid 
had broken down. Military aid had turned out to require 
extensive supporting economic aid and geographical 
containment had become ideological containment. By 1961 
when US. aid programmes existed in ninety-one countries, 
the balance between aid with broadly military purposes 
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and aid with ostensibly developmental purposes was on 
the verge of shifting in favour of the latter. 
Having sketched in this general context, we can now move 
on to examine how aid schemes worked in practice in the 
two most strategically important east Asian countries. 
Taiwan and South Korea 
As noted in the previous section, the pacific rimlands 
were critical to the Western drive for global economic 
stabilisation lead by the US. Their sensitive 
geopolitical positions were a specific focus of concern. 
Taiwan is widely regarded as one of the successful cases 
of aid fuelled development. According to Jacoby's study, 
which covers the period 1951-1965, a minimum 30 per cent 
of the annual gain in GNP was attributable to economic 
aid, although he also argues that the average rate of 
economic growth would have been 9 per cent a year, 
rather than the 7 achieved, if Taiwan had not had to 
divert resources to military expenditures (1966: 37,46). 
He attributes aid's positive impact to favourable 
complementary government policies, including substantial 
land reform, conducive to sustained expansion, and the 
fact that even by the early 1950s Taiwan was already 
partly developed, having established iron and steel, 
paper and aluminium industries as far back as the 1930s. 
Within this favourable environment, aid could and did 
assist in the development process, leading also to the 
spread of economic benefits to large population groups. 
It also helped to ease specific bottle-necks as they 
arose, for example by expanding electrical energy 
capacity. 
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However, as the Korean case shows, when a country is too 
poor to feed her own people, and the political situation 
is badly corrupted, aid cannot act effectively as a 
problem solver in economic development. Indeed, South 
Korea has often been cited as the strongest case in 
favour of the proposition that aid impedes development 
and that the absence of aid in a context of laissez- 
faire policies is the surest way to secure advances and 
prosperity. These conclusions are based on a particular 
reading of the evidence of South Korea's development and 
aid performance. 
In the 1954-60 period, the country was dominated 
economically, politically and militarily by the US., 
which provided over 90 per cent of all foreign aid. 
Statistics reveal, however, only minimal economic gains, 
especially in contrast to the post-1961 era. For 
example, average annual economic growth in the period 
1954-60 was 4.2 per cent, with per capita income only 
rising from $67 in 1953 to $82 in 1961. Few gains were 
achieved in rural and agricultural development. Export 
levels in 1961 were no higher than in the early 1950s 
and there was very little improvement in infant 
mortality and other health indicators. Yet over this 
period-the US channelled over $1,892m. in economic aid 
to Korea, averaging $236m. a year. Aid accounted for 
some 8 per cent of GNP, providing one-third of all 
government revenue and paying for 75 per cent of all 
imports. US project aid ceased in 1959 and in the period 
1962-70 general US aid funds averaged only $55m. a year 
(Steinberg, 1984). Yet, since the early 1960s, the 
economic record of Korea has been remarkable as will be 
shown in detail in the next few chapters. 
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The crucial difference between the pre- and post-coup 
eras related to key changes in economic policy. These 
included: a major currency reform; a sustained export 
drive; the nationalisation of commercial banks and 
increased state control of credit; a more systematic 
approach to rural development; rapid industrialisation; 
a major expansion in education; normalisation of 
relations with Japan; and the diversification of sources 
of foreign finance. This supports the argument that it 
was the more favourable economic and political climate 
in this latter period that led to the aid provided being 
utilised much more efficiently than in the 1950s. 
While aid has certainly been a contributory factor to 
economic expansion over the past decades then, it has 
not been pivotal. Far more important in quantitative 
terms have been non-aid sources of foreign finance 
(Riddell, 1987: 251). 
Criticisms Considered 
For radical critics on the left, it is not growth per se 
which is the problem to be analysed but the type of 
growth that is achieved or attempted. Because, the 
pattern of growth that the insertion of aid into the 
recipient economy attempts to promote does not lead to 
recognisable benefits in economic development - and 
particularly highlighted in this respect are the effects 
on poverty alleviation and income and asset distribution 
- its positive value is undermined. 
The central question is thus not 'does aid promote 
economic growth in aid-recipient countries? ', but 'who 
gains and who loses in the process of economic growth 
that is promoted? ' In drawing the conclusion that aid 
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tends to (or does) harm the poor, critics focus their 
analysis on the following parameters: the internal 
structures of recipient economies, the manner in which 
external forces act upon and react with different strata 
and sub-strata within recipient economies, and the role 
of the state and political forces both within recipient 
countries and the ways these interact with extra 
governmental political forces. 
Structural theorists argue that state structures and 
recipient governments are major impediment to aid 
effectiveness but their analysis is usually 
international in scope, and historical. For them, aid is 
part of a structural relationship between rich and poor 
countries which has evolved over time to underdevelop 
the Third World. Rich countries are seen primarily and 
overwhelmingly to use poor countries to further their 
own economic interests. They are able to achieve these 
objectives by allying themselves with dominant economic 
groups in recipient countries. These groups in turn 
strengthen their own economic power by furthering the 
links already established between themselves and the 
rich countries. Hence, the existing international 
politico-economic structure provides economic benefits 
to the industrialised countries, which ultimately 
control and guide it, and to the elites in the Third 
World who gain economically and politically from its 
evolution. On the other hand, it provides little 
material benefit to the mass of poor people in the Third 
World who are effectively excluded from achieving or 
obtaining political power in their countries and for 
whom poverty and exploitation remain the major socio- 
economic results of this overall process. 
(Riddell, 1987) . 
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These criticisms have their roots in "Dependency 
Theory". This perspective on Third World development 
offers a generalised rejection of the possibility of the 
full development of the capitalist system ever taking 
place there. What occurs rather, is the 'development of 
underdevelopment'. From this perspective, poverty is not 
an original state but the consequence of the penetration 
of market forces into the peripheral Third World from 
the capitalist centre, which creates and deepens the 
process of underdevelopment. Self-reliant development is 
inhibited because the economic surplus which is produced 
is either siphoned off by foreign capital or its 
representatives in the peripheral economy or else spent 
on luxury consumption. A key negative force in the whole 
process is the state. 
It is argued that state power in the periphery is in the 
hands of a small elite which benefits from the dependent 
capitalist relations that have been established. This 
group enjoys close relationships or alliances with the 
advanced nations and gains power and economic benefits 
from furthering these external alliances. In 'contrast, 
the bulk of the population of Third World societies is 
marginalised by, the development of underdevelopment, so 
that accelerating the process provides no hope that the 
poverty of the mass of the people will be significantly 
alleviated. 
Another group of critical commentators concentrates on 
the characteristics of the recipient states (e. g.; 
Hayter, 1981; Wood and Morton, 1977). Here the argument is 
that much aid fails to alleviate poverty because its 
overall purpose is the preservation of a system that 
damages the interests of the poor in the Third World 
(Hayter and Watson, 1985). According to this line of 
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reasoning, capitalism and capitalist development provide 
no solution to Third World poverty, and aid cannot help, 
even if it is targeted to the poor, because it is 
channelled through Third World governments, the majority 
of which are authoritarian, often military, regimes, of 
a brutally repressive nature. Because foreign aid offers 
the possibility of releasing the recipient state from 
the need to extract the economic surplus it requires 
totally from domestic sources, one might expect it to 
increase the state's relative autonomy from major 
internal power groups and thereby facilitate statist 
patterns of development. 
However, as a number of authors have pointed out (e. g. 
Harris, 1986; Riddell, 1987; Twaddle, 1992), there is a 
wide cross-section of countries mainly in Asia, 
dominated by the Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs), 
which clearly show that underdevelopment is not by any 
means the only possible result of capitalist penetration 
in Third World countries . 
It is correct to point out that foreign aid gives Third 
World states, in practice, a degree of autonomyl in 
exercising power over the nation. In the cases of both 
Taiwan and South Korea2, in the key early phase of 
growth, governments were able to execute their economic 
1. For more detail discussion, see Randall, V., and 
Theobald, R. , (1985), Political Change and 
Underdevelopment; A Critical Introduction to Third 
World Politics, London, Croom Helm. 
2 In Korea, the more important fanancial base for the 
government has been coming from foreign capital in the 
form of commercial loans. 
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development planning relatively free from the need to 
negotiate with other social sectors. 
However, the fact that not all third world countries 
with strong states have achieved economic success, 
immediately raises the question of why it happened in 
the NICs, and not in other African countries or Asian 
countries. As mentioned earlier, the answer lies with 
the unique combination of international, domestic, and 
situational factors which, in the case of Taiwan, 
includes foreign aid. The important matter to be 
examined is not whether aid is helpful or not for the 
recipients, but how the recipients are using aid to 
advance their own interests. 
One more point should be made. Even though they are 
often criticised for weakness at the theoretical level, 
commentators on the left have highlighted the critical 
influence that political factors, external economic 
forces, and patterns of income and wealth distribution 
can and do play in the dynamics of development. Their 
work also challenges the naive view that development 
professionals have sufficient understanding of the 
development process to be able to pinpoint accurately, 
and on a basis that can be generalised, the 'correct' 
path to follow (Riddle, 1987: 153) . In terms of the aid 
debate this means that not only is there no automatic 
link between providing aid and positive measurable 
outcomes, but that in countries which need more aid - 
based upon a poverty - reducing requirement - its 
effective deployment is not always easy to target or its 
effects easy to quantify. In poor countries that have a 
potential for growth and are implementing policies aimed 
at poverty reduction within a governmental structure 
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oriented to such an objective, aid funds can more easily 
be used to accelerate this process. 
In contrast, in poor countries whose growth prospects 
are poor, whose income and asset distribution is highly 
inequitable, and whose political system is resistant to 
implementing poverty-reducing policies, it is far less 
easy for donors to ensure that aid is used to assist the 
fundamental transformation required for poverty- 
reduction to be effective. It is bitterly ironic to 
discover that the influence of aid is likely to be less 
in situations where it is needed most but where its 
impact is to further entrench structures that require 
change. Left wing aid critics are correct to highlight 
these issues and to place them firmly on the agenda, but 
they are almost certainly wrong, in their insistence 
that aid in general should be withdrawn or withheld. 
Let us now try to draw some conclusions from the 
foregoing discussion. 
1) Aid is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition 
for development to occur. Even conventional pro-aid 
theory only asserts that it may help in accelerating the 
process. 
2) The case for aid at the theoretical level is far from 
clear-cut. There is no general basis for asserting that 
foreign aid will always and necessarily help to promote 
economic development in aid-recipient countries. 
Conventional aid theory basis its claim that aid is a 
positive force in development on certain specific 
assumptions, about efficiency in resource use and the 
presence of a supportive political environment. It 
assumes that recipient governments are growth- 
maximisers, that aid monies are always used productively 
and, at least implicitly, that the external economic 
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environment is benevolent. Some or even all of these 
assumptions are often open to question and no 
satisfactory cross-country statistical tests have been 
carried out to show conclusively that aid does 
contribute to development. That it is positively 
correlated to development when its use and purpose are 
to assist in adjustment policies would be even harder to 
prove. Aid's effect depends upon a range of factors, 
which may vary in different circumstances and over 
different time period. However, as the contrasting cases 
of Taiwan and Korea show, putting the influence of the 
donors aside, effective economic policies in the 
recipient countries must be counted among the major 
factors in determining success or failure. 
1.3. Changes in the World Market 
In looking at the international environment of the four 
East Asian NICs, the timing of changes in the world 
market cannot be ignored. After the end of World War II, 
developed capitalist countries expanded their trading 
and monetary relationships. This led to new patterns of 
interdependent specialisation, creating, in an important 
sense, a single world manufacturing system with 
production located in a number of countries. 
Once the buyers had stimulated the process, supply was 
reshaped. New companies learned skills and applied them 
to new commodities. A process that went far beyond its 
modest starting-point and could no longer be easily 
controlled, gripped many of the newly industrialising 
countries. 
The historical moment when this process seems to have 
begun - in the late fifties and early sixties - 
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coincided with the development of severe labour 
shortages in Western Europe. There, the labour markets 
were swiftly diverting workers from agriculture, 
attracting large numbers of women into paid employment 
and drawing in workers from abroad. Gender and 
nationality barriers weakened in the face of the scale 
of labour demand. The geographical reach of the European 
labour market widened. The more highly skilled the 
worker, the more extensive the geographical catchment 
area, to the point where the demand for highly skilled 
people came to encompass a global supply area. As 
Europe's demand extended, it met an equally strong 
demand from North America, with the United States also 
attracting workers from Europe. 
The drawing in of new sources of labour to labour- 
intensive sectors in the more developed countries - to 
agriculture, mining, sectors of manufacturing 
(particularly garments and assembly work), and domestic 
services, - appears as part of the same process as the 
search by buyers and manufacturers from the more 
developed countries for new sources of cheap products in 
less developed countries. Initially, this concerned 
cheap, labour-intensive goods among which garments, 
plastic goods, and footwear, were pre-eminent examples. 
Later, microprocessing and electronic goods were added, 
and as transport cost declined, heavier engineering 
commodities. 
This moment, at the end of the 'fifties and the 
beginning of the 'sixties, thus appears as the starting- 
point for a new phase in the perpetual process of the 
redistribution , of manufacturing 
capacity and the 
manufacturing labour force, sorting out a new network of 
specialisations. By the late 'sixties, due to growing 
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competition, new areas of technical ingenuity developed 
to marry skill-intensive processes in a number of more 
developed countries to labour-intensive ones in a number 
of less developed countries, organised by a growing 
supply of international managerial ability and 
experience. 
From this perspective, we can say that in a very real 
sense the four east Asian NIC's were 'created' by shifts 
in the world economy. With the exception of Hong Kong, 
policy and management were certainly vital in 
capitalising on this process, but without changes in the 
structure of the global system, their governments, on 
their own, could not have achieved the levels of growth 
they are now known for (Harris, 1983; 1986). 
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CHAPTER II. 
Confucianism and Economic Success 
CONFUCIANISM AND ECONOMIC SUCCESS 
One of the most exciting but least studied aspects of 
the East Asian success story concerns the role of 
cultural factors, and particularly Confucianism, in the 
process of capitalist development. True there have been 
some interesting and illuminating discussions on the 
subject, but thus far they have been couched in rather 
general, theoretical terms. 
In East Asia, for more than two thousand years, 
Confucianism has functioned as a philosophy for 
intellectuals, a political ideology for officials and 
policy makers, and the basis of a working morality for 
everyday life. Bearing this in mind, it would be unwise 
to reject altogether the proposition that the 
macroeconomic dynamism achieved by the collective 
efforts of the people in the region has something to do 
with cultural factors held in common. Core Confucian 
elements such as the strong work ethic, the emphasis on 
thrift and diligence, respect for educational 
achievement, avoidance of overt conflict in social 
relations, loyalty to hierarchy and authority, stress on 
order and harmony, all suggest themselves as possible 
influence on the dynamic economic activities practised 
by workers, farmers, entrepreneurs, public servants, and 
even policymakers (Hsiao, 1988). 
Confucianism is primarily concerned with behaviour and 
attitudes in the context of interactions within daily 
life. Although originally shaped and transmitted by a 
cultural elite it gained almost universal currency among 
ordinary people. It originated in China but gradually 
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became a manifestation of East Asian spirituality more 
generally. 
2.1. Confucianism in General 
Confucianism reached the peripheral countries at various 
stages of its development adapting to indigenous 
cultures as it went. Consequently, in common with other 
imported cultures and religions, it developed a variety 
of forms. However, although the specific contents have 
changed in the process of development, its basic 
concerns with authority, family, service to society, 
harmonious human relationship, education, and individual 
self-cultivation have remained remarkably stable. 
The essence of Confucianism is the belief in the Way, a 
great natural order which exists without conscious 
design. It serves as a model for human society, which 
can reach perfection only when it functions in 
accordance with an order characterised by harmony, 
balance and tranquillity. However, neither the natural 
nor the social order is conceived of as created by some 
divine power. Rather, the linkages between them place 
men and the world of men at the centre of Confucianism. 
The Confucian view of society is characterised by 
explicit social hierarchies. The underlying 
justification for social stratification comes from the 
assumption that the ideal society has a natural order 
and that men, endowed with different capacities by 
nature, have different positions within that order. Its 
hierarchical foundations are expressed in terms of three 
main bonds: father-son, husband-wife, and ruler-ruled. 
On this basis the structural core of society was built 
around the 'five cardinal relations'; relations between 
33 
Charter II Confucianism and Economic Success 
ruler and ruled; parents and children; husband and wife; 
brother and brother; and friend and friend (Li, 1996). 
2.2. Modern Confucianism 
In this section, we focus in more detail on four central- 
features of Confucianism which are particularly relevant 
to the east Asian NIC's recent history; the central role 
of family; the emphasis on education; and the consequent 
respect for meritocracy; and finally, the relations 
between citizens and strong states. 
The Role of the Family 
The most important institution in Confucian society is 
the family. Indeed, in a sense, the Confucian social 
system can be seen as a progressive extension of the 
family. Within this conception, the cardinal relations 
of society are determined by kinship. Therefore, the 
ideal relationship between the ruler and ruled can be 
portrayed as the one between father and sons. Inside the 
family, authority lies with the father and the elders, 
who are to be respected unconditionally. They are 
expected to know how best to take care of their 
offspring who, in return, on required to respect and 
obey them. 
The importance of family life can be seen across a range 
of areas of everyday life in all four East Asian NICS. 
In Korea, while the traditional ideal of the family is 
diminishing within the domestic sphere under the rapid 
Westernisation of culture, it is still projected onto 
other groupings based on common local origins, shared 
school experiences, or a workplace. People within such 
groups have a strong sense of shared identity and mutual 
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responsibility, which is not unlike the ties operating 
within the extended family. In a society where personal 
relationships take precedence over formal regulations, 
such groups are an essential source of sympathetic 
support in times of need. For example, 'old boy' 
networks formed among university and high-school alumni 
and even more importantly, among people who came from 
the same region, continue to be an important source of 
bounding in professional and social life. This will be 
explored more fully, with supporting evidence in later 
chapters. 
Businessmen participate in the market not as 
individuals, but as members of families. And the fact 
that the relations between employers and employees are 
based on the model of the family gives a distinctive 
character to business organisation which is not general 
in capitalist societies. Again this will be explored in 
detail in Chapter IV. 
The Emphasis on Education 
The Confucian belief in the perfectibility of man 
requires that people pursue knowledge in order to 
achieve the fullest measure of their potential. 
Confucians assume that people can achieve perfection 
through their own efforts, and particularly through 
education. Education is seen as a means to self- 
cultivation and self-realisation. The corollary of this 
is that the main task of education is the cultivation of 
moral character and the development of virtues, rather 
than the transmission of specialised skills. 
In the contemporary era, education has become even more 
valued and central. After the Korean civil war, the 
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country launched a remarkable educational drive. Almost 
three-quarters of the cost of building schools, paying 
teachers, buying books and organising transport was met 
by parents, not the government. Today, a Korean teenager 
is more likely to go to university than his/hers 
Japanese peer. Or to take an example from another Asian 
NIC; one in every four candidates for doctorates in 
electrical engineering at American universities is from 
Taiwan (The Economist: 19. November,, 16th, 1991) . The 
interesting thing is that these American-trained 
engineers are coming home - even though salaries in 
Taiwan are half those in America. Some undoubtedly hope 
it will be easier to start their own company in Taiwan. 
But within the Confucian world view, their return might 
also be understood as a way of putting their family's 
and nation's interest before their own. 
Meritocracy 
Confucius urged every learned moral person to strive for 
a governing position so that people could benefit from 
their knowledge and morality. In Korea and Taiwan, 
today, government service continues to be a prime goal 
for educated elites. Consequently, government can boast 
officials with higher degrees in a range of modern 
sciences. This has helped to create a 
'technobureaucratic elite' (Davis and Ward, 1990) that 
is relatively independent from both the military elites 
dominating the political regimes in power and from the 
rising capitalist class. As in the other Asian NICs, the 
ranks of technobureaucrats in Korea were expanded 
through the establishment of policy think tanks and 
economic planning units within the government, by 
bringing universities and academics into national 
planning projects, and by recruiting those receiving 
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technical training abroad into the state planning 
apparatus. 
In contrast, the cases of Singapore and Hong Kong are 
somewhat different from Taiwan and Korea. Li argues that 
this variation is rooted in the divergent composition of 
the population (Li, 1996). Historically, the Confucian 
system concentrated on developing intellectuals and the 
aristocracy. For the peasants, who comprised the 
majority of the population, traditional Confucian 
expectations were low. Since the Singaporean and Hong 
Kong Chinese are either ex-peasants or the descendants 
of ex-peasants, the emphasis on material values within 
the Chinese community is much more prominent. The growth 
of the capitalist system has further enhanced the role 
of money, and personal wealth has become an important 
measure of social esteem. In particular, in Hong Kong 
which under the British administration has restricted 
opportunities for political advancement, money making 
and a wealthy family life have become the principal 
goals of mobility. 
Relations with the Strong State 
It is also worth emphasising two other Confucian related 
features that are to some extent related with economic 
success - diligence and an attitude of self-cultivation 
(Berger, 1988). In all the East Asian NICs people work 
hard'. Thanks to the emphasis on education, they also 
1 See the difference between Asian NICs and European 
countries. 
City Working hrs-per year Paid holiday 
Seoul 2,302 
Hong Kona 2,222 
7.8 
12.1 
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have a pool of skilled and knowledgeable workers who can 
lead technology oriented industries in combination with 
technobureaucrats. In addition, the stress on family 
centred values emphasises harmony among members rather 
than conflicts. That is one of the main reasons that the 
theory of 'Corporatism' can not explain the unequal 
relation between the state and other social sectors in 
Korea. The strong sense of belonging to the group and 
the belief that personal interests should be 
subordinated to those of the collective means that 
employees in an East Asian enterprise are more likely to 
identify with the company, and to feel obligated to 
follow the rules set by management. On the other hand, 
the owner of the company is expected to take 
responsibility for ensuring that his/hers employees are 
well and happy. Their biographies often make a 
particular point of emphasising how hard they have 
worked to achieve worthwhile goals not only for their 
companies but also for the society and the nation (Tu et 
al, 1992: 77) . 
The next question to be asked is whether these cultural 
characteristics are-related to the relative autonomy of 
the state in East Asian NICS. There are several 
Confucian tenets which can be understood as producing 
Taipei 2,136 17.0 
Singapore 2,044 17.7 
Copenhagen 1,669 25.0 
Madrid 1,721 32.1 
Frankfurt 1,725 31.2 
London 1,880' 22.1 
Source: Union Bank of Switzerland cited from John 
M. Leger 1994. 
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the basis for relative autonomy or at least as providing 
the possibility of sustaining it. First of all, it is 
important to understand the philosophy governing the 
relations between ruler and ruled as proposed by 
Confucius. The Confucian ruler is seen as the co- 
ordinating link between nature and man, and the leader 
in man's effort to conform to the Way. Consequently, all 
power comes from one supreme ruler who is both the 
natural focal point of loyalty and the sole source of 
authority. 
The second factor relates to the acceptance of hierarchy 
in society. This is based on the hierarchical structure 
of the family. As explained earlier, this is expressed 
in terms of three main bonds: father-son, husband-wife, 
and ruler-ruled. However within the Confucian system, 
the asymmetry in these relations is seen as conforming 
to a natural order of things. Because all people are 
infinitely perfectible, no matter how different their 
social positions are, there is no necessary conflict of 
interests because they share the same goal - to conform 
to the harmonious order of nature. 
If we take these two factors, they do seem to be 
prerequisites for the excuse of relatively autonomous 
state authority. However, it is important to note that 
according to Confucius, rulership is conditional (Chan, 
1963). 'Heaven sees as the people see. Heaven hears as 
the people hear'. The ruler is required to be the most 
learned, the most virtuous, and the one who conforms 
most closely to the Way. Even though rulers have to deal 
with mundane policy issues, their main duty is to set an 
example which people will wish to emulate. This 
requirement is well summarised by Mencius: 
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"There is a way to gain the Empire. It is to gain the 
people --- There is a way to gain the people. Gain 
their sympathy. --- Share with them the accumulation of 
the things you wish for you, and do not practice what 
goes against them" (Mencius, Book 7). 
In the modern era, this principle means that the 
government must be able to portray itself as the 
guardian of public goods, and committed to the well 
being of the people. If those conditions are not 
fulfilled, the people are entitled to overthrow it. The 
strong resilience of this aspect of Confucianism is one 
reason why Korea, compared to other East Asian NICs, has 
experienced frequent political turmoil. 
However, the attribution of state power as derived from 
the mandate of Heaven is not distinctive to 
Confucianism. In the past, all Western monarchies were 
based on a similar concept of divine right which they 
deployed to justify their rule over the people. 
Therefore, it is perhaps naive to conclude that 
Confucianism is the sole or distinctive basis for state 
autonomy in the modern East Asian NICs. Moreover, no 
single government in the East Asian NICs conforms fully 
to Confucian philosophy. The closest is, arguably, 
Singapore which has deployed a selective variant of 
Confucianism as an official ideology. Under the 
leadership of Lee Kuan Yew, the Singaporean government 
has sustained a stable political environment and 
exercised strong state authority across a wide range of 
sectors from moral education to welfare policy. 
In contrast, in Korea and Hong Kong, Confucianism has 
not been mobilised as an official ideology, though in 
the case of Taiwan, Confucianism has penetrated everyday 
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life to a considerable extent with the government being 
very active in its promotion. 
Government officials in Taiwan, believe that their 
retention of Confucian tradition makes them the 'true' 
heirs of Chinese civilisation, and not the mainland 
regime who denounced Confucianism in adopting Communism. 
The birthdays of Confucius and other prominent 
Confucians are celebrated nation-wide. There are also 
many government supported organisations devoted to the 
study and propagation of Confucianism, and its moral 
teachings are incorporated into every part of the 
curriculum from kindergarten to middle school 
(Meyer, 1988) . 
The Singaporean government has been even more active in 
promoting Confucianism from the early 1980s. In 1982, it 
announced that Confucian ethics would be incorporated 
into the teaching of religious knowledge in secondary 
schools, in order to counter the penetration of Western 
attributes such as materialism, individualism and 
hedonism. In 1992, religious teaching was replaced by an 
expanded civics/moral education programme so as to lay 
greater emphasis on Confucian values and less on other 
religious systems. The ruling party, the PAP also 
intervenes in almost every aspect of people's life 
through a combination of regulations and campaigns on a 
scale hardly dreamt of by other countries' governments. 
These range from housing to family planning; from 
driving safety to courtesy; and from a clean environment 
to the length of a man's hair. More importantly, the 
government's initiatives face very little opposition. 
As this example illustrates, there are considerable 
differences in the extent and forms of adoption of 
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Confucianism among the four Asian NICs. Consequently, 
its influence varies in the different countries. Again, 
in the cases of Korea and Hong Kong, arguably, it can be 
concluded that the importance of Confucianism as 
everyday ideology is considerably weaker compared to 
Taiwan and Singapore. It is therefore difficult to 
assign it a major role in explaining the economic and 
political system. 
On the other hand, as mentioned in the introduction to 
this section, it would be foolish to argue that two 
thousand years of Confucian culture has had no impact on 
their recent economic success or on their political 
environments. However, it is clearly and equally unwise 
to argue, as some commentators have, that cultural 
factors are the primary causes of the regions' success 
(Husiao, 1988: 19) . The best way to deal with this 
issue 
is to understand cultural systems as one of several 
important factors which interact with other external and 
internal variables. Certainly the continuing influence 
of Confucianism can help to explain the pattern of state 
autonomy, but here again, it is important to note that 
other factors have also had an influence. 
2.3. Discussion 
Before closing this discussion, it is worthwhile to 
emphasise how, in the Korean case, Confucianism has been 
transmitted throughout the social order since it has not 
been mobilised as an 'official' ideology. Although it no 
longer dominates Korean political and social life as a 
prescriptive orthodoxy, it continues to covertly shape 
behaviour and social organisation. 
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When analysing the economic success of Korea, 
development economists continually stress the importance 
of the high levels of education and training of Korea's 
work force. This is a logical outcome of the deeply 
rooted Korean tradition that education is the principal 
avenue to social mobility. In this respect, traditional 
Confucianism values have supported Korean growth. In 
common with other Asian NICs, the focus on education and 
self-cultivation within the Confucian tradition as means 
for improving both the individual's and family's 
position in society, encouraged the expansion of mass 
education. In addition, the high valuation placed on 
hard work, diligence, and self-discipline also helped to 
shape a trainable, hard-driving industrial work force 
that for many years was willing to postpone financial 
rewards for security during the post-1960 boom. Thus it 
can be plausibly argued that general values and 
attitudes towards education have been a major Confucian 
influence on the character of the modern blue- and 
white-collar work force (Mason et al., 1980). 
Nor is industrial organisation free from the Confucian 
influence. The strong emphasis placed on positive 
relations between employers and employees is quite often 
compared to the central father-son relation. The core 
Confucian values of loyalty-to the family, trust among 
friends, acceptance of hierarchy and obedience to 
authority also resonate with the requirements of modern 
corporate life (Robinson, 1991). This is one reason why, 
in Korea, the theory of Corporatism finds it difficult 
to explain either industrial relations or the more 
general power dynamics among the'social sectors. 
The corporate ownership structure of most of the Korean 
conglomerates (chaebols) concentrated as it is on the 
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founders' family members also resonates strongly with 
Confucian values. As will be shown in detail in Chapter 
VII, a remarkable percentage of the leaving Chaebols are 
still under the control of founding families producing a 
particularly concentrated and stable power structure 
within the industrial sector. At the same time, this 
same characteristic is also widely blamed as a 
hinderance to the further development of firms. 
In the political sphere, Confucianism has long since 
disappeared as a formal state sponsored ideology, yet 
the basic terminology survives in corrupted forms in 
government propaganda and mobilisation campaigns. The 
traditional respect for Confucianism as a system of 
values integrated into political life has been destroyed 
by the unremitting hostility of modern intellectuals and 
nationalists, who have blamed Confucianism for Korea's 
political and economic woes in the twentieth century 
(Robinson, 1991). As a consequence, Confucianism 
occupies a contradictory position in contemporary 
politics. The modern Korean state is happy to mobilise 
Confucian values of loyalty and service, but it is 
reluctant to endorse the tradition itself because of the 
widespread argument that it has acted as an obstacle to 
economic development. Deciding whether or not the 
negative 'traditional' values singled out for blame, 
such as lack of independent spirit, indolence, lack of 
enterprise, encouraging a mentality of vassalage (Park 
Chung-Hee, cited from Robinson, 1991) are actually 
attributable to Confucianism is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. However, there is no doubt that this is a common 
popular perception which is also emphasised by the 
government. Indeed, the government has been largely 
successful in divorcing the modern nation-state from its 
Yi dynasty Confucian precursor. And at the same time, 
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they have exploited the Confucian values, such as 
loyalty and acceptance of hierarchy, selectively in 
order to strengthen and sustain state power. The 
'paternalistic' state operates through a range of 
institutions including; the centralise school system, 
indoctrination in the armed forces, and (as we shall see 
in more detail in Chapters 8 and 9) efforts to control 
the mass media's organisation of public information and 
knowledge. 
In conclusion, we can say that although overall the 
Confucian tradition has declined in importance with the 
advent of the twentieth century, it remains active at an 
everyday level within of a vastly changed Korean 
society. And undoubtedly this has played a part in 
sustaining support both for the state structure and its 
relative autonomy, and for the forms of economic 
organisation developed within the corporate sector. 
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THE ROLE OF THE STATE 
The Role Of the State 
In the previous chapters, we have concentrated on two 
principle points. First of all, we have drawn attention 
to the international context in order to delineate the 
relationships of the NICs to other major powers and to 
suggest how these relations have influenced their 
economic development. Secondly, the role of Confucianism 
has been examined placing due emphasis on the degrees of 
difference in its adoption and application among the 
four East Asian NICs. However, a close reading of 
remarks scattered through these analyses would conclude 
that the crucial element in making and maintaining the 
success of the NICs is the role played by the state. 
Before we move on to take a detail look at individual 
states and their role and function in the process of 
economic development, a general explanation will help in 
understanding those apparently coincidental, but in fact 
necessary movements that are common to the NICs as a 
group. 
In economic terms, the similarities can be summarised 
under two broad headings: situational and structural. 
Situational similarities include; the relative lack of 
natural resources; a plentiful labour force with a 
medium level of education; relatively competitive wage 
rates; and small domestic markets. As explained more 
fully in Chapter I, one further important situational 
factor influencing these countries has been their 
international relationships. Both Korea and Taiwan have 
enjoyed strategic support from the American government, 
because they were seen as Marginot lines protecting 
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capitalism from communist attack. Singapore was a 
British colony until it became independent in 1955. Hong 
Kong is due to return to Chinese rule in 1997. When 
foreign powers withdrew from other, all three countries 
they needed to develop strategies for survival and 
growth. The principal solution decided upon was 'Export- 
Oriented Industrialisation'. 
3.1. 'Export-Oriented Industrialisation' 
Through a combination of external and internal factors, 
'Export-Oriented Industrialisation' presented itself as 
the best, indeed the only viable choice. As a matter of 
fact, the whole initial economic development of these 
countries is based on export oriented manufacturing 
industries. According to one report, by 1987, in Korea 
and Taiwan, roughly 50% of GDP was dependent on exports, 
while the figure for Singapore was even higher (UNCTAD, 
1987)1. In the first period of growth, their industrial 
expansion concentrated on labour-intensive manufacturing 
1 While Korean and Taiwanese development really only 
gathered speed during the process of industrialisation, 
Hong Kong and Singapore developed much earlier as a 
result of their positions as important centres of 
entrepot trade within the British empire. For example, 
Between 1871 and 1902, Singapore's trade grew six-fold, 
from an annual average of s$67 million to s$ 431 
million. Hence they already had a high export - GDP 
ratio at the beginning of the period and the 
importation of inputs for processing to export even 
raised the ratio above 100%. Even so, they did increase 
their exported output, though to a lesser extent. 
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industries. After the oil shock in the early 70s, and 
the subsequent world recession, they switched to heavy- 
chemical and high-tech industries. One important thing 
to be considered here is their rapid reactions to 
international economic crisis and situational changes. 
In the initial period, export-oriented policies were 
introduced as a way to survive and respond to immediate 
crisis and short-term dilemmas rather than as part of 
comprehensive schemes for change. Only later, did these 
decisions become established as de facto long-term 
development strategies. However, this incremental and 
pragmatic stance has played a critical role in the 
economic success of these countries since it has allowed 
them to be much more flexible in responding to changes 
in the world economy. 
3.2. Structural Similarities 
Even though all these countries experienced 'late 
industrialisation' (Alice Amsden, 1993) which made it 
easier for them to catch already developed countries up 
by borrowing, adapting, and improving upon foreign 
designs, without strong states, the remarkable degree of 
development would not have been possible. The state has 
provided the key political and economic conditions 
necessary for economic success (Stephan Haggard, 1990). 
All three governments (Korean, Singapore and to a lesser 
extent, Taiwan) have imposed powerful constraints on 
labour movements and deployed a range of means designed 
to influence enterprises (Frederic Deyo, 1989). In fact, 
the states in all three countries have been the pivots 
of economic performance, through their command of 
economic planning, their high levels of public 
investment (Robert Wade, 1990), and their actual 
ownership of significant industries. Their exceptional 
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degree of freedom of action in pursuing these 
interventions was due both to their origins and to their 
particular characteristics. In neither Taiwan and Korea 
did government have strong liaisons with traditionally 
dominant groups. In the Taiwanese case this was because, 
it was transplanted from mainland China, and in the 
Korean case, because it came to power by a military 
coup. In Singapore, Lee Kuan-Yew emerged from the anti 
colonial struggles, and had the absolute support of the 
Singaporean people. Through land reformation, the 
landlord class was decimated. 
These special factors meant that all three governments 
enjoyed a high degree of autonomy in executing policies 
and guiding economic development. This in turn, provided 
a basis for the legitimacy of the regime. However, in 
pursuit of rapid economic development, the political 
power and organisational resources of key social groups 
were not given a chance to grow, and labour movements 
were strongly controlled and repressed. 
In the next section, we will explore how the states in 
Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong acted in the particular 
situation imposed on them by their international and 
domestic contexts. These accounts will further help to 
identify the communalities and the peculiarities of the 
Korean case, which is the central focus of this thesis. 
3.3. TAIWAN 
In the Taiwanese case, the land reform programme created 
many small land-owning families while the previous 
landlords turned to small business enterprise with the 
help of government compensation. In addition, the state 
itself took over most of the strategic sectors inherited 
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from Japanese colonisation. These included petroleum, 
steel, railways, power stations, shipbuilding and 
telecommunication. These operated on a large scale and 
were major suppliers of energy, raw materials and 
intermediate products. Therefore, all private industries 
were heavily reliant on state owned sectors (Pang, 
1992). At the same time, owing to the traditional value 
placed on the family, small-scale enterprises which 
operated as extensions of family business, become the 
most characteristic feature of Taiwan's economy. In 
1986, enterprises with fewer than ten workers made up 
nearly 70% of all businesses (Long, 1991). Small firms 
are more adaptable to changing international economic 
conditions and in relation to control, since they have 
only limited bargaining power in economic policy making, 
they are more manageable. Moreover, the plethora of 
small business in Taiwan played a significant role in 
reducing income inequality (Kuan Li, 1996). 
The process of economic policy making was a 
technocratically dominated project. Technocrats treated 
economic activities as scientific experiments which 
could be continually adjusted and fine-tuned. With this 
attitude, there was less possibility that they would 
abuse their power and favour privileged groups. 
Preferential interest rates were set in order to 
generate high volumes of private savings and money was 
lent-to local businessmen, together with tax incentives, 
cheap raw materials, administrative assistance. The 
state also controlled the banking system through the 
state-owned Central Bank of China. This ensured that it 
was able to maintain a dominant position within the 
financial sector. 
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Moreover, a specialised non-profit making organisation 
was created by the government to conduct R&D and to 
assist in its dissemination to the private sector. 
Multinational companies were induced by government 
policies, to invest and establish large manufacturing 
plants. 
3.4. SINGAPORE 
Instead of pursuing protectionism, Singapore chose to 
open itself to multinational capital and attempt to 
obtain the maximum benefits. However, due to an active 
labour movement in the early days, the government could 
not attract as many as foreign investors as it wished. 
It responded in two ways. Firstly, it invested money in 
housing and the other public services. One report shows 
that by 1988,86% of the population lived in government 
flats, more than two-thirds of which were owner occupied 
(M. Castells, L. Goh, & R. Y-W. Kwok, 1990). The public 
housing programme played an important role in 
encouraging positive social values and in internalising 
social control. At the same time, additional financial 
incentives were offered to foreign firms, on the top of 
existing favours such as, very low tariffs on imports 
and exports, free capital flow, unrestricted 
repatriation of profits and investment, and unlimited 
foreign equity participation. Records for 1990 show that 
71% of domestic exports were produced by multinationals. 
However, this high degree of dependency on multinational 
corporations and the resulting lopsidedness of the 
manufacturing sector means that Singapore is still very 
vulnerable to external influences and pressures, despite 
its recent efforts to diversify and upgrade. 
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As in the other NICs, the direct engagement of the state 
also plays an important role. State-owned companies, 
semi-state companies, and joint ventures with both 
foreign and domestic corporations, own a large number of 
key enterprises in banking, transportation, 
communications, trading, shipbuilding, steel production, 
other manufacturing sectors. 'The state-owned 
enterprises had a total capital of S$4.75 bn in 1985, 
while total paid-up capital of all Singapore-quoted 
stocks at the time was roughly S$10-llbn' (FEER, 8 
January 1987). In addition, government guidelines kept 
the average wage in manufacturing at the lowest of any 
occupational group. 
However, recognising the possible vulnerability of the 
economy, the government has recently made a special 
effort to re-locate or to diversify business centres. It 
is urging both public and private sectors to 'go 
abroad', in search of alternative markets and niches. 
Since 1985 it has been allocating resources to help 
establish Singapore's 'second wing', a strategy which 
gained further momentum in 1993 as multinational 
companies began to relocate their business elsewhere 
(Elkan, 1995) . 
As we noted in the previous chapter, the government has 
also attempted to inculcate particular values and 
patterns of behaviour through a combination of 
punishments, rewards and moral lessons in conjunction 
with the promotion of Confucianism. Some government 
campaigns, such as the campaign to promote team sprit 
for higher productivity, have been directly related to 
the economy. 
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3.5. HONG KONG 
The Role Of the State 
Hong Kong is an exceptional case. Among the newly 
industrialising countries, it is a long established 
monument to the virtues of laissez faire in a being 
free-trade area with a relatively unlimited supply of 
cheap labour and cadres, the exiled Shanghai textile 
capitalists and their skilled workers, but without a 
domestic market large enough to absorb the potential 
output. The tiny open economy could be worked upon 
freely by external demand without official intervention. 
The needs of the world market, and of the merchants and 
entrepreneurs of Hong Kong coincided. 
Unlike Singapore, the major player in Hong Kong's 
export-led industrialisation has been local firms. In 
the early 1980s around 90% of manufacturing exports were 
originated by local companies. The emphasis has been on 
small-scale operation. In 1980, over 90% of enterprises 
employed fewer than 50 workers. This feature is more 
important than in Taiwan because the industrial 
structure of Hong Kong is almost exclusively 
concentrated on light industry, which does not depend 
too much on economies of scale. 
The interesting point about the Hong Kong government was 
not only that it subsidised housing, health services and 
education, but that it also regulated the prices of 
transport, rice, and utilities, and imported foodstuffs 
and raw materials from China at a negotiated low price. 
This was possible because of the important role played 
by the cheap basic supplies provided by China. With only 
2% of the economically active population working in 
agriculture, Hong Kong's food supplies depend on 
imports. Low and stable prices help the economic process 
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in two ways; they lower production costs, especially 
labour costs, and they create a stable business 
environment. 
From the early 1980s, the government started to take a 
more active role in providing the conditions for renewed 
competitiveness for manufacturing industry and 
supporting its development. Government facilities were 
expanded to provide information and services to 
manufacturers, in order to help them upgrade their 
production processes and increase productivity. Special 
attention was given to manpower training and R&D 
development. The government set up a number of 
industrial R&D centres and a new University of Science 
and Technology was created. 
One more thing which needs to be mentioned is that from 
the 1970s onwards, Hong Kong has gradually transformed 
itself into a major international financial centre. 
Today it is the fourth largest in the world, after New 
York, London, and Tokyo. There are now more than 400 
financial institutions, including 75 international 
banks. It has the advantages of location, total 
flexibility, and the rapid economic development of the 
East Asian region which demands an international 
financial centre in this time zone. 
3.6. A Change of Direction 
The decisive role played by the state in the economic 
development of the newly industrialising countries is in 
no way peculiar. On the contrary, it appears to be "the 
norm" in developing countries (Harris, 1986: 160). In the 
cases of South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, strategies 
of development were strongly related to military 
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concerns. Indeed, the exceptionally energetic 
intervention of the state in these three cases partly 
reflects the desperate struggle for survival in a 
militarily unfavourable environment. In this context, 
despite the staggering burden of arms spending, the 
incentives to industrialise were perhaps even greater. 
However, at the end of 'seventies, the climate of 
opinion changed. The public sector came to be seen less 
and less as the basic instrument for national 
industrialisation, and the volume of criticism directed 
at nationalised industries reached unprecedented levels. 
The shift towards privatisation was central to the 
process of relinquishing the previous goal of national 
economic development. That aim had created large public 
sectors as the prime instrument of growth. But if 
development now meant the growth of the global system, 
with different countries playing specialised roles 
within it, a redefinition of the role of the state was 
required. Nationalised industries were either not needed 
or, if they remained, they had to operate in all 
essential respects as if they were private companies, 
competing on a world market. 
Thus rapid economic development produced a paradox. The 
more successful the governments of the newly 
industrialising countries were in pursuing growth, the 
more powerful private capital became at home and the 
more closely they were integrated with external markets 
and world capital, and the more the power of the 
government to shape the domestic economy declined or, 
more accurately, the more governmental power, in order 
to be effective, had to follow the trend of the market. 
This is particularly true in the case of Korea which has 
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had a much more concentrated private sector than any of 
the other Asian NICs. The story of the chaebols is in 
many respects the story of Frankenstein, of a monster, 
originally created as a servant who came to challenge 
his creator and to pursue his own projects. 
The weaker the private sector was, the less important it 
was to the world system, and other things being equal, 
the greater the continuing power of the government to 
shape the domestic economy (but equally, the more 
pressing the problems of external constraints and dearth 
of resources). The changes in both more developed and 
newly industrial-ising countries thus promised the 
continuing erosion of the foundations of the economic 
power of the states concerned. Privatisation - and its 
theoretical underpinnings in neo-classical economics - 
was the ideological and practical recognition of this 
emerging new world order. 
This did not entail a simple decline of the state, but 
rather a redefinition of its role. Governments remained 
fundamental to the system. They supervised the 
territories and inhabitants of the world; provided the 
necessary conditions of production in terms of 
infrastructure; guaranteed the stability of exchanges - 
and therefore, of the forms of value without which the 
system had no stability - and of rights to property and 
management. Their police and armies secured the order 
and safety of economic participants. They ensured the 
quality, physical, educational, emotional and 
psychological, of the labour force. Without these 
interventions there could be no capital accumulation or 
profit making. In his book titled The End of the Third 
World, Nigel Harris summarises this as follows; 
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If capitalism seemed to be 'the offspring of the 
state' in the early phases of national 
accumulation, in the great broad ocean of the world 
system the world's states were clearly the 
offspring of world capital, heterogeneous though 
that entity might be. And that was true even for 
the giant state that dominated the world political 
order, those of the more developed countries 
(Harris, 1986: 169). 
In the next chapter we explore theoretical debates about 
the role of the state and the components that underpin 
its autonomy in more detail, and look at how it has 
responded to shifting international and national 
dynamics. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
STATE, CAPITAL AND THE ASIAN NICs: THEORETICAL 
DEBATES 
Two main paradigms have dominated theorising on the 
economic development of the NICs: the neo-classical view 
and the dependency perspective. Both suffer from the 
weakness that they tend to neglect both the NICs' own 
internal political dynamics and the role of 
international factors. 'Political scientist have turned 
neo-classical tools to the modelling of politics and 
institutions, but this work remains confined largely to 
the study of the United States, where its pluralist 
political assumptions are plausible' (Haggard, 1990: 9). 
At the same time, the weakness of dependency theory work 
on the NICs stems from its tendency to focus on the 
international and class-structural determinants of 
policy. In this chapter, I will explore these two 
perspectives further and attempt to ascertain which best 
fits the Asian NICs and, in particular, the South Korean 
case. 
4.1. The NICs and the neo-classical revival 
This theory, rests on an unconditional belief in the 
beneficial characteristics of the market, rooted in the 
theory of perfect competition and central theorems of 
welfare economics and equilibrium analysis. Economic 
policies hilighting the operation of free markets are 
based either explicitly or implicitly on what is termed 
general equilibrium theory, the most complete model of 
the free-market economy. General equilibrium analysis is 
concerned with the interaction of a large number of 
economic agents, individuals, and firms, connected 
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together by various interlinked markets in a co- 
ordination mechanism through the price system. 
The equilibrium price in one market is the one which 
clears the market, that is, where all demand is 
satisfied and all goods exchanged. Furthermore, if, for 
some reason, demand for a particular product increases, 
the price for this product will increase, resulting in 
producers supplying more. The price mechanism will thus 
have smoothly transformed an increased desire for a 
product into an increased output. At this stage 
equilibrium in that particular market will have been 
restored through a supply response brought about by a 
price change initiated by a change in demand (Riddell, 
1987). And according to this logic, the expansion of the 
market to a global level does not alter the basic 
principle. 
The problem with this is that contemporary liberals, 
like their 19th century precursors, tend to ignore the 
political dimension of the international economy. The 
fact that asymmetric economic interdependence can 
generate or maintain unique power relations between 
countries does not concern them. They reject the 
proposition that trade and investment relations between 
developed and the developing countries are inimical to 
development. Instead, they assert that they will 
encourage upward mobility. We can see this argument at 
work in Bela Balassa's explanation of his "stages" 
approach: 
[Japan's] comparative advantage has shifted toward 
highly capital intensive exports. In turn, 
developing countries with a relatively high human 
capital endowment, such as Korea and Taiwan, can 
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take Japan's place in exporting relatively human 
capital-intensive products and countries with 
relatively high physical capital endowment, such as 
Brazil and Mexico, can take Japan's place in 
exporting relatively physical capital-intensive 
products. Finally, countries at lower levels of 
development can supplant the middle level countries 
in exporting unskilled labour-intensive commodities 
(Bela Balassa, 1977: 27) 
The deficiencies of the neo-classical approach, based on 
international trade and outward-oriented economic 
policies, become even more evident when its proponents 
have turned their attention to the East Asian NICs. They 
assume that the key to the economic success of these 
countries are the policies which have actively promoted 
production for export and the fact that these products 
are sold in the international market without 
discrimination between the domestic and foreign goods. 
In addition, as we can see from the quote above, free 
international trade is understood as a positive 
encouragement to competition, efficiency and technology 
transfer (see also Krueger, 1984; Linder, 1986; Little, 
1981). 
Neo-classical economists consider the adoption of an 
export-oriented policy by the East Asian countries as 
the product of rational economic calculations that 
conform to the requirements of markets. For them, it is 
'the free market environment that provides the necessary 
mechanism to gear the economies towards their optimal 
points on the production possibilities frontier' 
(Chen, 1979: 185). 
60 
Chapter IV State, Capital and the Asian NICs 
Interestingly, some neo-liberal scholars do acknowledge 
the role of the government in the economic development 
process but view state intervention as a positive 
support for rational policies which have already been 
decided by the free international market and its price 
system. In addition, they concede that the state can 
provide the structural conditions necessary for economic 
growth. These include building infrastructures; 
correcting proven market failure through subsidies and 
incentives; promoting science and technology in 
industry; and providing a stable and predictable 
macroeconomic environment through the appropriate co- 
ordination of fiscal, monetary and exchange rate 
policies. The important point is that the state is seen 
as intervening to 'get prices right', where 'right' 
means that domestic prices are in the line with 
international prices, thereby facilitating economic 
activity without distorting the market. 
Although the neo-classical economic construction of the 
East Asian NICs' development prevailed up to the early 
1980s, by the end of the decade the accumulation of 
evidence contradicting this perspective was 
overwhelming. The new view was that in these countries, 
states were not simply moderately involved, but that on 
the contrary they were extreme cases of state 
intervention and manipulation of the economy and society 
alike. 
Two main points should be reasserted at this stage. 
Firstly, the naivety of neo-classical economists 
prevented them from seeing the inequality between the 
developed countries and developing countries and its 
intimate links to the political structure of 
international trade. As we noted in the previous 
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chapter, in the context of Cold War politics and foreign 
aid, world trade cannot be reduced to disinterested 
market transactions. Secondly, the neo-classical view 
cannot explain why the East NICs governments chose 
export-oriented policies or how they executed them in 
practice or how they adapted them to their own 
circumstances. This weakness leads us to take a fuller 
look at the perspective which emphasises the role of the 
state in East Asian NICs. 
4.2. Dependent Development 
Before we move on to the 'statist' theorists' arguments 
however, it is important to build a bridge to 
'Dependency Theory'. This has already been touched on in 
a previous chapter in the context of our discussion of 
foreign aid. However, to present our general argument in 
a more balanced way, it is necessary to revisit it. 
Dependency theorists argue that the underdevelopment of 
Third World countries results from their structural 
position in the world capitalist system (Cardoso and 
Faletto, 1979; Frank, 1967). Developed countries operating 
within the core of the system use their control over 
capital and technology to regulate the economic growth 
of underdeveloped countries on the periphery. However, 
the cases of Brazil and the East Asian NICs which are 
now becoming developed have generated the notion of 
'dependent development'. 
This notion is based on two theoretical assumptions. 
Firstly, dependent development theorists understand the 
international economy as a hierarchically ordered system 
of dominance. As with a stratified social system, 
various mechanisms, both political and economic, exist 
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through which inequality is reproduced. Secondly, the 
character of the periphery's development is seen as 
largely a function of the way in which it was 
incorporated into the international division of labour. 
This 'postulate of external dominance' holds that 
external factors are responsible for the distortions 
that characterise the economies of the developing world 
(Haggard, 1990). 
Dependency thinking was recast to account for peripheral 
industrialisation, particularly in the large South 
American NICs where direct foreign investment by 
multinational companies has played an important part in 
the economy. Peter Evans (1978), for example, saw state 
elites, foreign firms and local firms as forming a 
"triple alliance". However, the power of the 
multinationals within this triangle is still seen as 
dominant. Local firms cannot compete on equal terms 
because multinational companies have structural 
advantages, including financial power, technology, 
accumulated marketing capabilities and managerial 
skills, and, economies of scale. Their dominant position 
within the economy allows them to play an important role 
in policy making. 
The economic problems attributed to dependency on 
foreign firms are numerous: the introduction of 
inappropriate products, patterns of consumption, 
technologies, and production processes; industrial 
concentration; the displacement of local producers; 
undesirable trade behaviour; transfer pricing 
(Newfarmer, 1978) . 
However, the weaknesses of dependent development 
theorists rooted in the experience of the South American 
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NICs become increasingly evident when they try to expand 
their analysis to cover other situations. First of all, 
in many cases, many of the problems they attribute to 
multinational companies' structural advantages can, as a 
matter of fact, be understood as the product of domestic 
political choices within each country. For example, the 
biggest problem Korea is now facing in economic 
development is the lack of accumulated high technology. 
The state can be blamed for this since in the effort to 
achieve rapid economic development, the regime 
encouraged the importation and copying of foreign 
advanced technology instead of devoting long-term 
investment to domestic research and development. At the 
same time, the major corporate actors, the chaebols, 
were no different from the regime. They too pursued the 
same strategy. 
Secondly, in the East Asian NICs, by the 1970s 
commercial borrowing far overshadowed foreign direct 
investment as a source of capital (even in the 
Singaporean case) In the Korean case particularly, 
direct foreign investment was very modest until 
recently. Between 1959 and 1985, the rate of direct 
foreign investment averaged only 8% compared to 44.8% 
for public loans and 47.2% for commercial loans'. One 
more factor to emphasise here is that the relationship 
between the US. and Korea is much more geopolitic rather 
economic. Thus, the assumption which dependent 
development theorists tried to derive is a case of 
putting the tail before the head. 
1 See Table. VI. 2.5. 'Changes in the Composition of 
Foreign Capital, 1959-1985' for more detailed 
explanation. 
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The final point of criticism concerns their disinterest 
in domestic politics and in the wide variation in state 
responses to similar situations of dependency 
(Haggard, 1990). Like neo-classical theorists, they 
cannot explain why under generally shared circumstances, 
each individual country has chosen a certain policy, how 
the degree of dependency differs from one country to 
another, and how it affects economic policy making. 'The 
international environment should be seen not as a 
rigidly determinate structure but rather as a set of 
shifting constraints within which states can learn and 
expand their range of manoeuvre' (Haggard, 1990: 22). 
4.3. The 'Developmental State': A New Way of 
Thinking 
There is a huge support by now for the position that 
emphasises the strong state's central role in the 
development of the Asian NICs (Amsden, 1989; Bello and 
Rosenfeld, 1990; Castells et al, 1990; Deyo, 1989; 
Haggard, 1988 & 1990; Wade, 1993; woo, 1991). Given the 
impressive economic performance of the Asian NICS in 
terms of rising per capita rates of GDP, the neo- 
classical economic expectation that such strongly 
interventionist states would find themselves overseeing 
inefficient, non-competitive economies is 
comprehensively contradicted by experience. Their 
regimes not only helped to generate the highest 
sustained rates of economic growth in modern world 
history, but, at least in the case of Korea and Taiwan, 
did so against rising internal pressures (Wade, 1993). In 
doing so, their interventions also cast doubt on earlier 
Marxian theories that the state has no autonomy from 
capital (Miliband, 1977) and, in the case of 'peripheral' 
social formations, is essentially dependent on a world 
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system dominated by transnational capital and core 
metropolitan states. Their successes thus called for new 
thinking about the state on both the right and the left 
(Douglass, 1994). 
One outcome of this renewed thinking has been the 
discovery of the 'developmental state'. The starting 
point for this notion is the recognition that these 
states are very different from other Third world states. 
First of all, they enjoy the high degree of autonomy 
necessary for the exercise of a positive role in 
economic development. Further, this autonomy is derived 
from historical features and conditions common to all 
the Asian NICs, but rare elsewhere. Secondly, these 
states have effectively used their autonomy to 
orchestrate the economic growth process and have been 
able to avoid the debilitating rent-seeking and other 
nondevelopmental state-economy relations typically found 
in other developing countries (Douglass, 1994: 545). 
In order to provide a more academically secure 
underpinning for the theory of the developmental state 
however, we need to explain the sources of state 
autonomy and the factors which -influence its 
maintenance. 
4.3.1. State Autonomy 
The question of autonomy lies at the centre of most 
theories of the state. Although there is by no means a 
consensus on this question, particularly with regard to 
the conceptualisation of the political driving forces 
surrounding the state. A wide band of theory posits that 
the state enjoys relative autonomy from class and other 
social relations. Here, we can usefully start by 
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exploring the traditional Marxian view of state autonomy 
and how it moved towards a new way of thinking. 
4.3.1.1. Traditional Conceptions of State 
Autonomy 
The relative autonomy of the state was mainly 
acknowledged by Marx and Engels in connection with forms 
of state where executive power dominated all other 
elements of the state system, as for instance, in the 
Absolute Bonapartist, and Bismarckian states. According 
to their writings, this relative autonomy consists of 
the degrees of freedom which the state has in 
determining how best to serve what those who hold power 
conceive to be the 'national interest', but which in 
fact involves underwriting the interests of the ruling 
class. These degrees of freedom are in direct relation 
to the freedom which executive power and the state in 
general enjoy vis-a-vis institutions (eg. parliamentary 
assemblies) and pressure groups which present or speak 
for either the dominant or subordinate classes. In this 
sense, the relative autonomy of the state is greatest in 
regimes where executive power is least constrained, 
either by other elements within the state system, or by 
various forces in civil society (Miliband, 1977: 77-80). 
Poulantzas, who is better aware of this specific 
characteristic of the state than anyone else, derives 
his notion from an analysis of the function of the state 
in relation to the capitalist mode of production. In 
Political Power and Social Classes (1973) (henceforth, 
PPSC), he argues as follows; 
"The place of the state in the unity, in so far as, it 
assigns specifying and constitutive limits to its 
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regional structure, depends precisely on the forms 
which this function of the state takes on. ... This 
function of the state, becomes a specific function, 
specifies the state as such in the formations 
dominated by the CMP (capitalist mode of production], 
characterised by the specific autonomy of instances 
and by the particular place which is there allotted to 
the region of the state. This characteristic autonomy 
is the basis of the specificity of the political; it 
determines the particular function of the state as 
cohesive factor of the levels which have gained 
autonomy" (PPSC, 1973: 46-7). 
In this conception, the state is understood to be a 
force which maintains or alters the balance of class 
forces. The state must represent itself as a national- 
popular ensemble,, even though, in the final instance it 
is determined by the economic level, revealing its 
identity as a class state. The state can act and 
exercise its power separately from direct influence on 
the economic region. Poulantzas asserts that the state's 
separation from the economic region and its national- 
popular character permits it to make concessions to the 
economic interests of subordinate classes. Indeed, as 
long as they do not threaten the overall reproduction of 
capitalist society, these concessions may even 
contradict the short-term economic interests of the 
dominant classes. 'For the capitalist state does not 
directly represent the economic interests of the 
dominant classes but their political interest' 
(PPSC: 190). Thus economic concessions which further the 
immediate interests of the dominated classes can 
simultaneously advance the political interests of the 
dominant classes. This can occur because the forms in 
which the dominated classes struggle for concessions 
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contribute significantly to their political 
disorganisation. Moreover, to the extent that such 
concessions are won in the face of resistance from the 
dominant classes, this confirms the state's claim to 
represent the general interest (PPSC: 191-3). The state 
may present itself as the political guarantor of the 
interests of various classes and factions of the power 
bloc against the interests of the hegemonic class or its 
factions and it may sometimes play one against the 
other. But it does this in its function as a political 
organiser of the hegemonic class or faction. As a 
general rule, it is precisely that hegemonic class or 
faction whose political organisation is constituted by 
the state. 
However, this formation still leaves questions to be 
answered about the degree of the state's relativity and 
how it can be sustained. 
Even when it discusses the most extreme case of state 
autonomy, the Fascist state, its conclusions remain more 
or less the same as the instrumentalists. It claims 
that, fundamentally, fascist regimes serve monopoly 
capital. In the economic field, this becomes evident in 
the development of the war economy and in the massive 
extension of capitalist relations of production into the 
countryside under the dominance of big capital. These 
changes are associated with shifts in the form and 
content of the state's economic intervention (Jessop, 
1985). 
Nevertheless, it is very difficult for this theory to be 
criticised as a circular argument, as long as it accepts 
the importance of the last stage in determination. 
Therefore, the notion of relative autonomy may be useful 
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to describe the concrete process by which the state 
actually exercises its power, rather than as a frame of 
analysis for the whole ensemble of the state itself. 
This theory is not brave enough to oppose Marxism 
outright, and at the same time, it cannot successfully 
release Marxism from economic reductionism. 
4.3.1.2. An Alternative Approach 
As we have noted earlier, in the case of. the Asian NICs, 
the proposition put forward by a number of analysis is 
that the state has enjoyed an exceptional degree of 
autonomy from all sectors of society. In order to 
discover how this was possible we can start from the 
sources of autonomy which are common to all of the Asian 
NICs. According to Douglass (1994) who has placed this 
concern at the centre of recent NICs study, four factors 
can be identified. I want to add a fifth important 
factor. 
The first is the absence of the powerful rural-based 
landed interests that have been identified as obstacles 
to export-oriented strategies in the industrialising 
countries of Latin America. During the colonial period, 
most of the traditional feudal class already experienced 
an erosion of their power under the colonial government. 
After liberation, the first action of the new regime in 
power was the land reform. As will be explained at 
length in the following chapters, in the Korean and 
Taiwan cases, the new regimes started from a so called 
'power vacuum' situation since the Taiwanese government 
was transplanted from-mainland China and the Korean 
regime came to power through a military coup. This 
disconnection from traditional power groups made it much 
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easier for both regimes to execute their own policies 
without seeking extended negotiation. 
A second factor is that, at least in the initial period 
of industrial expansion, the capitalist class was small, 
weak, and easily leveraged by the state. In the case of 
Singapore, government has deliberately restricted 
indigenous capitalist enterprises to the present day. In 
doing so, they believe they can attract more foreign 
enterprises to invest to Singapore. In Hong Kong and 
Taiwan, partially because of the Chinese valuation of 
the family unit and partially because it is easier to 
cope with rapid changes, they have concentrated on small 
size companies, most of them family based and run. In 
Korea, as will be explained at length in the coming 
chapters, in the early 1960s, the state created giant 
businesses, called 'chaebols', supporting them with 
foreign loans and other favourable policies. In sum, in 
the early phase of industrialisation social forces 
opposed to urban-industrial development linked to the 
world economy were either nonexistent, eliminated, or 
relatively easily controlled. 
A third source of state autonomy is the regimes' claim 
to a 'special historical mission' and its deployment to 
justify concentrations of power and nondemocratic 
practices. Most of the East Asian states have portrayed 
themselves as bulwarks against communism. This is 
particularly so in the cases of Taiwan and Korea. This 
highly resonant ideology allows them to intervene to 
repress demands from labour, to restrict political 
activities and to justify their authoritarian attitude. 
As a consequence, more that in most developing 
countries, the state was able to present capitalist 
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development as a 'mission', part of a historical 
struggle against communist totalitarianism and thereby 
to reinforce its own autonomy of action. This had a 
cumulative effect. The more these states were successful 
in delivering high standards of material welfare, the 
more they were able to argue against widening access to 
decision making and to use their control of police power 
to suppress any and all forms of anti regime activity 
(Douglass, 1994: 546-7). 
A fourth factor supporting strong state autonomy is 
rooted in the common cultural system which the Asian 
NICs have shared for centuries, namely the shared 
inheritance of neo-Confucianism (O'Malley, 1988; Li, 
1996) . As argued earlier, the main 
features of this 
tradition include meritocracy within the state elites, a 
high valuation of education, strong vertical and group 
loyalties and the central importance of patriarchy which 
places leaders (either political or of the companies) in 
the role of the father. Termed 'post-Confucian' by Moody 
(1988), the culture common to the contemporary Asian 
NICs is seen as a code of ethics to guide behaviour that 
is institutionalised, in part, in a centralised 
bureaucracy which is essentially authoritarian in nature 
and is allowed to formulate policy goals independently 
of particular groups. 
The fifth and final source of relative autonomy stems 
from the US government's strong and continued support 
for the Taiwanese and Korean regimes. As explained 
previously, because both countries have occupied a very 
important geopolitical position, the US has made 
consistent efforts to maintain the status quo within 
these countries and to police their separation from 
their communist counterparts. It is a delicate matter to 
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draw the line between being dependent on a foreign power 
and using it as a power source. However, in the Korean 
case, US. support was crucial at the early stage of the 
military regime when it did not have widespread popular 
support. By the same token, foreign aid made it possible 
for the regimes to consolidate their power and to 
execute economic policy effectively. Even though there 
are strong arguments about the negative effects of 
foreign aid, in the absence of domestic capital, it 
played a key role in providing the resources that 
allowed these governments to start the process of 
industrialisation. Again, in the Korean case, as we 
noted earlier, instead of relying on direct investment 
by multinational companies, money to finance the push to 
growth was mostly borrowed by the government. This 
allowed them to allocate it in ways that they 
determined. However, it is clear that in addition to the 
nationalisation of the banks, the availability of 
foreign capital was a central resource which allowed the 
government to operate with relative autonomy in the 
economic sphere. 
4.3.2. The State's Relations with other Sectors 
Having outlined the main sources of state autonomy, we 
turn now to an exploration of how it operated in 
practice. State autonomy is not static. It is enmeshed 
in an endlessly dynamic relation with other social 
sectors. If we argue that autonomy is 'relative', we are 
accepting that the character of its relation with other 
social sectors will decide the degree of this 
'relativity'. In the past political scientists have 
entered into fierce arguments on the question of 
relativity. The position advanced in this thesis is that 
there are two principal relations that influence the 
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relative degree of effective state autonomy; its 
relation with capital; and its relation with labour. 
4.3.2.1. State and Capital 
As we have noted, there is now overwhelming evidence 
that strong state control and capitalist development 
went hand in hand in the four Asian NICs. State 
interventions were used both to create the foundations 
for export-oriented industrial expansion and economic 
growth and to sustain it. However the avenues chosen to 
accomplish this diverge substantially among the four 
NICs (Douglass, 1994). 
As explained previously, each state's choice of strategy 
was shaped by its particular situation and by historical 
factors. Nevertheless, there are some basic similarities 
which we can categorise under four general headings; 
policy making; financial support; state ownership; and 
welfare policy. One positive contribution of exercises 
in comparison is that they can highlight difference as 
well as the similarities. As the present study proceeds, 
it will become clearer that each state took a particular 
route to achieve economic success. 
Due to the disadvantages of having very limited natural 
resources and a very underdeveloped domestic market, the 
four Asian NICs opted for export-oriented policies. In 
this process, the state was the core instrument in 
planning and execution. In the Taiwanese and Korean 
cases, the key role was played by the technobureaucracy 
which was expanded through the establishment of policy 
think tanks and economic planning units in the 
government, by bringing universities and academics into 
national planning projects, and by recruiting those 
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receiving technical training abroad into the state 
planning apparatus (Davis and Ward, 1990). In Singapore, 
though it was the government that planned economic 
development, it sought out foreign capital and 
cultivated extensive linkages with transnational 
corporations headquartered in OECD countries. Its 
strategic geographical position in the world economy 
also favoured its attractiveness to foreign investors. 
In Korea, state intervention in the economy led to the 
emergence of the Chaebols, huge family-based oligopolies 
that resemble the pre-World War II Japanese Zaibatsu. 
Some academics argue that due to differences in cultural 
background, the other three Asian NICs (Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and Singapore) have been resistant to the creation 
of big conglomerates (Johnson, 1988) and emphasise that 
in Taiwan and Hong Kong, most businesses are small and 
medium size enterprises. 
The second general communality between the Asian NIC' s 
stems from the active role played by the state in the 
provision of financial support. In Korea and Taiwan, the 
state nationalised the banks and exercised strong 
control over investment and capital loans. In Singapore, 
the government played key roles in banking, as well as 
in other important industries, either through state 
ownership or joint ownership. State ownership also 
played a key role in Taiwan. Here the state took over 
most of the strategic sectors inherited from Japanese 
colonisation including petroleum, steel, railways, power 
stations, shipbuilding and telecommunication. In 
Singapore, state-owned concerns, semi-state companies, 
and joint ventures with both foreign and domestic 
enterprises control a large number of key industries in 
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transportation, communication, trading, shipbuilding, 
steel production, and other manufacturing. 
Government emphasis on welfare policy is another shared 
factor among the East Asian NICs. In Singapore, the 
public housing programme played an important role in 
building legitimacy and internalising social control. 
Indeed the programme became so successful, as cited 
earlier, that by 1988,86% of the population lived in 
government flats. Though less extensive in the case of 
Hong Kong, the government did direct investment into 
public housing, together with the health service, and 
education. It also regulated the prices of transport, 
rice and utilities and imported foodstuffs and raw 
materials from China at a negotiated price. 
The particular form of state intervention pursued in 
Hong Kong has been termed 'positive non interventionism' 
(Haddon-Cave, 1984) and 'Accommodationist' (Kim W- 
B, 1993). Not only has the Hong Kong government not 
formulated any strategic industrial policy. It has 
deliberately refused to provide any long-term national 
plan for industrial development or direction for the 
operation of the market economy (Lui and Chiu, 1993: 69). 
Compared to the other Asian NICs, the state's 
involvement in the economy is indirect rather than 
direct. It is focused on institutionalised support 
through, for example, the Hong Kong Productivity Council 
and the Trade Development Council, or university-based 
science and technology facilities. It can be argued that 
even though Hong Kong has a long and successful history 
of labour-intensive light industrialisation, there will 
be difficulties in moving to more developed industries 
without state support. As an alternative, Hong Kong has 
made an effort to transform itself into a major 
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international financial centre. Today, it is the fourth 
largest in the world with more than 400 financial 
institutions. 
In sum, variations in historical conditions, including 
pre-existing industrial organisation, together with 
external requirements, have generated quite different 
strategies toward indigenous capital and the drive 
toward export-oriented industrialisation among the east 
Asian NIC's. Whereas Korea has most closely followed a 
corporatist alignment of state and large-scale 
indigenously generated oligopolies and Singapore has 
attached its fortunes almost exclusively to 
transnational capital, Taiwan has moved towards an 
entrepreneurial state, and Hong Kong pursued positive 
non interventionism cum accommodation (Douglass, 
1994: 551). 
One last factor to pay attention to is the relations of 
the four NICs' with foreign capital. The distinctiveness 
of these relations and strategies used again suggests 
that dependent development theory has little useful to 
say about economic success in the Asian NICS. In the 
cases of Korea and Taiwan, for example, the security and 
military interests of the core capitalist countries, 
which worked to shore up these bastions of anti 
communism on the western Pacific Rim, were used by these 
countries' governments not only to dampen down internal 
social and political reform but also to resist opening 
their economies to imports from the industrialised 
countries (Wade, 1993) . In addition, the Korean 
government prohibited direct foreign investment, and 
instead, borrowed foreign capital allocating it as 
loans. Since the government controls all the banks in 
the Korean society, it became the main source of finance 
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and this helped to consolidate the 'special' 
relationship between the state and the chaebols. 
In Taiwan, the KMT invited direct foreign investment 
through a vigorous selection process designed to give 
the government the upper hand. On the other hand, in 
Singapore, additional financial incentives were offered 
to foreign firms, on top of the existing privileges such 
as, very low tariffs on imports and exports, free 
capital flow, unrestricted repatriation of profits and 
investment, and unlimited foreign equity participation. 
Hence, just as they worked to create different internal 
alignments and industrial structures, state strategies 
were also characterised by differences with regard to 
the international economy and foreign investment. 
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4.3.2.2. The State and Labour 
It is important to point out that the labour systems 
within the Asian NICs were not institutionalised through 
market forces alone. Quite often, the state appealed to 
traditional family values as a means of manipulating the 
labour force as well as surpressing industrial disputes. 
In Taiwan and Hong Kong the state relied on traditional 
communal paternalism in small and medium-sized. locally 
owned factories to segment labour through 'noneconomic 
claims'. At the same time, the state in Singapore and 
Hong Kong, focused on welfare. However, since there was 
always an alternative supply of labour from mainland 
China or neighbouring poor countries, the negotiating 
position of labour was relatively weak. 
The labour sector in all the Asian NICs has suffered 
from state intervention to depress workers' wages below 
market rates in order to make exports competitive on the 
international market (Amsden, 1990). In all cases the net 
effect of indirect and direct state action has been to 
provide continuous supplies of low-wage, vulnerable 
labour - most often female - that was not able to 
organise to make effective demands for higher benefits. 
Where the state itself provided those benefits, as in 
the case of housing in Hong Kong and Singapore, labour 
was made all the more dependent upon retaining its good 
will (Douglass, 1994: 555). On the other hand, in the 
Korean case, the direct deployment of the police in 
industrial disputes fuelled anti-statist activity and 
became a major political issue. 
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Again, although they share common basic policies for 
sustaining low wages, the four NICs have responded in 
different ways in pursuit of their interests. 
4.3.3. The Developmental State Model 
The concept of the 'developmental state' emerged in the 
late 80s, after the effectiveness of the states' direct 
or indirect interventions in the economic and market 
spheres in East: Asia became evident among development 
experts (Hsiao, 1988). There is a tendency to categorise 
instances that appear similar as examples of the same 
general case. However, as the previous section has 
emphasised, the more we explore, the more differences 
among four Asian NICs are revealed. One of the most 
obvious common features they share is the subordination 
of all values associated with 'development' to a single 
privileged concern: economic growth. In a sense, they 
provide models of development only to the extent that 
they illustrated divergent ways of addressing the 
economic requirements for 'late industrialisation' under 
strong state intervention. However, according to 
Douglass, they do not, either individually or 
collectively, provide the model of the developmental 
state,. -for at least three reasons; 
1) the historical context surrounding their 
particular experiences has significantly changed 
and cannot be reconstructed in these economies 
elsewhere; 2) there is no 'theory' to allow a clear 
differentiation between those state actions that 
were necessary for economic growth and those that 
were simply opportunistic and served the 
'political' expediency of regimes in power; and 3) 
the term -'developmental' is itself subject to 
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further debate and interpretation (Douglass, 
1994: 556). 
The construction of a new paradigm always suggests that 
aspirants might learn from the emerging model and 
emulate its success. However, as many academics have 
pointed out (Doglass, 1994, Hsiao, 1990), the unique 
combination of historical circumstances and 
international political factors that generated the 
initial growth of the Asian NIC's cannot be recreated. 
Even among these countries each is now at its own cross- 
roads, facing difficulties and dramatic changes in the 
90s. The most obvious uncertainty concerns the future of 
Hong Kong after 1997, when China takes over. It is not 
easy to predict clearly what kind of possibilities they 
will pursue to continue development. Both Taiwan and 
Korea are experiencing radical changes in politics and 
moving towards more democratic forms of state. However, 
as yet we do not know if this change will boost economic 
development or act as an obstacle to future growth. 
If there is a communality among the Asian NICs at this 
current juncture in history, it is that the state in 
each is facing extraordinary pressures emanating from 
changing social as well as economic forces. In the 
political sphere, Korea has had a long and harsh history 
of military regimes which has shaped many aspects of the 
society. On the other hand, it has been in the 'fast 
lane' economically for the last three decades. It chose 
to create giant conglomerates as the main spearhead for 
its export-oriented growth strategy. However, in the 
process relations between the state and capital have 
shifted from paternalism to increasingly equality of 
negotiation. The key to the next stage of development 
for the Korean economy and equally important for future 
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politics can be found in the way this shifting relation 
will unfold. In the following chapters, we will explore 
the Korean case in detail looking at the way the state 
attempted to exercise control in the crucial period of 
the take off to growth, over both the economy, and over 
the political sphere, and looking particularly at the 
communication system as central link between economic 
development (as a set of industries in its own right and 
as a vehicle for advertising) and political culture (as 
the major source of public information). 
Before we move on to next chapter however, it is useful 
to summarise the major differences between the four East 
Asian NICs in the spheres of politics, economy and 
culture in one synoptic chart so as to situate Korea 
more precisely. 
82 
Chapter IV 
w 
u H 
z 
ý 
cý 
. rI ý 
ý 
a) 
.0 H 
44 
0 
4. ) 
14 
U 
e-I 
ý 
4) 
ý 
cd 
Ei 
State, Capital and the Asian NICs 
N 
Ö 
ö 
x 
z° z° rn 
a H rT4 
w 
ý 
(d 
Ul 
z ° 
>-4 
z z ° 
>-4 
z 
N 
$+ 
o 
"ý to 
ý "ý r14 
U) 
a) ý-1 0 
0 
z 
N 
>4 
O 
Z 
N U) U) 
w 
.H 
H ri a 
0 
(1) Ei 
N 
G4 
ý 
F. 
N N z z z 
N 
0 ý 
ö 
N O 
x 
O 
Ü 
ý4 N 
bý 
N o N U) 
[-4 0 
U 
U 
H 
O 
OZ 
U 
44 0 
p, 
U) 
ý4 
N 
a) 
1ý 
1) 
U) 
N 
S4 
r. 
pg 
N 
ý 
ý 
ä 
O 
U 
0 
-r-) 
z 
N 
"r-1 ý4 
4- ) 
U) 
pi 
ý 
P 
0 
"ý 
Z 
" 
ä 
ö 
"A 
4J 
-ý 
ý 
-0 
(13 
CA 
ý 
N 
ý-1 
ö 
w0 
4-) 
ý 
"ri 
0 
A 
" 
r-l 
rd 
-ý 
04 
c, U 
ý 
4) 
0 
fý 
ý 
FC 
JJ 
H 
U 
N 
A 
FC U 
Ei 
ä 
O 
U) 
.ý ty) 
Q) 
P: 
-W "r'1 
"r-I Z 
" 
ý4 
ý 
0 
.Q 
H 
0 
" r-I 
4J 
pi 
ý 
ý4 
N 
4-1 
H 
" 
ý 
H 
4. ) 
'r1 
.ý Ü 
Fl., 
a 
Ü 
fcý 
O 
ý 
pi 
x 
tm 
r: 
. C-1 N 
"rl 
rcl 
N 
Q 
Ül 
" 
ý 
Z 
U 
4.4 rl 
0 
U 
r-1 
(d 
U 
"ri 
W 
44 
0 
(i1 ci N M d1 p4 r-1 N U2 r-1 (N 
Chapter V 
CHAPTER V. 
Korea in Political Analysis 
KOREA IN POLITICAL ANALYSIS 
From this chapter onwards, the thesis focuses on the 
Korean case. As noted at the start of the thesis, the 
key components contributing to the uniqueness of the 
Korean case include; a particularly volatile 
geopolitical position in international politics; 
military regimes that lasted for nearly three decades; 
and the development of a private sector based around the 
'chaebols'. In this chapter, we will discuss these three 
features in more detail in order to provide the 
necessary background to understand the details of the 
Korean situation. 
As noted earlier, the Korean Civil War was fought to 
keep the Asian periphery open to the Japanese economy 
and thus to insure Japan's retention as a functioning 
member of the world-system and, conversely, to prevent 
it from drifting into the Sino-Soviet sphere of 
influence. 
Even now Korea is one of very few places left in the 
world which is actively experiencing the last phase of 
the Cold War as a prosperous capitalist South faces an 
impoverished communist North across the internal 
partition established at the end of the Civil War. This 
situation has influenced Korean politics and society and 
even its economy very considerably. First of all, it 
provided a plausible reason for the military group to 
intervene in politics when there was a 'power vacuum', 
and helped to justify their action by appeals to 
national crisis. Literally speaking, to share the border 
meant that both Koreas were faced with a permanent 
possibility of armed conflict. 
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The following discussion of militarism is therefore 
essential in order to understand Korea as a society 
which was under military rule for nearly three decades 
but is now changing following the decrease in the 
international centrality of the Cold War and the moves 
towards greater demonstration within Korea. In order to 
illustrate the impact of these changes, we will take the 
debate about the national defence budget as a case 
study. Previously, this topic was treated as national 
security related', and nobody could talk about it openly. 
However, now, people are much aware of their rights to 
know how their taxes are spent and there are social 
groups pressing to have their voices heard on key 
issues. One of them is the capitalists, and the debate 
between government and capital, will lead us in turn to 
a discussion of the relation between state power and 
labour. 
5.1. The Military and Civil Society 
In Korea, before February 1993, when the new President 
declared the Seventh Republic, the country had been 
subject to an unbroken period of military rule. However, 
as mentioned in an earlier chapter, most recent work on 
the success of the Korean economy, fails to pay 
attention to the role and characteristics of the Korean 
military. In contrast, I believe that a careful 
consideration of militarism can provide an essential 
base from which to understand the political situation 
which provided the main context for economic development 
and for the formation of the power structure. This 
section is divided into two sub-sections: the definition 
of militarism, and explanations for military 
intervention in politics. 
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5.1.1. What is Militarism? 
The term 'militarism' is widely 'used to refer to a 
number of different things - from high military 
spending; bellicose foreign policies and the promotion 
of military values in society; the pervasiveness of 
militaristic ideology; and government by martial law 
(Smith & Smith, 1983: 10); to a representation of 
imperialism. Although various definitions have been 
proposed, most can be allocated to one of two basic 
philosophical points of view. 
5.1.1.1. Imperialist and Liberal Definitions 
In 1960, when 'cold war' ideology pervaded the world, 
the birth of many military regimes could be seen in the 
underdeveloped countries. To many commentations in 
Western countries, the military appeared as the only 
capable and 'modernised' group which could effectively 
govern 'traditional', and therefore chaotic, societies. 
In this context, the notion of modernisation means 
'being Western' (Shils, 1962: 11). According to Shils, 
the new states were not yet modern. In contrast, the 
states of Western Europe and North America (and the 
English speaking domination of the British Commonwealth) 
need not aspire to modernity. They were already modern. 
Modernity was part of their very nature (Shils, 1962: 12). 
Despite their differences such as history of origin, 
time since independence, or level of economic 
development, all new nations have chosen without 
exception the goal of modernisation (Janowitz, 1964: 24). 
Their military organisations have been modelled on those 
in developed societies and thus, represented in many 
ways, almost an 'ideal type of industrial and 
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secularised enterprise'. Similarly the officer corps 
were selected and trained according to principles which 
were very different from those of the surrounding 
traditional society. Furthermore, the continuous 
revolution in military technology has led the army 
leaders of the newly emergent societies to be extremely 
sensitive to the extent to which their countries are 
economically and technologically underdeveloped. 
Occupying roles basic to advanced societies, the more 
politically conscious officers could hardly avoid being 
aware of the need for substantial changes in their own 
societies (Pye, 1968: 69). Hence, in new nations, the 
intervention of the military into political and economic 
spheres, beyond their own intrinsic role, often appears, 
to them and to others, to be the most desirable way to 
achieve modernisation. 
But one may ask: What does it mean 'to be modernised'? 
Firstly, for countries outside the orbit of the Soviet 
Union it has meant the adoption of a capitalist mode of 
production. As a corollary, a dependence on investment 
and 'know-how' provided by advanced capitalist nations 
is almost always required, in order to 'kick-start' the 
system. Secondly, militarism itself demands a permanent 
arms race and a consequent dependence on high 
technology. However, third world countries cannot afford 
such demands without aid from developed countries. 
Finally, as a more direct influence, to maintain such 
conditions, and its own privileged position, militarism 
is ready to fight against any kind of opposition. It 
demands obedience and uses its command over the means of 
violence to execute its strategies. For all these 
reasons, liberal analysts of advanced nations generally 
welcomed military regimes after decolonisation. 
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5.1.1.2. A Marxist Definition 
In contrast, Marxist authors opposed the identification 
of military rule with progress and criticise the virtual 
absence in non-Marxist writings of any attempt to 
incorporate the international dimension into analysis 
(Berghahn, 1981: 80). According to this point of view, 
industrial capitalism is a global system. Imperialist 
expansion still seeks to consolidate and refurbish its 
control through checking forces 'subversive' to its 
system of domination. Therefore, the third world officer 
corps are integrated into, what Tibi called, the 
'international military system' which reinforced the 
military's preoccupation with order and stability. All 
these factors work in favour of a rigid maintenance of 
the status quo and, ultimately, the emergence of 
military dictatorship (Berghahn, 1981: 81), which allows 
the indigenous ruling class and the imperialists to 
secure a dominant position in the local situation and 
underwrites their freedom to exploit (Liebknecht, 
1974: 22). In this process, the technique and 
organisational blueprint of advanced countries are 
transferred to the third world, through the inter- 
connected mechanisms of arms sales and industrialisation 
(Luckham, 1977: 23). Within the Marxist perspective then, 
militarism, as the organised and legitimate use of 
violence, is not a new or surprising trend. Rather, it 
is one of the many integral components of the capitalist 
system. In the Marxist view the military is a instrument 
of the capitalist class which is deployed to their 
economic power and profit, while militarism in turn 
rests on their success for its economic base 
(Skjelsbaek, 1980: 84). 
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However, as with any other aspects of the Marxist 
perspective, these arguments can be criticised as 
oversimplified. Militarism has changed its clothes from 
Khaki to more sophisticated colours and has also sought 
corporate alliances within the social structure. 
Therefore, the question of "Who really benefits? " from a 
military regime, demands a more complicated and more 
expansive analysis, not only on at an international 
level, but also within the domestic arena. 
5.1.2. Why Do Military Organisations Intervene in 
Politics? 
The causes of intervention can be found in the internal 
and external balance of social forces and within the 
mechanisms of military organisation itself. We begin 
this section with an attempt to specify the motives 
arising within military organisation - amongst its 
material and ideological bases. And then turn to a 
consideration of the contextual factors which seem to 
prompt intervention. 
5.1.2.1. The 'Manifest Destiny' of Soldiers: 
Military Virtue 
The first motive can be derived from the ideology of the 
military. By the very nature of its appointed task, 
national defence, the military has to subscribe to a 
strong version of nationalism. Military training lays 
heavy emphasis on national identity. It aims to inspires 
patriotism and nationalism in its recruits, and hatred 
and contempt for the enemy (Finer, 1962: 33). Nationalism 
functions as a support for a concern with war and 
preparations for war. One element within nationalism, 
the idea that the nation is sacred, provides a 
89 
Chapter V Korea in Political Analysis 
particularly powerful rationale for a national defence 
system since it establishes the object which is 
threatened or may become threatened. Without such an 
object, there would be no reason for defence 
(Abrahamsson, 1968: 72). Regardless of developments in 
weapons technology, the objective realities of 
international situations, and differences of condition 
between nations, all military officer corps have 
emphasised a high level of danger and the possibility of 
armed conflict. In order to justify their position and 
their monopoly' over the means of violence. This 
'pessimistic' view of the world (Abrahamsson, 1968.: 74) 
is highly functional to the interests of the profession. 
In one survey, the relationship between 
professionalisation and beliefs within the officer corps 
was assessed, and concluded that "The higher their level 
of professionalisation, the more likely officers are to 
believe that there is a great risk of war" (Abrahamsson, 
1968: 74). Another survey reveals the low faith in 
ordinary people among the officer corps and accordingly, 
the generally pessimistic attitude towards the 
possibilities of avoiding war (Rosenberg, 1957). This 
pessimism is also evident when military organisations 
attempt to characterise society. 'The military ethic 
views conflict as a universal pattern throughout nature 
and sees violence rooted in the permanent biological and 
psychological nature of men' (Huntington, 1964: 63). 
Because violence and danger is seen as a permanent 
condition, both internally and externally, the need for 
a strong military profession also appears permanent. 
In addition, the major internal values of the profession 
are generally consonant with the basic elements of the 
conservative tradition. They stem from the military's 
historical role as a guardian of the status quo, and its 
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traditional ties with ruling establishments bent on 
preserving, rather than changing, existing social and 
political patterns. Even though in revolutionary 
situations, military organisations may take on a 
progressive role, once the immediate revolutionary 
struggle is over and a period of consolidation is 
established, they tend to revert to the role of 
supporter of the status quo (Abrahamsson, 1972: 63) 
mobilising noticns of 'counter-revolution' to label and 
dismiss critics and opponents. Military organisations 
are generally suspicious of rapid and seemingly 
disorderly social transformation, and define any kind of 
opposition group demanding social change as an 'enemy' 
which can damage the status quo. In short, military 
organisations are ready to 'save' the 'sacred' nation 
whenever they judge that it is, or may be, in danger. 
5.1.2.2. Sectional Interests 
a) The Motive of individual self-interest 
'The seismic zones of military intervention, the areas 
where it is or has been endemic, tend by and large to be 
regions where social stratification is marked, and where 
by consequence, the army provides one of the few avenues 
for social advancement' (Finer, 1962: 56). As this 
quotation suggests, some analyses try to explain 
military intervention in terms of the collective 
interests of the officer corps as a class or class 
faction. However, in the Korean case, it is very 
difficult to identify a specific class character within 
the officer corps. While historically in Western 
societies, officer corps have been drawn mainly from the 
property-owning class and have therefore tended to have 
close ties with members of that class as a whole, in 
third world countries, there is more variation in their 
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class origins (Ayu, 1984: 40). From the outset, many 
entrants to the military in these countries have seen 
the profession as an opportunity for upward mobility 
outside the traditional channels. They therefore often 
choose a military career as the best route for their 
personal success (Kim, 1988: 96) under conditions in 
which they can hardly afford to make a different choice 
of occupation, for economic reasons. As a consequence, 
there are possibilities for a permanent vicious circle. 
If the officer corps do not feel that their desire for 
advancement has been satisfied, and they feel 
frustrated, they may try to arrange new social 
conditions that are seemingly 'fairer' to themselves. 
b) Regional Interests 
Sometimes, regional interests can be a central factor 
explaining military intervention, if 'the officer corps 
is predominantly drawn from one particular region of the 
country or develops special ties with it' (Finer, 
1962.: 43). If the meaning of 'region' is expanded from 
its geographical origins to encompass other forms of 
social organisation, such as religion groups, school, or 
family, this line of inquiry becomes more generally 
useful. Even if the first coup d'etat was not driven by 
this motivation, the more privilege becomes firmly 
entrenched by a coup, the stronger the intention to 
maintain it. In the Korean case, this process has been 
partially aggravated by the political culture. One 
notable aspect of this culture is its 'parochial' nature 
(Kim, 1988: 108), so that, although this factor could not 
account the first coup d'etat, it may be an important 
variable in consolidating its success. 
The variable of 'regional interest' is not limited to of 
military interventions in politics however. It has 
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penetrated through Korean society as a whole, and can be 
used to help explain many problems which the society is 
faced with. This factor will be discussed in more detail 
in the forthcoming chapters, though, a concrete example 
is useful at this point. The region of Chosun, before 
Japanese colonisation, 'Chunla' Province, in the south- 
western part of the country, suffered severe 
discrimination at the hands of the central government, 
and became famous for its riots and rebellions against 
both the ruling class and civil servants. Nevertheless 
'Chunla' Province had the most productive soil and 
could, theoretically, have been the richest area of the 
country. However, the reality was that it repeatedly 
suffered from chronic famines due to the corrupt 
administration and its ruling class. The leading group 
of the first military coup d'etat in 1961, including 
General Park, came from 'Kyeongsang Province', in the 
south-eastern part of Korea. Since then, the pre- 
existing inequality between 'Chunla' Province and 
'Kyeongsang' Province has been aggravated year by year. 
In the next chapter, our analysis will reveal that this 
inequality exists even in employment policy. 
c) Organisational Interests 
The military is fiercely protective of its corporate 
status and privileges. This stance stems from a lack of 
faith in politicians and a distrust of negotiation, 
rooted in the belief that the military and only the 
military, are entitled to determine such matters as 
recruitment, training, numbers and equipment. 'In its 
more aggressive ! form it can lead to the military demand 
to be the ultimate judge on all other matters affecting 
the armed forces. As these certainly include foreign 
policy, domestic economic policy and may well include 
all the factors making for morale, i. e., education and 
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mass media of communication' (Finer, 1962: 47) . The 
reaction of the military to economic policy is the most 
crucial index of its organisational interests. Always as 
both sides recognise, military expenditure has been 'a 
burden on capitalism' (Liebknecht, 1983: 51) . As the 
voices of other interest groups demanding more resources 
have been growing louder, the state must allocate a 
growing portion of its budget welfare rather than 
warfare. In this situation, the military is likely to be 
particularly sensitive to economic policy and its 
consequences for the military budget. Such concerns are 
bound to bring it into conflict with the civilian 
government at a certain point. 
5.1.2.3. Intrinsic Features of Militay 
Organisation 
The military's principal object is to fight and to win 
wars. To lose wars means to lose lives. 'The highly 
peculiar features of its organisation flow from this 
central purpose, and find in it their supreme 
justification. These features are 1) centralised command 
2) hierarchy 3) discipline 4) intercommunication 5) 
esprit de corps and a corresponding isolation and self- 
sufficiency' (Finer, 1962: 7). In a strongly cohesive and 
hierarchical organisation, there is no space for 
objection and the only admissible relationship is one of 
command-obedience. More importantly, only the military 
is armed extensively with a means of violence. This 
'threat of violence is a permanent reality' (Janowitz, 
1964: 26) for leaders and followers alike. 
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5.1.3. Structural Contexts 
5.1.3.1. Internal Contexts 
Overt Crisis 
Under conditions of overt crisis, the dependence of the 
government on the military greatly increases. It becomes 
indispensable, not only to the pursuit of foreign 
policy, but also to the maintenance of domestic 
stability. This dependence is most marked in war time, 
when every social sphere must be re-regimented into a 
system of war. Economic, cultural and every other 
institutional sphere must be included. It is a total 
system. Dependence on the military is also magnified 
when 'rival political forces have arisen willing to and 
able to use violence - which are so equally matched that 
no government can rely on support from any single one 
without drawing on itself the full violence of the rest' 
(Finer, 1962: 75). On some other occasions too - such as 
continuing civil war, and recognisable objective threat 
- the indispensability of the military is also 
underlined. "Under prevailing conditions, militarism 
within the third world is more and more an inherent and 
constitutive dimension of [the] growth-oriented 
accumulation process. The more Third World economies are 
mobilised, the more social conflict potential will there 
be, and the more social warfare will there be waged to 
preserve the general political pattern. Prospects for 
more militarism operate, indeed" (Senghaas, 1980: 203). 
Although such threats to social stability may be 
overestimated and exaggerated owing to the 
professionalisation, pessimism and organisational 
interest of the military, no-one can estimate the exact 
situation or measure the degree of threat, except the 
military. This factor has had a major effect on Korean 
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politics and society. As a divided country, the presence 
and possibility of crisis has been more than usually 
salient, providing a fertile context in which the 
military can use for their own interests and as a 
justification for their regime. 
The Power Vacuum 
However, the operation of this dynamic needs to be 
placed within the context of the balance of forces 
between the social classes. Generally, military 
organisations have been subordinated to the ruling class 
and has acted as their instrument. But when power 
dynamics shift, the military may choose to try to 
reverse its position. When the relation of class forces 
is unfavourable to the ruling class, and its power is 
weakened, allowing other social classes to gain power, 
there exists a 'relative equilibrium between the main 
contending classes and the consequent inability of 
either of these warring classes to act as a force 
capable of exercising political power' (Woddis, 
1977: 39). In such a situation, the military may become 
detached from the ruling class and "is transformed 
from its instrument into its master" (Kucuk, 
1980: 150) . Chronic economic depression, and surges of 
dissatisfaction with the ruling class, can also engender 
cleavages which. open. spaces for military intervention. 
As Senghaas has pointed out, the 'weaknesses and 
structural fragility and concomitant high propensity for 
political crises are based on the sociological fact that 
no single class can become predominant within such a 
society and economy (Senghaas, 1980: 201). Such 
situations provide fertile grounds for the military to 
announce that it is acting 'in response to the national 
call' in intervening in the political process. This 
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promise to bring order out of chaos may bestow initial 
popularity on military intervention. 
Popularity 
Although popularity amongst the public cannot prompt a 
military group to intervene in politics in itself, it 
can play an important role in justifying and 
legitimating actions taken on other grounds. As 
discussed earlier, when popular dissatisfaction with the 
ruling class and the government is at a peak, people 
long for any kind of change. But in many cases, they are 
not strong enough to organise themselves into an 
effective opposition in order to subvert the present 
regime. At this point, a military coup is welcomed 
'because initially, it means all things to all men and 
because no change is otherwise possible and the 
situation is such that people have come to believe that 
any change is for the better' (Finer, 1962: 118). So that 
'the army is popular, not because of what it stands for 
(which nobody knows at first), but of what, quite 
patently, it has fought against'(Finer, 1962: 115). 
There is another element which is deeply rooted in the 
myth of military organisation. When the civilian 
government has a reputation for corruption and 
inefficiency, the military find it easier to represent 
itself as a group of pure hearts and clean hands, with a 
passion for saving and defending the nation, and as a 
organisation capable of operating modern and efficient 
way and eradicating social disruption. Without 
exception, the initial declarations of the all military 
coups are focused on 'ending corruption, saving the 
nation' and the 'restoration [of] law and order' 
(Woddis, 1977: 41). Here, one more aspect of the military 
'myth' must be considered. Even though the military 
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possesses the more advanced technological armaments, its 
appeal to popular values is based primarily on appeals 
to tradition. Military virtue and discipline demand 
self-sacrifice and absolute obedience. Consequently, the 
military represents itself as the perfect combination of 
modernity and tradition. Most third world countries have 
suffered from the problem of how to harmonise these two 
contradictory systems. This is because, although 'to be 
modernised' looks to be the inevitable path, their 
traditions as specific identity must be respected as 
well. This is an ideological dilemma with which every 
third world country is still struggling. Thus, it is 
only political cleavages but also ideological cleavages 
that facilitate the military's intrusion into the civil 
sphere. 
5.1.3.2. External Contexts 
Until now our discussion of 'militarism' has been 
focused on the condition within third world countries, 
but now our analysis needs to be expanded to the 
international context. 
Capitalism as an economic system was never confined to 
one nation. It was born, developed, and prospered as 
part of a world system. Karl Marx goes so far as to 
claim that the specific task of bourgeois society is the 
establishment of. a world market, and of production based 
upon this market (quoted in Senghaas, 1980: 239). It 
has 
been the specific task of imperialism to fill out this 
outline and build a complex international network of 
trade, finance and investment. While the most dramatic 
and often the most revealing operations of the state are 
those actions which directly and immediately serve the 
interests of business, its highest priority - both 
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domestically and internationally - is the preservation 
and spread of the institutions of capitalism. It can be 
said in more popular jargon that the role of the state 
is to insure a 'favourable investment climate' (as noted 
by Perlo, in his discussion of Magdoff's analysis, 
1980: 246). 
To preserve and extend this condition, the major 
capitalist nations exercise powers which, directly or 
indirectly, act to repress strong resistance in third 
world countries. As a result, imperialism necessarily 
involves militarism. This is not a new trend. But the 
more international capital confronts rising class 
conflicts in third world countries, the more militarism 
within these countries will be welcomed or at least 
tolerated, as a guarantee of stable conditions for trade 
and investment. It may even be actively promoted. 
The international functions of US militarism for 
example, include 'the extensive training of foreign 
military personnel, and the use of economic-aid funds to 
train local police forces for handling mob 
demonstrations and counter-intelligence work' (Magdoff, 
1980: 240). Nor does the US exclude direct invasion. This 
may be rare and an action of last resort but US 
government's political and economic support for military 
regimes around third world countries is both common and 
extensive. 
Another important function of militarism in the economic 
sphere is, the active promotion of commercial armament 
sales. The procurement policies of third world countries 
are primarily of benefit to the multinational 
corporations which produce armaments. as a consequence, 
"armaments" have a decisive contribution to the general 
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pattern of international capital accumulation (Ayu, 
1984: 57) . 
To summarise; international capitalism and third world 
militarism are strongly interlinked. 
5.1.4. The Military-Industrial Complexes in the 
Post War United States 
In the Marxist schema, militarism is understood as an 
instrument of the capitalist class and in the theory of 
imperialism, it becomes a tool for expanding the orbit 
of capitalism to third world countries. However, 
militarism is an active phenomenon in the advanced 
capitalist countries, too. Here it is no longer simply 
an instrument of capitalism but a major node within the 
economy. 
C. Wright Mills warned of the possibility of military 
ascendancy over politics and economy in post war America 
as early as 1956 (C. Wright Mills, 1956). After the two 
world wars, the USA became much more central to both 
international politics and the global economy. As a 
consequence, international issues move to the centre of 
most critical national decisions and became increasingly 
relevant to virtually all decisions of consequence. 
Significant military figures take over key positions in 
the foreign relations apparatus from civilian civil 
servants. 'War has become seemingly total and seemingly 
permanent.... Peace is no longer serious; only war is 
serious ... diplomacy becomes merely a prelude to war or 
an interlude between wars' (C. Wright Mills, 1956: 206). 
In the economic sphere, we can see the growing 
importance of the military through their increasing 
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share of the national budget. They become the biggest 
single spender in a range of sectors, such as, 'services 
of supply', and scientific research. After World War II, 
military demands continued to shape the corporate 
economy. Many generals and admirals, after retiring, 
became members of boards of directors. The scale of the 
permanent war economy made for a coincidence of 
interests and a political mingling among economic and 
military chiefs. 
The increased personnel traffic that moves between the 
military and corporate realms, however, is more 
significant as one clue the structural shift of modern 
American capitalism towards a permanent war economy. The 
military has become enlarged and greatly increased its 
capacity to shape the economic structure; and, the 
economic and the military spheres have become 
increasingly structurally interrelated. 
5.1,5. Conclusion 
No two coups are the same, nor are the situations in 
which they take place identical. Each military 
intervention has its own characteristics, motivations, 
objectives and class character, as well as its own 
particular relationship to external factors. 
Specifically, in the third world countries, it is true 
that there is 'no inter-link with the analysis of the 
different concrete profiles of dependent reproduction' 
(Senghaas, 1980: 197) . It seems to be an overestimation 
to say that every military intervention occurs with such 
a world-wide perspective from the first. Rather, in many 
cases, it may be stimulated by personal lust for power 
or naive dissatisfaction within its organisation. 
However, in most cases, the military regime will pursue 
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a policy which promotes the development of capitalism, 
thus, ensuring, whatever the original intentions of the 
military leaders, the country's continuing subordination 
to imperialism. 
'Men make their own history, but they do it within an 
inherited set of circumstances and under conditions 
controlled, in the last resort, by the relation of class 
forces within the given country and in the world as a 
whole' (Woddis, 1977: 44). 
In third world countries, militarism represents a more 
direct way to intervene in politics since the military 
themselves take over political power. Therefore, the 
main power structure of the society can be described as 
a dynamic interplay between the military and the major 
capitalist groups. In America, however, the military has 
been struggling to increase its influence over civilian 
government and society through co-operation and by 
attempting to shift the economic structure towards a 
permanent war economy. Thus, the power structure assumes 
a triangular shape linking the government, the military 
and big business instead of a dyadic relationship. In 
this sense C. W. Mills' notion of a 'military 'industrial 
complex' could be said to operate more complex by than 
in a country like Korea, though as we shall see, the 
basic notion of a close integrated relation between the 
military and big business is still applicable. 
5.2. State-Capital Relations In Korea 
5.2.1. Militarism and the Korean State 
As mentioned previously, since the Park Regime assumed 
power in 1961, the Korean state was ruled by the 
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military until February, 1993. Although in 1986, the 
Korean people voted for a president through direct 
elections, the candidate elected, Roh Taewoo, was one of 
the people who had participated in the 1979 coup d'etat 
after Park's assassination. 
In this section, some explanations will be offered to 
the following questions. How was it possible for the 
military to occupy power for more than 30 years? What 
are the effects of militarism on Korean society? What is 
likely to be the next compromise between the military 
seeking to advance its interests and the people, who 
want more democratic government? And as a case study 
showing the recent shift of power between the military 
group and the capitalists group, the debate over 
National Defence Expenditure will be examined. 
5.2.1.1. The Origins of the Korean Military 
The South Korean Armed Forces were first built up after 
the country was liberated from Japan in August, 1945. 
Several private military or paramilitary organisations 
were formed, with the common objective of developing a 
unitary national army. These organisations however were 
quickly dissolved when the American military government 
in South Korea took steps to create a small-scale Korean 
constabulary as its operating base to ensure the area's 
internal order and external defence. Towards the end of 
1945, the American military government set up a Military 
English School, the predecessor of the Korean Military 
Academy, designed to train a professional cadre for the 
prospective Korean military establishment. When the 
South Korean constabulary came into being in January, 
1946, the number of officers who had graduated from this 
school and had received training from the American 
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military for a few weeks could be counted only in the 
hundreds. The remainder of the constabulary officer 
corps was made up of personnel who had served under the 
Japanese, the Manchurians, or the Chinese. These 
different military backgrounds of corps members had a 
significant impact on the new Korean military 
establishment. Apart from being poorly armed, the South 
Korean constabulary, which was steadily expanded during 
the period of American rule, was heterogeneous in terms 
of personnel, organisation, and training. 
This rudimentary military establishment was transformed 
into the regular South Korean Armed Forces in August 
1948, when the Republic of Korea proclaimed its 
independence. The withdrawal of the American Occupation 
Forces from South Korea was accompanied by positive 
measures to develop the three services of the Korean 
Armed Forces. But until the outbreak of the Korean War 
in June, 1950, the national army was still a fragile 
structure composed of fewer than 100,000 men, whose 
functions were directed to the suppression of communist 
insurrections, as well as to the defence of the 38th 
parallel. During the Korean War, however, with massive 
American military aid the Korean Army was built up into 
the world's fourth largest anti communist force, 
numbering nearly one million men. After the armistice 
of July 1953 however, the total manpower of the Korean 
Armed Forces was gradually reduced until by 1960, it 
reached its present level of 600,000. Ever since they 
were first established, the armed Forces of the Republic 
of Korea have been heavily dependent upon American 
support for their maintenance and development (ROK Army 
Headquarters, 1955. Vol. l.; Jaesouk Sohn, 1968). 
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5.2.1.2. The Military Coup of 1961 and the Park 
Regime 
As Finer has argued, the armed forces have three 
political advantages over civilian organisations; a 
marked superiority in organisation, a highly emotional 
symbolic status, and a monopoly of arms. They therefore 
form a prestigious order, enjoying overwhelming 
superiority in the means of applying force. The puzzle, 
therefore is not why they rebel against their civilian 
masters, but why they ever obey them (Finer, 1962: 6). 
After the resignation of the Rhee regime (1948-1960), 
the second republic government could not meet the 
demands of the Korean people. For almost a year, the 
Korean state was caught up in political chaos, and faced 
with numerous economic and social problems. At this 
moment, the military took power by a coup d'etat lead by 
a group of young colonels. The military take-over was 
ostensibly precipitated by the corruption and 
incompetence of the civilian government. However, it can 
also be interpreted as a reaction within the military, 
which had been rapidly expanded as a result of the 
United States Far East Policy against Communism, to the 
civilian politicians who had been trying to control such 
a large standing military force (Sohn, 1968: 108-9). 
The military coup brought to power the Supreme Council 
of National Reconstruction (SCNR), composed of some 
thirty officers, including top military commanders. When 
they first took over, they promised a speedy return of 
political power to civilian government after they had 
carried out their programme for political change, 
economic development, and social reformation. In 
addition, following the usual procedure of blacklisting 
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traditional and corrupt politicians, the junta pressed 
ahead with radical and comprehensive measures. However, 
it was not successful in carrying out its self appointed 
tasks for various reasons. The most important factors 
were the inherent limitations of the military officers 
in relation to political affairs, coupled with a fierce 
power struggle within the ruling junta. 
In December 1963, the military junta gave way to an 
elected military-civilian coalition government with 
hegemony in the hands of military. Even though on the 
surface it appeared to be a stable coalition which 
included old politicians from the Rhee regime, it should 
be noted that strong tensions existed between former 
military officers and their civilian partners. The 
influx of retired officers into key posts in the 
bureaucracy after the military coup had aroused a 
particular sense of insecurity among civilian officials 
and had disturbed the discipline of the civil service. 
The political dominance of former military men, combined 
with their unceasing reliance on police and espionage as 
methods of social and political control and increasing 
corruption within the government, generated civilian 
resistance. In general, the ensuing conflict can be 
categorised as between the ruling group and the popular 
opposition - between the government, on the one hand, 
and the students, intellectuals, labour groups, and 
journalists, on the other. Historically, university 
student groups have long been taken to be centres of 
opposition. The government regarded them as 
irresponsible and almost traitorous, and responded with 
repressive measures. Thus, Korean politics operated in a 
cycle of mutual distrust. 
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As explained in the previous section, militarism is 
rooted in a view of the world as continually prone to 
crisis. Regardless of developments in weapons 
technology, the objective realities of the international 
situation and differences of condition between nations, 
all military officer corps have tended to emphasise high 
levels of danger and to contemplate the possibility of 
war. This 'pessimistic' (Abrahams son, 1968: 74) view of 
politics and society is functional to the interests of 
the profession. The military ethos views conflict as a 
universal pattern throughout nature and sees violence as 
deeply rooted in the biological and psychological nature 
of men (Huntington, 1964: 63). If violence and danger are 
ever present both internally and externally, the need 
for the military profession is permanent. 
In the particular case of Korea, the division of the 
nation into north and south, provides a perfect exemplar 
of permanent crisis which the military has consistently 
used to justify their rule and its maintenance for more 
than 30 years. One example will suffice to illustrate 
how they used this situation to pursue their interests. 
Whenever the movement demanding more democracy becomes 
more vociferous, the government would report the arrest 
of a north Korean spy or point to an organisation in the 
process of attacking the stability of Korean society. 
These devices functioned to re-arouse people's concern 
about national security, and to maginalise calls for 
greater democracy. 
5.2.1.3. A Second Military Regime 
President Park was assassinated on October 26 1979 by 
his close associate and confidant, Kim Jai-Kyu, Director 
of the Korean CIA. The assassination was an act of 
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defiance, but it reflected a deep schism within 
President Park's inner circle. The Yusin system, the 
constitutional reform designed to legitimate a lifetime 
presidency for Park, had come under intense pressure 
from his various political opponents. By 1979 these 
consisted not only of opposition politicians but also of 
intellectuals, students, religious groups and workers. 
The military did not seem to be totally united behind 
Park either (Eugene Kim, 1973: 218-231; Eugene Kim, 
1988: 99). 
Following Park's assassination, the Defence Security 
Command, under Major General Chun Doo-Hwan, was charged 
with investigating the event. The military was now under 
the command of General Chun. His classmates in the KMA 
(the Korean Military Academy) 11th Class, were mobilised 
and placed in powerful positions within the military. 
The country was under martial law. Consequently, General 
Chun was not only responsible for maintaining law and 
order in the country but also in charge of the 
government. Finally, he resigned from the army as a 
four-star general on August 22,1980, and on August 30, 
was elected as President by the rubber-stamp electoral 
college, the National Conference for Unification (Eugene 
Kim, 1988: 101). 
After a seven-year presidency, President Chun 
transferred his power to his classmate from the KMA, Roh 
Taewoo, in 1988. Formally, it was the first peaceful 
transfer of power throughout the independent republic's 
history of some 40 years. The Korean people were allowed 
to vote for their own President by direct elections. In 
December 1987, General Roh Taewoo was elected as the 6th 
Republic President, and ruled from 1988 until February, 
1993. 
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What was particularly significant about the Chun regime 
was his willingness to transfer power to his successor 
through elections and to expand popular political 
participation. What brought the military to put its 
interests at risk so daringly? 
Firstly, the military was still confident that the 
opposition groups could not act collectively even faces 
with the firsts "historical" chance to establish a 
civilian government since the military first took power. 
The two main opposition leaders, Kim Dae-Jung and Kim 
Young-Sam, confirmed this view by organising separate 
opposition parties just before the election, although 
they had promised to run together and to field a united 
candidate. People were understandably frustrated by this 
turn of events. The other opposition groups, such as the 
labour groups, students, and politicians out of office, 
were also split into factions according to their 
ideologies or interests. These divisions disenchanted 
the Korean electorate and increased the possibility of a 
victory by General Roh (Henderson, 1988: 41). 
A second, but more important factor which brought the 
military group to seek for another way to transfer 
power, can be explained in terms of the dynamics 
operating between the . government, the Korean people and 
foreign relations. 
According to Ulf Sundhaussen, there are three sets of 
reasons for the military to withdraw from government 
responsibility (Sundhaussen, 1984: 543-562). The first is 
exogenous to the military, and consists of mounting 
civilian opposition to its continuing rule, in the form 
of armed struggles, wage demonstrations, riots, and /or 
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strikes. The active groups often consist of students, 
the new middle classes, and the new industrial 
proletariat, the products of the process of 
modernisation which the regime may have been 
instrumental in advancing. 
The second set of reasons is exogenous to the state. 
Pressure - political, economic, and military - may have 
been applied by a foreign power to persuade a military 
regime to withdraw from government. 
The third set of reasons however is internal to the 
military. Regime leaders and their military followers 
decide to relinquish power voluntarily. They may feel 
that they have completed their missions and /or that 
prolonging their stay in power may fragment their 
capacity. For this scenario to prevail, all the 
factional leaders within the military must consent to 
withdrawal. They must feel that their interests are best 
served by taking-such action and they must conclude that 
there is a viable civilian alternative to their 
continued stay in power. 
In reviewing the history of successive Korean military 
regimes, Sundhaussen's analysis is, in many ways, 
helpful. 
President Chun's rise to power was conservative in 
nature and he could never escape from the ghosts of the 
Kwangju "massacre"1 . While he was 
in office, political 
1 The Kwangju Massacre occurred in May 1980, in the 
provincial capital of South Chunla which is the home 
province of one of the most important opposition 
leaders, Kim Dae-Jung. The rebellious citizenry took 
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opposition had become much stronger and more organised. 
This was evident in the 12th national Assembly election 
held in 1985. The two major opposition parties gained 76 
seats, 30.8 percent of the popular vote, while Chun's 
party won 87 seats, 35.3 percent of the popular vote 
(B. C. Koh, 1985: 883-897). For Chun's government, the 
outcome of the 12th National Assembly election was an 
eye-opening experience. It also gave a new lease of life 
to the opposition cause. Increasingly, President Chun 
and his military followers came to feel that they must 
withdraw from power in 1988 as they promised. Any 
contrary move would almost certainly have increased 
political instability and possibly endangered national 
security (Eugene Kim, 1985: 363-379; Eugene Kim, 
1988: 107) . 
5.2.1.4. The New Era of the 'Grand Compromise' 
After President Roh took office in 1988 however, the 
political situation became much more complicated. By 
. 
nature, he was not inclined to take substantial steps 
towards democracy. Moreover, from the outset, his base 
of popular support was too weak to govern effectively. 
He therefore had to rely on two contradictory 
strategies. On the one hand, he employed repressive and 
authoritative methods to control the people demanding 
political democracy and a fairer distribution of wealth. 
over the city from May 18th to 27th. The city was 
retaken in the end by severe force, but in the process 
hundreds of innocent residents of Kwangju were killed, 
recorded as missing or wounded. ' At the present time, 
the exact number of deaths is still not revealed. 
(Monthly Sin Dong-A, May 1985; Monthly Chosun, May 
1985) 
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One report reveals that by November 1991, the number of 
political prisoners, or so-called 'prisoners of 
conscience', had reached 1,136 (Table V. 2.1. ). According 
to this report, under the 5th republic, which was 
notorious for its abuses of human rights, between 1981 
and December 1987, political prisoners numbered 
approximately 4,700 in toto. This means that for 7 
years, the Chun regime was producing 1.6 prisoners of 
conscience per day. Under the 6th republic, which 
represented itself as the "Regime for Harmony", the 
reality was no different. Between January 1988 and 
November 1991, a total of 5,186 political prisoners were 
arrested and sentenced, and on the 10th November 1991, 
1,136 were still in jail. The Roh regime had therefore 
arrested 4.4 persons per day since the republic was 
announced. 
Table. V. 2.1. 
Number of the Prisoners of Conscience in 
December, 1991 
Occupations Number 
Students 467 
Labour 384 
Underground Politicians 89 
Policemen/ Soldiers 41 
Publishers 20 
Farmers/ Fishermen 9 
Intellectuals 13 
Teachers 7 
Long-term Prisoners 96 
Others 20 
Total 1,136 
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Source: Seungheon Baik, 'White Paper of Conscientious 
Criminals Under the 6th Republic' (in Korean), 
Mal, December, 1991: 53. 
On the other hand, the Roh regime actively sought to 
build coalitions with various politicians. One of the 
most astonishing events was the formation of the DLP 
(Democratic Liberty Party) in January 1991. When the 6th 
Republic started, President Roh's party was the DJP 
(Democratic Justice Party), which had been organised in 
1980 by the former President Chun's military regime. 
After Roh succeeded to the Presidency, he took measures 
to split the opposition groups. Finally, two of the 
three opposition parties merged with Roh's party. With 
its expanded power base, it could hold the main-stream 
in the National Assembly. The Korean people experienced 
these events as an act of betrayal by the long-term 
opposition leader, Kim Yongsam, who had previously been 
regarded as one of the more reliable representatives of 
alternative views due to his previous political career. 
However, the success of Roh's political manoeuvres 
produced a climate of political apathy. 
This new step by the Roh regime had considerable 
significance for the military. Again, as Sundhaussen 
argues, as one of the most powerful political groups 
throughout recent Korean history, they felt that their 
interests could be best served only by building a 
coalition with a wide base of consensus. This view has 
been reinforced by the fates of former Presidents after 
leaving office. These were neither honourable nor happy. 
Former President Park Chung-Hee was assassinated by his 
close confidant. Former President Chun Doo-Hwan was 
betrayed by the Roh regime after a severe power 
struggle. Now, Roh and his followers had to prepare a 
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secure place after leaving power. The lessons of the 
past were stark; it is impossible for the military to 
act outside of a coalition which can ensure wider and 
safer support for military interests and key personnel. 
5.2.1.5. The Case of the National Defence Budget 
The History 
In the Korean case, the planning of national defence 
expenditure is a particularly good example to illustrate 
the shifts in the trend of politics and the power 
structure. Under the Park regime, national defence 
expenditure planning was merely a reflection of its 
'leader oriented' (Youngwahn Kihl, 1984: 118) system. 
Under martial law, President Park had absolute power. 
Within this kind of system, the regime monopolised all 
the financial resources of the society and could 
exercise control over demand and supply, so that, 
naturally, other social sectors became extremely 
dependent. Moreover, 'national security' was the biggest 
buttress for the maintenance of the Park regime, thus, 
the matter of national security became a sacred topic, 
being hardly even discussed in the public arena (In-taek 
Hyun 1991: 92-93)-. Due to the changes in the main 
policies and in personal style, under Chun's regime 
however, national security became less important than 
other aims. To gain legitimacy for its regime, the Fifth 
Republic claimed to stand for economic stability and the 
welfare society, and these policies entailed tight 
budget planning for everything, including national 
defence expenditure. As shown in Table V. 2.2., between 
1982 and 1989, the percentage share of national defence 
expenditure within the overall budget fell from 34.5% to 
114 
Chapter V Korea in Political Analysis 
28.3%. The annual rate of increase in national defence 
expenditure also dropped sharply after 1982. 
Table. V. 2.2. 
National Defence Expenditure in Korea from 1961 
to 1990 
(unit: billion $, %) 
Year GNP N. D. E. -a) % of GNP % of 
Budget 
Rate of 
Increase 
1961 4.2 0.237 5.7 29.0 -0.5 
1962 4.6 0.274 5.9 23.2 0.9 
1963 5.4 0.227 4.2 28.1 3.2 
1964 6.4 0.213 3.6 33.2 - 
1965 6.1 0.225 3.7 32.0 22.6 
1966 6.9 0.278 4.0 28.8 39.1 
1967 7.2 0.297 4.1 27.4 18.4 
1968 5.5 0.234 4.2 24.7 34.7 
1969 7.4 0.298 4.0 22.8 29.2 
1970 8.2 0.333 3.9 23.2 21.2 
1971 10.0 0.411 4.1 24.6 22.4 
1972 9.7 0.428 4.4 24.8 20.7 
1973 12.6 0.475 3.8 28.0 5.5 
1974 17.5 0.558 3.2 29.3 61.8 
1975 18.4 0.719 3.9 28.8 49.0 
1976 24.0 1.500 6.3 32.9 59.1 
1977 31.5 1.800 5.7 34.7 34.9 
1978 46.0 2.600 5.6 37.0 37.7 
1979 48.3 3.181 6.6 30.8 19.0 
1980 60.3 3.460 5.7 35.6 48.3 
1981 63.1 3.970 6.3 33.8 15.9 
1982 72.3 4.324 6.0 34.5 18.5 
1983 76.6 4.407 5.8 33.0 5.9 
1984 83.2 4.494 5.4 31.7 4.5 
1985 83.1 4.399 5.3 30.6 8.3 
1986 98.3 5.110 5.2 31.4 13.8 
1987 121.3 6.970 5.6 30.4 10.9 
1988 159.6 8.510 5.3 31.1 8.7 
1989 207.7 9.179 4.4 28.3 10.6 
1990 - 9.741 4.0 30.4 11.2 
a)N. D. E.: National Defence Expenditure 
Sources: SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and 
Disarmament, 1968/69,1975, The Military 
Balance for 1968 to 1987, Economic Planning 
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Board, Korean Economic Indicators, April, 
1988, Korea Statistical Yearbook, 1971 & 1975. 
Hankuk Daily, August, 28.1992. 
National Defence Expenditure and Other Powerful 
Sectors 
Apart from the characteristics of the regimes, there are 
several other variables to be considered as important 
factors affecting decisions on expenditure. In fact it 
could be considered to be a kind of game of power 
dynamics. However, it is not the main aim of this thesis 
to delineate the procedure of budget planning, thus, 
only two factors will be focused upon: welfare 
expenditure and the military group's relationship with 
the major corporations. 
a) Social Welfare Expenditure 
There are several different studies concerning the 
relationship between national defence expenditure and 
social welfare expenditure. These can be categorised 
into two perspectives: one argues that there is no 
strong correlation between the two and the other claims 
that there is a replacement effect. In the latter case,, 
the claims are based on the theory of the 'zero sum 
game', which means that the more national defence 
expenditure increases, the less money will be allocated 
to social welfare. However, in reality, generally 
speaking, the overall budget increases every year, and 
the absolute amount of expenditure for both national 
defence and social welfare increase as well. In this 
case, the rate of increase should be considered. 
Table. V. 2.3. shows positive signs that in the future, 
expenditure on social welfare will be greater than 
national defence expenditure. 
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Table. V. 2.3. 
National Defence Expenditure and Social Welfare 
Expenditure, 1973 - 1987 
National Defence 
Expenditure 
Social Welfare 
Expenditure 
Year Ratio (a) Rate of 
Increase 
Ratio (a) Rate of 
Increase 
1973 28.0 5.5 22.8 - 
1974 29.0 6.8 20.1 36.2 
1975 28.8 49.0 19.4 46.3 
1976 32.9 59.1 21.0 51.2 
1977 34.7 34.9 21.2 29.1 
1978 37.0 37.7 22.4 36.3 
1979 30.8 19.0 22.7 44.7 
1980 35.6 48.3 24.1 36.6 
1981 33.8 15.9 24.5 23.6 
1982 34.5 18.5 27.0 28.2 
1983 33.0 5.9 27.6 13.5 
1984 31.7 4.5 26.8 5.6 
1985 30.6 8.3 26.9 12.3 
1986 31.4 13.8 27.5 15.5 
1987 30.4 10.9 28.0 14.8 
a) Percentage of the national budget in the previous 
year 
Source: Economic Planning Board, Korean Economic 
Indicator, April. 1988. 
Since the mid 80's, social pressure asking for a more 
democratic society has acted as a strong influence on 
the regime. The military government realised that they 
could not continue to rule the people with only physical 
force. As Table. V. 2.3. shows, the expenditure on social 
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welfare has increased. This is one example where the 
government has tried to respond to social pressure from 
neglected groups who have started to organise themselves 
into powerful blocs. At the same time, it can be 
concluded that the regime has begun to co-operate with 
these sectors through their social policies. 
b) A More Open Discussion about National Defence 
Expenditure 
It is axiomatic in democratic theory, that as citizens, 
people have a right to know how fairly or otherwise the 
government spends their money. Before the 80's however, 
due to the authoritarian nature of the regimes, people 
did not have a chance to discuss the usage of their 
taxes. Particularly, in the matter of national defence 
expenditure, the government monopolised the right to 
plan and execute its expenditure. Because of its 
specific purpose, defence expenditure was treated as 
highly classified on the grounds of national security. 
In 1979, Korea and the US. government made an agreement 
that the Korean government could spend 6% of its GNP on 
national defence (Hyun, 1991: 111). By 1985, '6% of GNP' 
had become an untouchable sacred guide-line, no matter 
how much GNP grew. Under the Chun regime, as explained 
earlier, the 6% 'must' became negotiable against other 
social needs. For the first time, in 1991, national 
defence expenditure for the next year's national budget, 
was discussed in an open manner. An interesting feature 
of this discussion, is that each socially powerful group 
had a different point of view on this matter and tried 
to advance their own interests through this procedure. 
Even within the governmental administration, no 
consensus existed between the Ministry of Defence and 
other economic boards, such as the Economic Planning 
Board (which has the main responsibility for planning 
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the national budget) and the KDI (Korean Development 
Institute: Research Institute for Economy). Outside the 
government, the strongest voice against increasing 
national defence expenditure came from the major 
corporations the 'chaebols' who by then had organised 
themselves into a powerful interest groups within the 
society (as we will show in more detail in Chapter VI 
and VII). According to a report by the Korean Economy 
Institute (hereafter KEI) which is a sub-organisation of 
the FKI (Federation of Korean Industrialists: the 
chaebols' association), 'in accordance with the 
improving peaceful atmosphere around the Korean 
Peninsular, gradual curtailment of national defence 
expenditure should be considered' (Hangyeoreh Daily, 
August. 1.1991). In some senses, this was an unexpected 
response because the FKI had a reputation as the most 
conservative group (Hangyeoreh Daily, August, 13.1991). 
But at another level it was a clear expression of 
sectional interests. 
The 'chaebol' demanded an increase in the social capital 
devoted to such infrastructural items as road building, 
harbour facilities, electricity and industrial water, 
because the lack of investment in these areas was 
thought to be causing rises in cost prices for 
manufacturers and a weakening of competitive power in 
exports. However, if the government tries to increase 
allocations for social overhead capital, it will always 
be faced with relatively fixed expenses such as national 
defence expenditure, which needs a certain amount simply 
to maintain its current commitments, consequently, 
government found itself with limited room in this 
matter. 
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The leading corporations were not the only ones to call 
for a cut in national defence expenditure. The EPB 
(Economic Planning Board), and other economic 
institutes, all supported this position. However, the 
claim of the military group itself mobilised non- 
economic arguments which drew heavily in notions of 
mounting threat to national security. The Minister of 
National Defence outlined the case as follows: 
"... The coming 4-5 years will be the most critical 
period for security in the Korean Peninsular. 
Regardless of the world-wide peaceful mood, North 
Korea is building up its armament. ... thus, 
in 
coming years, national defence expenditure should 
be increased to 4.5% of GNP, and at least a 20% 
increase from the previous year" (Korea Herald, 
August, 17.1991. Interview with Minister) 
The crux of these debates revolved around an effort to 
harmonise the requirements of the national economy and 
perceived needs for national defence. While the military 
claims that in the present international climate, not 
only economic power but also military power is needed to 
gain a negotiating position (Dong A Daily, August. 
17.1991), the other side, which is against increasing 
NDE, claims that the national integrity depends in 
future on social welfare and stability (Doug A Daily, 
August. 27.1991 p. 11). 
One further point which commanded widespread agreement 
from people was the claim that the issue of an 
appropriate scale for NDE requires a new approach. As a 
first step towards this was it was argued that these 
should be a limited opening of NDE information to the 
public (K. Choi, 'Point of View', Hangyeoreh Daily, 
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August. 23.1991). According to this claim, when an 
evaluation of NDE was needed, some documents should be 
open to a limited number of specific people, in order to 
aid analysis. 
After all these discussions, the government finally 
announced that the national budget for the next year had 
been decided. The result for NDE was settled at a 9.8% 
increase from the previous year* (the national budget 
itself increased by 13%). This increase was the first to 
be less than 10% since 1985. Through this discussion, 
all the interest groups, including the military, 
realised that NDE was no longer a 'sacred' topic, and 
this awareness in turn, encouraged each social sector to 
fight more vigorously for a greater share of taxation in 
the future. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the 
characteristics of the Korean state as it is at the 
present time and to indicate how it has evolved in the 
post-war period. -As we have noted at' several 'points 
already, Korea 'is a divided country partitioned into 
separate states in the north and the south. This brute 
fact has a pervasive impact on 'both the dynamics of 
power and the socio-economic situation. However, to 
understand how its effects have been played out we need 
to examine the interaction between three main groups of 
actors; the state power, the major capitalists, and the 
labour movement. 
5.3. - Changes in the Relationship Between the 
State and the Chaebols 
As noted earlier, the key factors determining the degree 
of the state autonomy are the relations between the 
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state and the capital, and between the state and the 
labour. In the following discussion we will explore 
these relations in more depth. The critical role played 
by the state in the economic transformation process in 
Korea has led many researchers to place it at the centre 
of analysis. However once a certain level of economic 
development had been reached, the power structure came 
under pressure to change. In the previous section, 
Korean militarism was identified as one of the most 
important factors determining the characteristics of the 
state in the post-war period. But, as we also saw, the 
military is now seeking for a new way which can 
guarantee their power through compromises with other 
powerful groups. The growth of the major corporations 
and the progressive concentration of wealth in their 
hands has moved them to the centre of the discussion 
over the power structure. At the same time, the power of 
labour has also been increasing in the process of 
economic development. 
5.3.1. Large Corporations and the State From Past 
to Present 
No state is completely separated from its civil 
society, nor are individuals left entirely without 
choices when -confronted with state directives. 
Most 
statist theorists argue that state control can have 
positive effects on economic development2. Studies such 
as those conducted by Stephen Haggard and Chung-In Moon 
2 A good example of the application of this theory is 
Eun-Mee Kim (1987) From Dominance to Symbiosis: State 
and Chaebol in the Korean Economy, 1960-1985. Ph. D 
Dissertation. Department of Sociology. Brown 
University. 
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contend that the strong Korean state's control over 
economic resources was a prerequisite for export-led 
growth (Haggard and Moon, 1983). On the other hand, 
there are strong voices arguing against the beneficial 
effects of government driven economic policies. Many 
commentators have argued that the Park regime's major 
motive in promoting economic development was securing 
its legitimacy. (Koo Hagen, 1987: 168; Lim Hyun-Chin 
1985: 72-73). Along the same lines, statist critics often 
focus on questions of political exclusion and 
favouritism in the distribution of economic benefits. 
The most common arguments point to the increased 
economic concentration that resulted from government 
support for larger enterprises, to the repression of 
blue-collar workers in order to maintain an advantage in 
labour costs, the inequity of distribution across 
regions as well as classes, the disparity between rural 
and urban opportunities, and the massive foreign 
indebtedness caused by the state's policy of relying on 
external capital to finance industrial expansion 
(Janelli, 1994). 
Up until recently, state power has been analysed almost 
exclusively in the context of autonomy or capacity, or 
through an unspecified combination of both. However, now 
that the situation has become more dynamic it is more 
appropriate to incorporate state-related concepts within 
a corporatist model which focuses on the bargaining 
process among powerful actors. There is no question that 
in the past, the Korean state did exercise a high degree 
of autonomy, especially through state-guided economic 
development planning. This is well illustrated by the 
Export-Oriented Industrialisation (EOI) strategy and the 
emphasis on Heavy and Chemical Industrialisation 
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policies (see Chapter VI. 2) . Another example is the 
nationalisation of the banks. 
However, the fact that the Korean state relied heavily 
on the chaebols for the successful implementation of its 
economic development plans substantially constrained its 
autonomy vis-a-vis powerful private interests and, 
subsequently, weakened its capacity to carry the project 
further. The Korean example then clearly supports the 
hypothesis that state power can be undermined as a 
result of its effective pursuit of autonomous 
objectives. Over the period of rapid economic 
development, since the 1980s, the chaebols have arguably 
become the central locus of control in the Korean 
economy. Since 1981, the government has allowed them to 
own shares in the main banks, and has further promoted 
their financial capacity with the law which made it 
possible for them to establish their own financial 
institutions. As a consequence the chaebols have become 
much less dependent on the state. By 1990, the top 30 
chaebols accounted for 14.21% of the country's GNP. More 
importantly, they sought to establish a solid social 
network through career mobility and intermarriage with 
other powerful groups, such as, politicians, academics 
and celebrities. (see Chapter VII. 3.2. ). 
5.3.2. Becoming 'Big Giants' 
Nowadays, the chaebols are not so amenable to state 
guidance and control. Rather, they appear as a 
significant potential counter force which is extending 
its power not only within the economic sector, but also 
within the cultural system. Their moves to control the 
symbolic field operate through their direct ownership of 
the mass media and their financial control exercised 
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through advertisements. These dynamics will be explored 
in a later chapter. In the present context however, the 
most salient instance of extended chaebol power is the 
FKI (Federation of Korean Industrialists). The FKI has 
placed a key role in creating a new alliance by inviting 
important former politicians to become FKI's chairmen 
and other executives (see Chapter VII. 2). This is 
crucial since the FKI's chairman is supposed to have the 
same status as the Minister of the Economy. Hence, when 
the state tries to plan economic policies, the FKI takes 
a central role in these procedures. The FKI is not only 
the major consultant but, more importantly, is also very 
active in attempting to secure policies which can 
benefit its members. It is used as the voice of major 
capitalists to suggest amendments to economic policies. 
Does this mean then that the state itself has become the 
instrument of the leading corporations? The answer is 
'no'. 
In contemporary Korea, the state has become the key 
arena of power struggles. No power group can assume 
state power without making concessions or bargaining 
with other groups. State power therefore resides not in 
the hands of politicians, business leaders, - trade 
unionists or any other groups, but in the organisation 
which has developed symbiotically -cause and effect- 
with the spread of capitalist rationality (Cawson, 1988). 
5.3.3. The Chaebol's Formation as a Political 
Power 
In Korea, the history of party politics is not long 
enough to have secure roots. Most parties have changed 
their names, members and characteristics, and when 
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existing parties do not, get sufficient support, new 
parties are always being established. 
On January 10,1992, the so called UPP (Unification of 
People's Party) was announced as newly formed, by Chung 
Jooyoung, the founder of the Hyundai' Conglomerate. 
According to the members of the party and manifesto, the 
UPP was to be the party of the major capitalists, for 
the major capitalists, and run by the-major capitalists. 
But why do the chaebols have to move into 'the political 
sector, when they know that this will create tenser 
relations with the government? It can be simply 
explained as; "the expression of crisis consciousness 
about the collapse of the capitalist system itself" 
(Mal, February, 1992: 40). This consciousness is related 
to the economic crisis which began in the late 1980s. 
Economic development planning guided by the state was 
faced with limitations and found to be a failure, even 
though the Korean economy apparently developed 
enormously. At the heart of the growing sense of crisis 
was a dilemma. On the one hand, Korean technology still 
lagged some 'way behind Japan. Thus, ' in high-tech 
industries, such as electronics, automobiles, computers, 
Korean companies had difficulties in growing further. On 
the other hand, in the sectors of low value added but 
labour-intensive industries,, for-example, textiles and 
needlework, Korea could no longer compete with the low 
wage economies ofý China or other South-east Asian 
countries. The major corporations, and a majority of 
Korean people, concluded that a change was needed, 
politically, economically and ideologically. 
The formation of'the UPP was therefore a signal that the 
honeymoon in the relations between the state and the 
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chaebols had finished, and that they no longer trusted 
each other. The major capitalists believed that the 
continuing economic recession was caused by an 
incompetent government which did not understand how the 
economy works. Accordingly, it appeared unwise to let 
the government continue to take charge of economic 
policies. Furthermore, as discussed in the previous 
section, because the military regime suffered from a 
lack of legitimacy, it sought to gain it by making 
compromises with popular demands. Some of these took the 
form of anti-capitalist policies, such as the property 
limitation law and the forceful share holding 
regulations in 'relation to the conglomerates. These 
policies, combined with the economic crisis, produced a 
feeling among the chaebols that the state could not be 
relied on anymore, and that they therefore had to 
participate in politics as direct political actors. 
At the same time, capitalism's development has produced 
a working class. But, the stronger state and corporate 
repression has become, the more the workers' 
consciousness of their own interest grows. The next 
section therefore will examine the struggles of labour 
groups, how they have reacted to control by the state, 
and what they are seeking. 
5.4. State, Capital and Labour 
5.4.1. The History of the Labour Movement 
After the liberation from Japan, Korea was plunged into 
political chaos, since there were so many parties and 
political groups insisting on their rights. Among the 
contending groups, -one of -the biggest was the 
'Chunpyeong' (National Labour Council), -established on 
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5th of November, 1945. It included 16 congresses of 
industrial organisations, 1,194 trade unions and 500,000 
union members. The main issue at that time concerned the 
distribution of property once owned by the Japanese. The 
trade unions insisted that the factories should be run 
and controlled by workers themselves. The US military 
government tried to distribute property to people who 
had close relations with them or at least some potential 
to incline towards the US (D. K. Jin, 1985: 117). Another 
major issue was the matter of trusteeship. This 
envisaged putting the Korean peninsular under the joint 
control of the US and the USSR. By the 15th of August, 
1948, the day Korean Independence was announced, the 
country's sovereignty was under two military 
governments, of the US and the USSR, allegedly, in order 
to give Korea time to qualify as an independent country. 
At that time, 'Chunpyeong' was mainly controlled by a 
strong socialist minded leadership. This meant that on 
trusteeship the organisation followed the position of 
the USSR and North Korea, which was pro. In response the 
US military government and the nationalist camp created 
and mobilised a mass labour organisation against 
trusteeship. Called the 'Daihan Nochong' (Korean Labour 
Association), it was launched on the 10th of May, 1946. 
'Daihan Nochong' pursued a right wing line. As their 
manifesto insisted, they sought to build up co-operative 
relationship between employers and employees. More 
specifically they pursued an anti-Chunpyeong, and anti- 
Communist policy. 
Hence when 'Chunpyeong' planned the 'Great Strike' in 
September, 1946, and invited workers throughout South 
Korea to take part, it faced opposition not only from 
the, US military government and the police, but also from 
nationalist organisations. This counter attack was 
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successful and the strike was aborted. As a consequence, 
'Chunpyeong' lost power within the labour movement and 
turned its attention to the political struggle. From 
1948, when the Korean government was formally 
established, 'Daihan Nochong' became the sole legal 
labour organisation (Keumsoo Kim, 1985: 119). 
After Syngman Rhee's regime collapsed in the 'April 
Civil Revolution' (see Chapter VI. 1.3. ), the opposition 
labour movement had another chance to develop. Although 
it was a short time-span of just over a year, -from April 
1960 to May 1961 before Park's military coup, the labour 
movement of this period was continually active. Firstly, 
the number of strikes increased considerably. Most 
demanded either higher wages or the right of labour to 
organise autonomous trade unions or the democratisation 
of government controlled trade unions. (These demands 
have still not been conceded and remain on the agenda to 
the present day). Secondly, a labour movement including 
intellectuals and white collar workers, such as 
teachers, journalists and bankers, was launched (Myung- 
Kook Chang, 1985: 123-124). Thirdly, a distinctive 
movement emerged among the unemployed, who were not 
covered by labour law, and had no way to claim their 
rights. Accordingly, they organised the 'Struggle 
Committee of the Relief Measure for the Unemployed'. 
5.4.2. Under the Military Regimes 
When Park took power by military coup on the 16th of May 
1961, he did not allow any sort of movement or 
organisation, and the country was placed under strong 
martial law. In August, 1961, the government formed the 
"Organisation Committee for Reconstruction" comprising 
nine members designated by the military regime. Its task 
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was to rebuild the industrial trade unions in a way 
sympathetic to the regime. This procedure, which lacked 
support from the mass labour groups, was met by the 
underground trade unions in the 170's. 
Because the labour movement has always interacted with 
and been formed by the wider economic situation, it is 
important to examine the economic crisis and 
developments in the 60's in order to understand the 
development of labour. After the normalisation of the 
diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan in 1963, 
foreign investment capital, including Japanese capital, 
flooded into Korea. This helped to exacerbate the gap 
between rich and poor, and deepen the sense of 
alienation among labour groups. Moreover, the government 
intervened in labour-capitalist relations continually 
changed the Labour Law to a more retrogressive form. 
Inevitably then, the struggles of labour groups had to 
deal with both economic and political issues (In-Dong 
Kim, 1985: 152-3)'. Examples from this era included; the 
fight for the restoration of the right to strike which 
had been suspended since the military coup; strikes in 
1963 and 1964 against the retrogressive revision of the 
Labour Law; and in 1968. Most of these actions can be 
categorised as political interventions against 
government policies guided by the trade unions 
Generally speaking however, under Park's regime, because 
of authoritarian nature of the military based 
government, the labour movement in Korea was relatively 
weak. There was one initiative, though, which sounded 
alarm bells throughout the whole society in 1970. On the 
13th of November, Tai-il Chun, a cutter in a small 
textile factory in Pyeonghwa Market burnt himself to 
death after his union's demands for higher wage and 
130 
Chapter V Korea in Political Analysis 
systematic change of working condition had been rejected 
by the company and the government. Pyeonghwa Market 
combined shops and factories, mainly of cheap clothes. 
Many shopkeepers owned their own small factories. Thus, 
after they had produced cheap clothes, -they-were able to 
supply their products directly at competitive prices. 
While the owners of factories and shops kept prices low 
they still wanted to make a profit, and the easiest way 
to achieve this was to exploit their labourers. Wages 
were below the minimum living standard requirement, and 
working hours were incredibly long, and working 
conditions were criticised as 'deadly' (In-Dong Kim, 
1985: 155). Because the work entailed dealing with fabric 
materials, -the working environment was full of 
dust and 
poisonous smells from the poor quality material used. 
Factory workers at Pyeonghwa Market kept asking for 
improvement their working condition, but had always been 
refused by the owners, and from-time to time, such 
demands were seen as rebellious actions by the 
government. On the 13th of November, labour groups met 
to press their demands. Once again, these were not 
accepted. Tai-il Chun then burnt himself to death to 
express the labourers' anger and to accuse the companies 
and the government. He left some words before his death. 
They read as follows; "(Employers! ) Obey the Labour 
Law! ", "(Colleague workers! ) Don't let my death be in 
vain! " (In-Dong Kim, 1985: 155). This event made a deep 
impression on the labour groups. They started to realise 
that if they were going to improve their working 
conditions and social status, they had to organise 
themselves and corporate with other social sectors. Two 
groups in particular attracted attention as potential 
allies; radical religious groups and youth (mainly 
university students). In the 70's, new movements 
developed against the conservative attitude in religion 
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and sought to evangelise with /among the working class. 
One was the CIE (City Industrial Evangelist) . Another 
was the Catholic Youth Association. Both established 
small study groups within industrial areas, which 
discussed working class' suffering and encouraged them 
to organise themselves. University students were one of 
the main supporters of the working class. They formed 
associations with workers by organising night time 
educational classes. Some students even went to 
factories to live and participate in the labour movement 
as manual workers. 
After Park's assassination in October 1979, the 
political economic situation became very unstable. In 
1980, for the first time, the rate of the unemployment 
reached 5.0% up from 3.8% the previous year, and the 
inflation rate of the wholesale price index approached 
44.2%. The number of strikes, before the proclamation of 
martial law by General Chun, reached 897 and involving 
nearly 200,000 workers throughout the country. However, 
after General Chun took power by military coup, he made 
every congress of - industrial organisations illegal and 
to consolidate his control, he only allowed individual 
trade union. This meant that, it became nearly 
impossible for workers to associate with workers in 
other companies, including those in the same--industrial 
sector. 
In February, 1985, after a parliamentary election had 
produced an overwhelming success for the opposite party, 
the government tried to appease its political opponents. 
As a result, the formation of trade union became easier 
which in turn created fertile soil for the further 
development of the labour movement in 1987. 
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5.4.3.1987 'The Great Strike' 
On 13th of April, 1987, President Chun announced that he 
had no intention of amending the constitution relating 
to Presidential elections, and that from now on all 
discussion and demands about this matter would be 
treated as illegal. The people reacted angrily and went 
out into the streets to demonstrate their disagreement 
with the government. By June, participation in street 
demonstrations involved 5 million people from small 
villages to the main cities and from secondary school 
students to the elderly. Korea looked to be on the verge 
of civil war. The military had to make concessions to 
protect its own power. On the 29th of June, 1987, Roh 
Taewoo, a candidate for president from the DJP 
(Democratic Justice Party, the party then in power) 
announced the so-called '6.29 Declaration', which 
included the promise of a constitutional amendment 
giving people a direct vote in the next presidential 
election. 
After this, the demonstrations faded since most people 
believed that they had achieved their main goal. This 
appeared to be supported by the fact that in the '6.29 
Declaration', Roh promised several further concessions, 
such as; guarantees of freedom of speech; improvements 
to people's basic rights, and the correction of social 
corruption. However, these promises remained abstract 
and were never supported by specific policies. As a 
consequence the centre of the democratic movement 
shifted to the labour groups, because they saw clearly 
that they had gain nothing from the Declaration. 
On the 5th of July, 1987, 'The great Strike' was 
launched from the Hyundai Engine Co., one of the 
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affiliates of the country's biggest conglomerate, 
Hyundai. Within the Hyundai group, the organisation of 
trade unions was prohibited. However, seizing the 
opportunity presented by the democratic mood of the 
society, the workers at the Hyundai Engine Co. broke 
this taboo, and succeeded in forming a trade union. The 
euphoria at this breakthrough spread to all the other 
affiliates in the Group. On the 16th of July, company 
administrators stole documents related to trade union 
organisation at Hyundai Mipo Ship Building Co.. This act 
ignited workers in other divisions, and on the 8th of 
August, the 'Trade Unions Association of Hyundai 
Affiliates' was, formed. Meanwhile, because of the scale 
of the Hyundai Group, these events motivated workers in 
other factories throughout the country. The movement 
started in the big heavy industries centred around male 
workers, but it soon pervaded other sectors and 
developed to form a national general strike. 
The main achievement of these strikes were the 
organisation of new trade unions and the achievement of 
higher wages. Graph V. 1. shows the annual number of 
newly organised trade unions. As can be seen in 1987, 
the number increases dramatically. Table V. 4.1. shows 
this movement in more detail showing that it was not 
limited only to' heavy industries, but spread to other 
industrial sectors (see Table V. 4.2. ). 
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Graph V. 1. 
Annual Increase in the Number of Newly Organised 
Trade Unions 
Source: Christian Society Research Institute, '87 White 
Paper for Working Condition. 
Table V. 4.1. 
Number of Organised Trade Unions, 29th June to 
31st of September, 1987 
Period Number of Trade Unions 
29th, June - 15th, Jul 33 
16th, Jul V- 31st, Jul 126 
1st Au ust- 31st, Au ust 681 
1st, September-31st, 
Se tember 319 
Source: Christian Society Research Institute, 
Labour Condition. 
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Table. V. 4.2. 
Distribution of Strikes in Major Industries, 
of June to 13th of September, 1987 
Industrial 
Classification 
Number of 
Strikes 
Heavy Industries 1,796 
Transp ortation 1,247 
Mining 127 
Others 195 
Source: Christian Society Research Institute, 1987 
29th 
At this point, it is necessary to look in a little more 
detail at labours' demands during this period. These can 
be summarised under three main headings. First of all, 
they demanded higher wage. Before the '6.29 
Declaration', the agreed rate of wage rises was between 
7% and 8%. During 'the Great Strike', workers generally 
requested from 20 to 30%. As labour strikes spread over 
the country, so' the workers became more confident and 
expected to win. The second set of demands related to 
improvements in working condition. Agreed demands 
include; opposition to the impersonal treatment of 
manual workers by those performing managerial functions; 
opposition to big wage differentials between workers in 
the Administration and Production Divisions; fair 
periods of paid holiday (both annual and monthly); and 
equal treatment for female workers (Ministry of Labour 
Affairs, 1987) . 
'Thirdly, workers demanded the right to 
organise their own trade unions instead of government or 
company controlled unions. 
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5.4.4. Some Characteristics of 'The Great Strike' 
We can point to three main characteristics of 'The Great 
Strike'. The first was the massive level of 
participation in strikes, involving most workers 
whatever their jobs. For three months, the rate of 
participants among the total labour force reached 48.8 % 
(Ministry of Labour, 1987: 147; Youngmin Lee, 1988). This 
meant that 'The Great Strike' was widely supported. At 
the same time, it helps to explain the second main 
feature. The major reason for mass participation was 
that the strikes represented the generally agreed 
demands of workers. Thirdly, we have to re-emphasise the 
significance of the starting point for 'The Great 
Strike'. For the first time, the strikes were lead by 
male workers in heavy industries. This is very different 
from the situation in the 70's when the main core of the 
labour movement was still located among female workers 
in light industries and textiles. 
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5.4.5. Changes in Labour Policies 
Before the Strike, the reactions of the government and 
employers to labour movements inclined towards the use 
of physical force by the police. After the Strike, they 
were inclined to try to solve conflicts by negotiation 
and bargaining. In December, 1987, the government 
revised the Labour Law to remove restrictions on the 
formation of trade unions and rescind some of the 
qualifying conditions relating to the operation of trade 
unions. The government even arrested some employers who 
had mistreated their employees in 1988. The government 
also promised various welfare policies, such as; a 
policy for minimum wage guidelines; a people's pension 
scheme; amendments to the medical insurance policy; a 
better mortgage policy for working class' housing. 
Overall it attempted to maintain a neutral position in 
to labour matters. 
5.4.6. Conclusion 
The gap between the 'have' and the 'have not' is a 
common product of all capitalist societies, but in the 
Korean case, it has generated a deep popular hatred of 
capitalist privilege. This is the product of the short 
history of capitalism in the country and the fact that 
the major conglomerates have exacerbated social problems 
in the process of accumulating their wealth. In 
addition, authoritarian government, based on militarism, 
has created a distinctive model of action and reaction 
within the Korean labour movement (Palais, 1985). 
Generally speaking, labour groups' interests were to be 
absorbed into the central authority with a only small 
quid pro as the prize for surrendering their 
associational autonomy (Choi, 1987: 322). 
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As a consequence, labour groups have sought political 
power through the establishment of their own party which 
can represent their interests. However, in the 1992 
elections, the party did not win a single seat in 
Parliament, and was therefore cancelled as a legal 
entry. Perhaps labour groups are not mature enough to 
organise their own party yet, particularly when we bear 
in mind the short history of capitalism in Korea. 
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CHAPTER VI. 
State Support and Economic Growth 
STATE SUPPORT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Throughout the first part of this thesis, we have 
concentrated on two principal tasks; 
1) To identify the main components of the economic 
success of East Asian NICs. 
2) To examine each nation as the product of a unique 
combination of factors and circumstances. 
Although the four Asian NICs share strong similarities, 
what allows them to survive and sustain their high rate 
of continuous development lies with each country's unique 
history and circumstances, and with their responses to 
these differences. As noted earlier, Korea can generally 
be differentiated from its counterparts in three ways; 
the continuity of military regimes; the domination of 
conglomerates within the business sector, and; until 
recently, strong protectionism, which forbade direct 
foreign investment. 
In order to pursue these points in more detail this 
chapter outlines the early development of economic growth 
in Korea focusing on the relationships between successive 
regimes and the major corporations in their historical 
context. In the case of Korea, state economic policies 
created the gigantic conglomerates, 'chaebols'. The 
government did little to improve the inequality of income 
distribution between the poor and the riche. In other 
1 Taiwan, in contrast, had remarkable success in reducing 
the gap between the lowest 20% of the income range and 
the upper 20%, moving from a Gini coefficient of 0.440 
to 0.317. Singapore and Hong Kong were affected by 
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words, Korean economic development planning has- been 
executed in favour of the capitalist group instead of 
considering the people's welfare and quality life. 
These features are partially derived from the 
characteristics of the Korean state or more precisely the 
military regimes. Park Chung-Hee and his colleagues from 
the Military Academy took power via a coup d'etat in 1961 
ushering in a succession of military regimes which lasted 
for more than thirty years. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the characteristics of militarism penetrated to 
all the levels of the society and influenced people's 
life on a considerable scale. Many studies have been done 
to explain the economic success of Korea, but as 
mentioned earlier, they do not pay sufficient attention 
to the militaristic character of the society. In this 
thesis, I argue that the one of the most important 
factors shaping the Korean power structure is militarism. 
Even the origin of the major capitalists grouping cannot 
be properly explained without taking their relationship 
with the military regime fully into account. In 
initiating economic development planning, instead of 
calling on the expertise' of long-term research, the 
regime took over the Japanese model which was centred on 
the Zaibatsu (the Chinese word for 'chaebol'). Direct 
investment by foreigners were strictly prohibited and the 
inflows of refugees and immigrants. However, their Gini 
coefficients are still slightly declining compared to 
1965. In contrast, even if it has been relatively low, 
Korea's Gini coefficient has remained more or less the 
same after 20 years of development, and has even 
increased marginally, from 0.344 to 0.345. (Sakong, 
1993: 17, Chowdhury & Islam, 1993: 25; Haggard, 1990: 226; 
Papanek, 1988: 58). 
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government allocated preferential resources to favoured 
companies as a routine way to exercise its power over 
capitalists. 
Despite the turmoil of the political situation, the role 
of the big capitalist groupings has been steadily 
transformed. From an initial position of dependence on 
the regime they have emerged as the power group with more 
influence on society and on the government than any 
other. 
The next two chapters pursue the details of this process 
and are divided chronologically. The first explains how 
the core capitalist groupings were formed under Japanese 
colonisation through to the early years of Korean 
independence. The second examines their subsequent growth 
and the various forms of co-operation with the regime 
that this involved. 
6.1. The Origins of the Major Korean Industrial 
Corporations - The Chaebol 
This initial section is concerned with the historical 
background to the rise of the major industrial 
corporations, known as the 'chaebol', from the early 
stages of capitalist growth under the Japanese 
colonisation through to the 1960s when the government 
began to implement initiatives to develop the economy. 
The term 'chaebol' derives from the Japanese counterpart, 
the 'Zaibatsu'. Indeed, 'chaebol' is the Korean 
pronunciation of the Chinese characters used by the 
Japanese to write the word 'Zaibatsu'. One can find many 
similarities between the organisation and practices of 
these pre-war Japanese business groups and those of the 
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modern South Korean conglomerates (Jones & Sakong, 
1980: 259-60, Hattori, 1989)2. While several definitions 
can be found, 'chaebols' are generally thought to be 
'very large conglomerates, owned and managed by a 
single family and composed of several firms 
operating in a wide array of often unrelated 
industries' (Janelli, 1993: 81). 
6.1.1. The Japanese Colonial Period 
During the Japanese Colonial Period which lasted from 
1910 to 1945, severe restrictions both overt and covert 
were imposed against Korean-owned businesses. Even before 
that time, the ruling structure supported by Korean 
Confucian ideology had discriminated against the 
accumulation of capital through commercial enterprises. 
The occupational hierarchy was divided into four rigid 
strata; Sa (the learned); Nong (the farmer); Gong (those 
engaged in handicrafts or manufacture) and Sang (the 
merchants). The"Sa" strata covered the most prestigious 
occupations. These consisted of bureaucrats and Confucian 
scholars and were monopolised by the Yangban (nobles or 
gentry). The remaining three strata were shared by 
between the Sangmin (commoners) and the Chonmin (the 
lowly or bandman). The social norm stipulated that each 
estate should remain within the boundaries of the 
appropriate strata. The privileged Yangban estate 
2 The scope of this thesis does not extend to a 
discussion of the similarities between the 'chaebol' 
and the ' zaibatsu' , However, 
"a good summary can be 
found in Hattori Tamio's article, "Japanese Zaibatsu 
and Korean Chaebol" in Chung Kae H. and Lee Hak 
Chong., eds., Korean Managerial Dynamics. New York: 
Praeger. 1989. 
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therefore monopolised political and administrative power. 
It owned a large amount of cultivated land that had been 
granted as a reward for government service. It also 
enjoyed the social esteem derived from noble status (Suh, 
1988: 38). They developed a ruling ideology which was 
designed to maintain agriculture as the main basis of 
productive relations. The guided principle was "Farming 
is the most sacred vocation in the world". On the basis 
of this ideology, those in other occupations were 
discriminated against. 
During the colonial period, although traditional 
Confucian values remained strong, some industrialists did 
manage to emerge from the merchant strata and from those 
who were introduced to western and Japanese industrialism 
through their education in modern Japanese schools. But 
as Table VI. 1.1. shows, only two of 30 largest chaebols 
were established at that time. Even if we extend the 
category of leading chaebols to the top 50 concerns, only 
three others can be added. 
Table VI. 1. l. 
Foundation Date of the 50 Largest Chaebols, 1990 
Rank Before 
1910 
Japanese 
Colonial 
Period 
(1910-45) 
US 
Occupancy 
(1945-48 
Jul v) 
Rhee 
Regime 
(Aug. 
1948-60) 
Park 
Regime 
(1961-79) 
1-10 0 1 3 5 1 
11-30 1 1 4 8 6 
31-50 0 3 4 7 
-- 
6 
Total 1 5 11 20 13 T 
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Like any other colonial government, the Japanese acted to 
protect their own perceived interests. Since their basic 
objective during the first two decades of their 
administration of Korea was to develop a periphery 
specialising in producing food grains, industrial 
development was, ' not surprisingly, discouraged'. In 1911, 
a Corporation Law was passed designed- to restrict 
investment in-non-agricultural sectors and discourage 
private Japanese capital. from flowing into them. The 
-, 
aim 
was quite explicitly to prevent the establishment of new 
industries in Korea which might compete with those in 
Japan. Above all, the Corporation Law was used to 
discriminate against Korean business enterprises 
(Sangchul Suh, 1978: 9-10). As a result, by 1919 only 17% 
of corporations in Korea were Korean owned and Koreans 
held only 11% of invested capital (see Table VI. 1.2. ). As 
Table VI. 1.3. shows, most factories owned by Koreans were 
small and simply extended traditional household 
industries. The average capital invested by Korean firms 
in factories constituted only 0.1% of the average for 
Japanese large factories and 6.7% of the average for 
Japanese small to medium sized factories (Suh, 1988: 44). 
Table VI. 1.2. 
Number of Firms and Percentage of Investment 
Capital by Owners' Nationality, 1919 
Number of Firms Investment 
Capital 
Japanese 280 (76%) 77 % 
Korean 63 (17%) 11 % 
Korean-Japanese Joint 22 ( 7%) 10 % 
American-Japanese Joint 1 2% 
Total 366 100% KY 761,573 
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Source: The Government-General, Recent Chosun Review, 
1921: 278-281. as cited in Suh, 1988: 67 
Table VI. 1.3. 
Number of Factories, Amounts of Total Capital and 
Capital per Factory by the Nationality of 
Ownership, 192,7 
Nationality Number of Total Capital per 
Factory Capital Factory 
(KY 1000) (KY 1000) 
Korean 2,457 23,289 9 
Japanese 
Large factory 14 115,960 8,283 
Small/medium 2,265 303,558 134 
Other Foreign 93 18 609 200 
Source: The Government-General, The Statistical Yearbook, 
1927 as cited in Suh, 1988: 68 
In the wake of the World Depression in 1929, however 
Japanese colonial policy needed to change. State policies 
accordingly began promoting basic industrial production 
in Korea and Manchuria while Japan itself moved on to a 
more advanced stage of industrialisation (Jones and 
Sakong, 1980). More importantly, Japan was in urgent need 
of military equipment following the Manchurian incident 
of 1931-1932. To meet this need, it decided to make Korea 
a base for its armaments industry. The Japanese 
industrialisation strategy was based on a model of dual 
development with an agricultural south and an industrial 
north. As Table VI 1.4. shows 1948 the South accounted 
80% of food production whilst the North made 95% of the 
steel and accounted for 85-90% of power supplies. 
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However, the South was strong in the production of 
chemicals and machinery. This unevened the country's 
overall development and constrained Korea's initial 
attempt at industrialisation following Liberation from 
Japan. 
Table VI. 1.4. 
Production in Selected Industries in South and 
North Korea (in percentages as of 1945), 1948 
Industry South Korea North Korea 
Steel 5 95 
Hydroelectric 10 90 
Power 15 85 
Chemical 65 35 
Machinery 65 35 
Food 80 20 
Source: Yi, 1984: 376 
To sum up, traditional Korean Confucian ideology coupled 
with Japanese colonial policy meant that there was no 
possibility of a full transition from feudalism to 
capitalism during the colonial period. This had to wait 
until after the Liberation when land reform brought about 
the collapse of the material base of the landlord class. 
There was only one exception: the Sam Yang Group. 
The Sam Yang Group was established in 1924 by the 
founder. He had accumulated a huge estate and was able to 
transform these landed assets into modern industrial 
capital in various ways. By 1990, the group was ranked 
the 39th largest in Korea. 
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6.1.2. The US Military Government 
After Japan conceded defeat in World War II, Korea was 
liberated suddenly on August 15,1945. However the 
country could not achieve independent sovereign status 
immediately. The two major political poles of the post- 
war political map, the USA. and the USSR, both concluded 
that Korea should not become an independent country. For 
three years, from August 1945 to July 1948 (the day Korea 
announced the formation of its own new government) a US 
military government ruled South Korea. The political and 
economic consequence of American military rule went 
beyond merely reproducing or strengthening features of 
the Japanese colonial state (Janelli, 1993: 71). It also 
divided the nation at the 38th parallel creating two 
hostile domains, one aligned with communism and the other 
with the United States. Because the United States was 
concerned primarily with the geopolitical rather than the 
economic potential of south Korea throughout the 1950's, 
American attention focused on strengthening South Korea's 
military capacity. This helped to create the conditions 
for the later military dominance of South Korea society. 
Major General Park Chung Hee's coup d'etat in 1961 marked 
the return, not the beginning of military rule in South 
Korea (Cumings, 1981; Henderson, 1991). 
Even though the US military government subjugated Korea 
it did not take an active role in transforming the 
country into a developed industrial capitalist state. 
There were two reasons for this. Firstly, after 
Liberation from Japan, the internal political situation 
of Korea was chaotic. For the previous 35 years, every 
attempt to take or organise power had been completely 
prohibited. As a consequence, when political space was 
opened up, numerous organisations and parties either 
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emerged from underground or were newly formed. It was, 
literally, a period of dynamic vacuum. 
The first land reform on March 23,1948 was implemented 
by the US military government and met with strong 
opposition from most Koreans. They did not want such a 
massive reform to be introduced by a foreign power. They 
felt that it should have been organised by the new Korean 
government. Moreover, the reform that was introduced 
could not satisfy the two main sides, landlords and 
peasants. However, it did pave the way for land reform in 
the future. 
Secondly, it is important to remember that underpinning 
the USA's treatment Korea and many other third world 
countries was a strategy aimed at creating peripheral 
production sectors under its control. How US aid affected 
economic development in Korea will be discussed later. 
However, there is one point to be emphasised here that 
'Land Reform' coupled with foreign aid concentrated on 
surplus grain caused the Korean agricultural system to 
collapse in the long-term. It led inevitably to periodic 
imports in the future and more importantly, created a low 
paid labour market which made labour intensive industries 
possible. 
6.1.3. The Rhee Regime 
The first general election of the post period was held to 
elect representatives of the National Assembly in South 
Korea. It took place in spite of national resistance 
fuelled by fears that such a 'half' election would cement 
a division of Korea into south and north. However, the US 
military government felt that they had to transform Korea 
into an independent nation since in the north, the Soviet 
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military government had already turned over the reins of 
power to the Korean people a few months-earlier. The US 
government was seeking a 'fit and proper' person as the 
first President of Korea someone who could match their 
conditions. Firstly, the President needed to support US 
global strategies and diplomatic policies. He had to be 
pro-America and anti communist and capable of making 
Korea a vanguard of capitalism in eastern Asia. Secondly, 
in order to establish the legitimacy of the government, 
he must have participated in the independence movement 
during the Japanese colonial period. The answer was 
Syngman Rhee. He was duly elected as the first President 
of Korea by the representatives of the National Assembly 
and remained in office for 12 years until he was forced 
to resign on charges of corruption, an event 'which 
precipitated the April Civil Revolution3 in 1960. 
3 The April Civil Revolution occurred after the March 
15 elections. Well before that date, there was 
already a great amount of dissatisfaction about the 
Rhee regime, however, after the election, the body 
of a student who had apparently been killed by a 
tear gas canister was discovered in the bay around 
Masan, a southern port city. This immediately 
brought citizens into the streets and into 
confrontation with the police. By the end of the 
demonstrations, about 130 students had been killed 
and another 1,000 wounded in Seoul alone, and the 
country had been placed under martial law. Lacking 
American support and faced with nation-wide demands 
for his resignation, President Rhee finally resigned 
on 26 April, leaving the government in the hands of 
his foreign minister. A month later Rhee left for 
Hawaii. The First Republic was over. 
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As Table VI. 1.1. shows, during Rhee's period in office, 
the Korean economy moved into a new phase with 20 of the 
50 largest business groups being established over that 
time. In this situation, three main factors enabled the 
Korean business class to accumulate capital and to make 
the transition from commercial to industrial capitalism; 
the politics of the Rhee regime, the privatisation of 
Japanese properties and the huge amount of foreign aid. 
The last two factors however are arguably, less important 
than the first. 
Despite his weak power base, when Syngman Rhee was first 
elected as President, he was backed by Hanmin-Dang (the 
Korean Democratic Party) which was based within the 
ruling landlord class and had pro-Japan members. Once in 
power however, he was able to undermine the financial 
base of the Hanmin-Dang landlords by means of the 
presidential prerogatives specified by the new provisions 
of the constitution. To consolidate his power base, Rhee 
established his own Liberal Party 'in 1952. He implemented 
Land Reforms in the period 1950-1955 and thereby created 
a strata of nouveau riche Liberal Party entrepreneurs 
willing to finance both his party and other illegitimate 
political interventions such as two constitutional 
revisions (Kim 1975: 154, History of Liberation 30 years 
Vol. 2: History of Korean Revolutionary Court 1962: 92-98). 
Jones and Sakong (1980: 271-2) summarise the special 
favours which were given to the Liberal Party 
entrepreneurs by the Rhee regime: the non-competitive 
allocation of import quotas and import licences; bargain 
basement price acquisition of former Japanese assets; the 
selective allocation of 'aid fund and materials; 
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privileged access to cheap bank loans4; non-competitive 
awards of government and US military contracts for 
reconstruction activities. All of these devices, except 
the second have been used actively up until today to 
distribute the privileges that have provided the fertile 
soil for chaebol investments. During the Rhee regime 
then, the bond between the regime and the large 
capitalists was consolidated. The result was the 
production of 'political capitalists'. 
The process employed to distribute properties abandoned 
by the Japanese after the Liberation provided great scope 
to guarantee receivers non-competitive advantages. 
Persons or firms who sought to acquire enterprises could 
sometimes buy them for less than ten percent of their 
market value, and even the purchase price was financed by 
low-interest bank loans, with the aid of the Rhee regime 
(see details, Jones & Sakong 1980: 272). According to one 
study, of 57 Korean chaebols in 1986,21.1% had become 
major capitalist enterprises on the basis of their 
acquisition of Japanese properties (see Table VI. 1.5). 
4 According to Kuznets (1977: 48), one of the other 
reasons for the Rhee administration's principal 
policy of giving favours was to create "distorted" 
prices for low interest and exchange rates. This 
encouraged entrepreneurs to seek profit not by 
increasing production but rather by using' 
contributions to foreign exchange at the official 
rate to acquire imported goods and then selling them 
in the domestic market. 
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Table VI. 1.5. 
Initial Source of Capital For Fifty Seven Leading 
Chaebols 
Tvpe % (n) 
Foreign Trade 40.4 (23) 
Merchant 
Small/medium manufacture 15.8 ( 9) 
Rice mill and rice store 22.8 (13)' 
Japanese Property 21.1 (12) 
Transportation 19.3 (11) 
Construction 8.8 ( 5) 
Manager 3.5 ( 2) 
Total 100 N=57 
Source: Suh, 1988: 67 
Thirdly, the foreign aid, especially, from US has to be 
considered as an important factor. Geographical 
speciality burdened Korea as a very important role for US 
world strategy. Korea could be the arena of struggle 
between capitalism and socialism. Thus, from 1953 to 
1962, economic assistance to south Korea by USA. amounted 
to roughly $2 billion and military assistance to roughly 
$1 billion (Mason et al 1980: 181) . Such foreign 
assistance played an important temporary part in the 
economic reconstruction during this period. It financed 
69 % of total imports from 1953 to 1962. This was equal 
to 77% of total fixed capital formation and 8.1% of GNP 
(see Table. VI .1.6) . 
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Table VI. 1.6. 
Ratio of Aid Imports, Net Foreign Savings to GNP, 
Total Imports, and Fixed Capital Formation 1953-62 
(unit: %) 
Ratio to GNP of 
Total Imports 11.7 
Fixed Capital Formation 10.5 
Foreign Savings 9.1 
Aid Imports 8.1 
Ratio to Total Imports of 
Foreign Savings 78 
Aid Imports 69 
Ratio to fixed Capital Formation of 
Foreign Savings 88 
Aid Imports 77 
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 
National Income Of Korea, 1975 as cited in Mason 
et al, 1980: 185 
However, foreign aid reinforced the dependence of the 
Korean economy on the USA. Although its surpluses of 
agricultural produce in raw forms stimulated the growth 
of industries to process them, such as sugar mills, flour 
mills and cotton spinning factories (Suh, 1988: 61), the 
resulting supplies of finished commodities hastened the 
collapse of traditional agricultural society in Korea. It 
also generated a huge low paid labour force operating in 
poor working conditions. Finally, the development of such 
labour intensive industries relegated Korea to a 
peripheral role with in the emerging structure of the 
post-war world economy. 
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6.1.4. Conclusion 
State Sunoort and Economic Growth 
Ever from this brief examination of the historical 
background, it is clear that the social origins of 
Korea's contemporary capitalists can not be found in the 
feudal system. Due to various factors, Korean landlords 
could not transform their assets into industrial 
capitals. These factors can be summarised under three 
main headings. 
First of all, throughout the colonial period, landlords' 
assets were eroded by high rates of tax and the payment 
of the substantial amounts of grains requested by 
Japanese colonial policy. Secondly, even after 
Liberation, the landlords who failed to forge political 
bonds with the Rhee regime lost their material base 
through the land reforms implemented under the US 
military government and the Rhee regime. This was the 
result of power struggles within the regime, which had a 
weak power base and had been faced with a dynamic vacuum. 
The Korean Civil War played a major role in reinforcing 
this unstable situation, since it damaged or destroyed 
resources and infrastructures throughout the peninsular, 
except for one southern island and a small part of the 
southeast. Finally, the traditional ideology of Korean 
society, which is based on Confucian ideas, prohibited 
the landlord class from investing their capital in 
commercial trades. 
20 of the 50 largest chaebols were established during 
Rhee regime. Even though their growth rate cannot compete 
with those subsequently achieved during the Park regime, 
their passionate pursuit of durable political ties was 
reinforced and rewarded by the privileged distribution of 
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Japanese properties and foreign assistance and, more 
importantly, the policies of the Rhee Regime themselves. 
6.2. Strategic State Support and the Growth of the 
Chaebols 
After the resignation of the Rhee regime, the Korean 
people experienced democracy for the first time since the 
Japanese colonial period. The April Civil Revolution 
which had originated with students, now pervaded the 
whole nation. Throughout the Rhee regime, the Korean 
people had grown increasingly tired of the deepening 
corruption connected to political ties. But the 
escalating democratic demands which now erupted could not 
be met by the fragile new system of government and the 
country entered a power vacuum once again. This opened 
the door to military intervention and on may 16,1961, 
Park Chung Hee took power through a military coup. 
However, the surrounding situation did not favour his new 
regime. At domestic level, the Korean people refused to 
give up their trampled democratic demands. Externally a 
challenge also came from the United State, which at that 
time provided more than 50% of the national budget and 
72.4% of the defence budget. This gave them substantial 
leverage over the Korean government. Moreover, since the 
Korean War, the US government has had supreme command of 
the army in Korea. They still supported the_ former 
constitutional government and expressed serious concern 
about the new regime. 
The Park regime for its part, saw very clearly that only 
economic development would bring internal and external 
legitimacy, avoid United States' political intervention. 
Since GNP per capita at that time was only about $80, and 
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starvation prevailed during spring seasons, the regime's 
emphasis on economic development was well accepted by the 
populace. It also meant that demands for democracy could 
plausibly be delayed until after the appropriate level of 
economic development had been achieved. 
The military Government, in the years 1961-1963, planned 
to develop a nationalistically oriented, state-guided 
capitalism. As a first step, during-the junta period, 
Park introduced the Illicit Wealth Accumulation Charges 
and the nationalisation of banks with the aim of gaining 
greater control over capital and thereby making economic 
planning easier. Follow this, he pursued the more 
ambitious Export-Oriented Industrialisation strategy and 
the accompanying emphasis on the development of the heavy 
and chemical Industries. Both initiatives will be 
outlined here together with their impact on the growth of 
the chaebols. 
6.2.1. The Illicit Wealth Accumulation Charges and 
the Nationalisation of the banks 
As earlier studies have shown, during the Rhee regime the 
chaebols accumulated capital through their preferential 
treatment by the state and their monopoly of lucrative 
businesses (Chung, 1987; Kang, Choi & Chang: 1991). When 
Park came to power, he gave the Illicit Wealth 
Accumulation Charges the utmost importance and enforced 
the law in full. Because neither he nor other members of 
military junta had previous political ties with the 
chaebols, they could bring them under the regime's 
control as a group. At the political level, such charges 
had the added bonus of displaying the military 
government's will to 'save' the nation from corruption. 
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The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction announced 
the committee for the investigation and execution of the 
Illicit Wealth Accumulation Charges on May 28,1961, just 
twelve days after Park came power. On the same day, the 
presidents of the major chaebols were arrested and 
jailed. According to the Supreme Council announcement, 
they were being charged with; 1) the illegal acquisition 
of government properties; 2) the unjust loaning of 
government-owned foreign capital; 3) the illicit payment 
of money to government officials (bribery); 4) profiting 
from unjust bidding; 5) unjust profiting from foreign 
capital; 6) tax evasion; 7) transferring property to 
foreign countries; and 8) others. Without-exception, all 
the major chaebols and companies were given heavy fines. 
Then, on January 12,1962, the Supreme Council announced 
that those charged with illicit wealth accumulation 
could, if they wished, build factories necessary for 
national reconstruction and donate them to the state 
instead of paying the fines. On May 9,1962, the Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry approved ten companies which 
were to be donated to the state in lieu of payment of 
fines. These included companies for cement, electrical 
machinery, iron and steel, machinery, fertilisers, PVC, 
electrical cables, and refrigeration and freezing (Eun 
Mee Kim, 1987: 80). 
The state not only gave chaebols the right to build 
factories instead of paying fines, it also provided loans 
for their construction. Since all foreign capital had to 
be approved by the Supreme Council for National 
Reconstruction, it was the state which took the 
initiative in finding loans for the chaebols (Korea 
Yearbook, 1962: 1963). These initiatives were only 
possible because of the prior nationalisation of the 
banks by the military government. By controlling domestic 
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banks and acting as the guarantor of international loans, 
the state was able to direct low-interest policy loans to 
favoured industries, companies, or individual 
entrepreneurs (Janelli, 1993: 63). Businessmen acquiescing 
to state directives were able to obtain financing at 
interest rates so favourable that throughout most of the 
1970's, they were allegedly lower than the rate of 
inflation (World Bank, 1987a: 39). In this situation,,, -the 
relationship between the regime and the chaebols could 
not be viewed co-operative or bargaining. Rather it was 
weighted heavily in favour of the regime. The 
nationalisation was maintained until 1982. 
6.2.2. The Export-Oriented Industrialisation 
Strategy (EOI) 
The policy with the most far-reaching consequences for 
the chaebols in the 1960s was the Export-oriented 
Industrialisation (EOI) strategy. Its central emphasis 
was on the reduction and substitution of imports and the 
transition to an export-oriented economy. Although Korea 
was poor in natural resources except for a large but 
untrained labour force, a gap in the world market was 
perceived as opening up. Japan was trying to restructure 
its economy around high-tech industries and Korea hoped 
to succeed to its previous role in the world market. 
The Park regime nominated the chaebols as the principal 
agents of economic development. Since the regime had 
control over the chaebols, and was in a hurry to 
establish both its legitimacy and independence, this 
choice may have cost less than organising new industrial 
groups. Moreover, in order to increase the country's 
competitive edge in the world market, an appropriate 
level of accumulation of capital was imperative and only 
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the chaebols had such a capacity. Another factor however 
originated in Park Chung Hee's own background. He was 
trained by the Japanese in a military academy in 
Manchuria from 1940 to 1942 and in the Japanese Military 
Academy from 1942 -to 1944, and participated in the 
Japanese Kwangtung Army in Manchuria during 1944 through 
1945. He was therefore a typical member of the Japanese 
military elite of the Japanese period (Joungwon Kim, 
1975: 230) . Given this career background, it was natural 
for him to adopt the 'Zaibatsu'-oriented Japanese 
economic model. 
Once the chaebols had been designated as the executors of 
economic development, every support and privilege was 
accorded them by the government. Its aid can be 
summarised under three headings. First of all, the 
chaebols who had the capacity to produce and export could 
get guarantees for foreign loans and foreign technology. 
Korean companies did not have accumulated technology, so, 
they had to introduce foreign know-how. The asymmetric 
introduction of foreign technology, however, reinforced 
the uneven distribution already produced by competitive 
processes and lead to the further concentration of 
wealth, especially in a small domestic market which was 
insulated from competition. The companies which were 
permitted to get foreign loans also benefited from 
exchange rate, interest rate, and payment guarantees. For 
example, between 1965 and 1970, while official money 
interest rates ranged between 25-30%, foreign loan 
interest rate'were only 5.6-7.1%. Thus for a chaebol to 
get permission for a foreign loan was itself to get a 
favour (Kang, Choi and Chang, 1991: 133-4) (see Table 
VI. 2.1). At the same time, immoderate foreign loans lead 
to poorly-run enterprises in the late 1960s. 
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Table VI. 2.1. 
Foreign Loan Permission for Major Chaebols, 1969 
Chaebol Mone 
Lucky-Goldstar 123 
SSangyong 150 
Dainong 95 
Hanil Cement 41 
Chunwoosa 21 
Samyangsa 15 
Panbon 17 
Gaipoong 17 
Kolon 12 
Hwasin 11 
Source: Dongsun Park (1969), "Insolvent Enterprises" (in 
Korean), Monthly Chungang, 1969, September: 176- 
193. 
Secondly, in order to increase their competitive power in 
the world export market, the government guaranteed 
monopolies to the chaebols in the domestic market and 
enacted supportive financial laws such as the "export 
finance law". "Export Finance" consisted of loans at very 
low interest rate which were only given to export- 
oriented companies. For example, while the interest rate 
on general loans was 24.5% in 1969, the interest rate for 
export finance was only 6%. From 1974 through 1979, 
general loan rates increased from 15.5 to 18.7% whereas 
export finance rates were stable at 9.0% (Table VI. 2.2. ). 
161 
Chaoter VI State Suooort and Economic Growth 
Table VI. 2.2. 
Interest Rates on Money Borrowed 
1969 1974 1979 1980 1982 
General loan 24.5 15.5 18.7 24.5 10.0 
Export Finance 6.0 9.0 9.0 15.0 10.0 
Sources: Annual Statistical Report, Bank of Korea, each 
year 
Another core piece of legislation to promote big 
businesses specified high and strict barriers to entry 
into an industry. This was designed to protect existing 
firms and constrain new entrants and by so doing, to 
restrict competition. There were 120 separate items of 
regulation to follow when establishing new firms, until 
the laws were revised under the Industrial Development 
Law in 1986 (Dong A Daily 1985,9/11). 
Finally, following the Japanese model, the government 
decided to establish general trading companies as Korea's 
representative corporations in the world market in order 
to increase the efficiency of the export drive. The 
formal' requirements for qualification as a general 
trading companies were set by the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry. For each company; 
1) The minimum capital base should be 1 billion won 
(Korean currency), and the minimum annual 
achievements of exports should be more than US $50 
million. 
2) More than 7 items valued at more than $500 
thousand each should have been exported. 
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3) Annual exports must be more than $1 million to 
each of ten or more countries. 
4) Public opening of ownership is encouraged (Hanguk 
Daily 1983,7/1, p. 5) 
As we can see very clearly simply from reading the list, 
these qualifications were suited only to large chaebols 
with multiple product lines. The government provided 
lavish support and incentives to the general trading 
companies in order to maximise the quantitative growth of 
exports. The formation and growth of the general trading 
companies produced the top 9 chaebols. Table VI. 2.3. 
shows how concentration deepened between 1975 and 1982. 
With general trading companies taking a 48.2% share of 
the volume of total exports in 1982 as agent 13.2% in 
1975. 
Table VI. 2.3 
Percentage of Exports by Type of Firms, 1975-1982 
Year General 
Trading 
Companies 
Large 
Firms 
Small/Medium 
Firms 
Total 
1975 13.3 
1976 17.2 
1977 21.7 
1978 27.0 36.6 36.4 100 
1979 33.9 37.4 28.7 100 
1980 41.0 33.4 25.6 100 
1981 42.9 
1982 48.2 29.5 22.3 100 
Source: Korean Traders' Association; Korea Association of 
Small-Medium Industries, as cited in Jo, 1987. 
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In sum, as Table VI. 2.4. shows, the EOI Strategy and its 
accompanying policies was successful in securing economic 
growth. As a country poor in natural resources located in 
an underdeveloped region, the transformation to the 
export-oriented country was arguably, an inevitable 
choice. However, because the benefits accrued primarily 
to the chaebols, and other, small to medium sized 
companies were neglected, the interests of classes other 
than the leading capitalists were largely ignored. Even 
if the government's support for the chaebols was 
necessary in order to establish on secure presence in a 
competitive world market, the outcome was an increasingly 
uneven distribution of wealth. Since the cheap price of 
labour-intensive commodities was the major selling point 
of Korean made goods, to keep this advantage, the state 
guided wage controls, long hours were forced on workers 
and the price of agricultural products was frozen below 
the cost of production. All of these side effects created 
hostility against the regime both within the general 
population and within the capitalist class itself. 
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Table VI. 2.4. 
Growth of Exports: Amount, Growth rate of GNP 
Year Amount 
(Current $ 
million) 
Growth Rate 
(Real, %) 
Growth Rate 
of GNP (Real, 
1965 175.1 35.9 5.8 
1966 250.3 42.4 12.7 
1967 320.2 32.7 6.6 
1968 455.4 39.5 11.3 
1969 622.5 36.1 13.8 
1970 835.2 19.6 7.6 
1971 1067.6 20.4 9.4 
1972 1624.1 36.9 5.8 
1973 3225.0 55.4 14.9 
1974 4460.4 -3.1 8.0 
1975 5081.0 16.6 7.1 
1976 7715.3 43.0 15.1 
1977 10,046.5 25.7 10.3 
1978 12,710.6 27.5 11.6 
1979 15,055.5 -3.6 6.4 
1980 17,504.9 9.9 -6.2 
1981 21,253.8 17.0 7.1 
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, each 
year 
6.2.3. The Emphasis on Heavy and Chemical 
Industrialisation 
Economic development in Korea was faced with another 
turning point in 1975, when President Park officially 
declared the primacy of heavy and chemical 
industrialisation on January 12,1972 in his annual 
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address. There were three major reasons for this policy 
shift; economic, military, and political. Economically, 
the light-industry based export strategy now reached the 
limit of its development and was losing competitiveness 
in the world market. The advanced countries were 
introducing protectionist measures, and even though the 
state and the chaebols had been freezing wage levels, it 
became increasingly difficult to compete with the lower 
wage cost of newly developing countries', particularly 
the second tier NICs (Suh, 1988: 153). Another economic 
push factor stemmed from the dynamics of the world 
capitalist system. In 1973 and 1974 faced with the oil 
Price Shock and the mounting problems of pollution, the 
industrially advanced countries sought to transfer their 
high energy-consuming industries to the third world 
countries; Korea, Taiwan, Mexico, and Brazil, and to 
develop their information technology sectors. 
On the military level, after Nixon's visit to China in 
1972, the Cold War in Asia was seen as coming to an end 
and the US government started to withdraw their troops 
from the Korean peninsula even though the Korean 
government strongly resisted (Further withdrawals stopped 
later). Faced with a growing the sense of crisis, the 
Korean government believed that the country had to have a 
strong independent industrial structure, including a 
viable defence industry (Suh, 1988: 154, Kang, Choi and 
Chang, 1991: 140). 
Politically, in order to justify President Park's long 
term dictatorship (Koo Hagen, 1987: 168; Lim Hyun-Chin, 
1985: 72-73) and appease the rising opposition movement, 
the government needed to concentrate people's interest on 
economic issues and display a plausible blue print 
for a 
promising future. 
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Against this background and given the important 
implications for military and political affairs5, the 
heavy and chemical industrialisation strategy was 
strongly promoted by the government from the outset. 
However, since the policy required huge amounts of 
capital and highly advanced technology, given the 
. selection 
of available investors, the primacy of the 
chaebols was once again inevitable. Once selected as 
investors, such enterprises were protected from domestic 
competition and imports. And foreign loan and the policy 
finance were concentratedly on the two favoured sectors. 
According to one report, the debt ratio of major heavy 
and chemical industries reached 69.9% in 1979, up from 
55.1% in 1973 (Kang, Choi and Chang, 1991: 141-2). 
Table VI. 2.5. shows the total amount and composition of 
foreign capital between 1959 and 1985. Since the mid- 
1960s, the amount of foreign capital has been doubling 
every five years. Both public loans and commercial loan 
have to be approved by the state. In this way, the state 
exercised control over the distribution of foreign loan 
capital and could control the amount of foreign capital 
invested in each industrial sector according to its 
economic development planning. 
5 As Bruce Cumings has pointed out, HCI development 
had evidently been motivated more by military and 
political consideration than those of comparative 
advantage (Bruce Cumings, 1987: 75, "The Origins and 
Development of the Northeast Asian Political 
Economy: Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles, and 
Political Consequences". in Frederic C. 
Deyo., ed., The Political Economy of New Asian 
Industrialization. Ithaca, N. Y: Cornell University 
Press) 
167 
Chapter VI State Support and Economic Growth 
Table VI. 2.5. 
Changes in the Composition of Foreign Capital*, 
1959-1985 
Year Public Loan Commercial DFI Total 
Loan 
1959-61 4,386 0 0 4,386 
(100.0%) (100.0%) 
1962-66 115,594 175,598 22,999 314,191 
36.8%) 55.9%) (7.3%) (100.0%) 
1967-71 811,173 1,353,260 72,673 2,237,106 
36.3%) 60.5%) 3.2%) (100.0%) 
1972-76 2,366,209 3,002,717 565,239 5,934,165 
39.9%) 50.6%) 9.5%) (100.0%) 
1977-81 5,751,139 7,382,269 587,743 13,721,151 
41.9%) 53.8%) 4.3%) (100.0%) 
1982-85 5,809,648 3,709,709 1,406,313 10,925,670 
53.2%) 33.9%) 12.9 100.0 
Total 14,858,149 15,623,553 2,654,967 33,136,669 
44.8%) 47.2%) 8.0%) 100.0 
* Public Loans (Arrival) : Commercial Loans (Arrival) ; 
Direct Foreign Investment (Present Approval) 
Sources: Economic Planning Board, 1986; Ministry of 
Finance, 1986 
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Table VI. 2.6. 
Percentages of Foreign Loans by 
Industrial Section, 1965-84 
Year Manufacturing Inc. s. o. c. 
(1) 
Serv. 
(2) 
P. Ind. 
(3) 
Mining 
& 
Quar. 
Other 
H/C* Li ht Total (4) 
1965 39.3 60.7 41.5 22.0 2.4 
1975 77.9 22.1 44.9 31.6 18.9 
1976 64.7 35.3 41.5 22.8 27.6 7.7 
1977 80.0 20.0 49.3 28.6 11.8 10.2 0.1 
1978 81.1 18.9 49.0 32.0 12.6 6.2 0.1 
1979 74.8 25.2 39.8 38.8 3.9 5.3 0.1 1.0 
1980 89.3 10.17 22.7 60.1 10.8 5.8 0.1 0.4 
1981 85.0 15.0 17.3 54.8 12.7 14.2 0.1 0.9 
11982 
82.8 17,2 13.1 56.3 6.2 4.0 0.4 10.0 
H/C*--- Heavy- Chemical Manufacturing Industries 
S. O. C. (1)--- Social Overhead Capital 
Serv. (2)--- Services Industries 
P. Ind. (3)--- Primary Industries 
Mining & Quar. (4)--- Mining and Quarrying Industries 
Source: Youngchul Park, 1984: East-West Centre Population 
Institute, Honolulu, Hawaii. 
Secondly, Table VI. 2.6. shows the distribution of foreign 
loans by industrial section over time. Due to the 
difficulty of gathering information, the periods covered 
by Table VI. 2.5. and Table VI. 2.6. are unfortunately 
different. However, the comparison still gives us a 
useful baseline guide to trends. It indicates that while 
the total share of the manufacturing sector has decreased 
since 1977, the percentage of foreign loans channelled to 
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the heavy and chemical industrialisation sector increased 
from 39.3% in 1965 to 77.9% in 1975 and 82.8% in 1982. At 
the same time, the share for the social overhead sector 
also increased substantially mainly to support the 
construction of heavy and chemical industrial estates. 
Attracted by these inducement measures, the largest 
industrial groups, Hyundai and Daewoo launched their 
participation in. the heavy and chemical industrialisation 
strategy. Other major chaebols also entered into this 
industrial sector in order not to fall behind in 
transforming their industrial structure (see Table 
VI. 2.7). 
The effects of the heavy and chemical industrialisation 
promotion were crucial. First of all, because of 
government incentives and the importance of these sectors 
in upgrading the general industrial structure, there was 
massive competition for advantage among leading chaebols. 
About 97% of total investments for the heavy and chemical 
industrialisation projects were invested during the short 
period between 1977 and 1979. These trends to over- 
investment and 'overlapping investment caused the 
temporary economic depression of the early 1980s bringing 
bankruptcy to small and medium sized enterprises and 
unemployment. Secondly, owing to the heavy concentration 
of investment in the favoured industrial sectors, the 
concentration of wealth in the hands of the participating 
chaebols was further reinforced. Thirdly, since Korea had 
to rely on foreign capital and technology to develop the 
heavy and chemical industries, it created balance of 
payment problems and deepened Korea's dependence 
economically, and thus, politically on the industrially 
advanced countries. 
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Table VI. 2.7. 
Chaebol's Upgrading of Industrial Structure, 1960. -1970s 
Chaebol Previous Major 
Industry 1960 
Heavy and chemical Industries 
Participated in the 1970s 
Samsung Textile, Garment, 
Sugar, Insurance, 
Electric 
Shipbuilding, Machinery, 
Petrochemical, Electronic, Aircraft 
part 
Daewoo Garment Automobile, Shipbuilding, Machinery, 
Computer 
Hyundai Construction, Heavy 
industry 
Automobile, Machinery, Shipbuilding, 
Steel, Heavy electric machine, Oil 
refinery 
Kuk a Shoes Steel, Machinery 
Kumho Transformation Steel, Petrochemical 
Ssan on Cement Heavy electric machinery 
Hyosung Heavy electric machinery, Autopart, 
Petrochemical 
Sunk un Garment Chemical, Oil refinery, Machiner 
Lucky-Goldstar Heavy and Chemical Deepened existing industries 
Kolon Nylon Heavy electric machinery, 
Petrochemical 
Miwon Seasoning Petrochemical, Machinery 
Korea Explosive Precision machinery 
Daehan Electric wire Electronic, Petrochemical 
Doosan Beer Machinery 
Samlip Food Machine tool 
Daelim Construction Metal, Petrochemical 
Samwhan Construction Machinery 
Hanil Garment Petrochemical 
Taekwan Garment Electronics 
JDonqmyung_ 
Timber Machiner 
Source: Adopted from Byungyoon Park, 1980: 266-7 
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6.3.4. Conclusion 
The era of Park regime, between 1961 and 1979, was marked 
as the period in which the leading capitalists 
consolidated their economic base. This process was guided 
and supported firstly by the EOI strategy and then by the 
heavy and chemical industrialisation policy. However, 
these two economic initiatives also positioned Korea in a 
dependent role; within the international capitalist 
system. 
The new export orientation resulted in Korea being drawn 
more fully into this system. A scarcity of both raw 
materials and capital increased its dependency on imports 
and foreign funds. A lack of internally generated 
research and development created a dependency on foreign 
technology. Its small internal market and international 
political alignments created a dependency on 
industrialised markets concentrated principally in Japan 
and the United States. The export orientation prospered 
throughout the 1960's, however, Korea began moving from a 
peripheral to a semi-peripheral position within the world 
system, just as, Japan moved from the semi-periphery to 
the core. 
When the state later chose to promote the development of 
the heavy and chemical industries in the early 1970's, 
that choice was also influenced by the international 
power structure. Prompted in part by a desire for greater 
economic and military self-sufficiency, along with rising 
fears of American withdrawal from Korea, provoked by its 
departure from Vietnam, this capital-intensive industrial 
"deepening" greatly increased external indebtedness and 
industrial concentration. 
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Nevertheless, at the domestic level, it completed the 
formation of the core sector of the major Korean 
corporations, grouped around the leading 'chaebol'. It 
was in this period that the chaebols increased their 
diversification from light industries to heavy and 
chemical industries, creating a higher degree of overall 
business concentration. Indeed, it can be argued that the 
primary outcome of the development strategies pursued in 
the 1960s and 1970s was the promotion of the chaebols. In 
summary, the process of Korean economic development was 
more or less synonymous with the chaebols' growth and the 
unfolding change in their relationship with the state. 
This, in turn, led to a chaebol-oriented economy while 
neglecting the interests of other classes. It also 
provided a rationale for positioning attention to demands 
for greater democracy and equality coupled with a fairer 
distribution of wealth and matters of human rights until 
after the achievement of economic development. President 
Park said, "At first, let's make a big pie in order to 
have a bigger slice for everyone". However, after the big 
pie was made by the effort of everyone, reasonably sized 
slices never found their way onto the plates of all the 
participants. 
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CHAPTER VII. 
STATE AND CAPITAL: FROM DOMINANCE TO SYMBIOSIS 
Through the 1970s and 1980s, the chaebols, once the 
unchallenged symbol of Korea's economic success, came to 
be seen as part of a problem rather than as the core of 
a solution. After a generation of free-wheeling growth 
and rapid expansion, they came to stand for almost 
everything that had gone wrong with the economy. 
The main aim of this chapter is therefore, to delineate 
the detailed process of how the capitalist group has 
achieved the symbiotic position with the state power 
throughout the economic development. It is important to 
remember, however, that the real question of the thesis 
is not 'which is more powerful between the state power 
and the power of the capitalist group? '. The real tasks 
of this thesis are to provide answers to following 
questions; how has the relationship between these two 
changed since the 1960s; if it has changed, then what 
made these changes possible; what are the components of 
the changes; how did the change carry? 
We already focused on the standpoint that the importance 
of state autonomy in the four east Asian NICs is the 
main characteristic feature which makes the economic 
success possible in the short term, despite all of the 
disadvantages that they have. In addition, the status of 
the state autonomy is not static, and as discussed in 
Chapter V, the 'power' is relative: one man's powers are 
another man's weaknesses (C. W. Mills, 1956). This 
understanding can be applied to the relationship between 
the state power and the capitalist group in Korea. 
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In this chapter, the chaebol's concentrated economic 
power will be explored in depth, from the market shares 
enjoyed by their products, their highly concentrated 
ownership and management, to the social power network 
they sought to establish. 
7.1. The Concentration of Wealth 
The negative image of business groups in Korea is 
generally attributed to the inequality of economic 
opportunities among firms, as well as to general 
perceptions about concentration of ownerships. An unequal 
distribution of ownership is inevitable in every market 
economy. It became a critical issue in Korea because the 
capitalist ethos, in many ways, runs counter to the 
traditional value system, and the process of capital 
accumulation itself is not yet fully justified in the 
eyes of the general public. It has been shown that the 
public believes that large business groups with the help 
of favourable loans, both domestic and foreign, and 
government protection have accumulated monopoly profits 
at the expense of both consumers and smaller firms. 
These large business groups are also widely understood 
to have invested in unproductive sectors such as real 
estate and to have influenced government policies to 
further their private interests. These negative 
perceptions may ferment social tensions, raise doubts 
1 An academic survey conducted by Koo Hagen found that 
88 percent of the middle classes agreed with the 
statement that "Those who possess a large amount of 
property must return their property to society" (Koo 
Hagen, n. d. 1989: 15, cf) Choi Jang-Jip 1983: 21; Eckert 
1990). 
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about the economic system, and further distort economic 
morality among some segments of the general public. 
The concentration of wealth in the hands of the chaebols 
can be examined along three dimensions; the markets for 
the elements of production; the markets for end- 
products; and the structure of the chaebols' ownership 
and management. 
7.1.1. Markets for the Elements of Production 
In order to produce commodities, a range of essential 
resources are required. These include; funds, work 
forces, technologies and real estate. These are the 
'elements of production'. 
Financial Structure 
Financially, the Korean chaebols are, arguably amongst 
the worst structured corporate bodies in the world. 
Generally speaking, there are a variety of methods used 
by corporations to obtain capital. They can use their 
own capital, obtain funds through the stock market, or 
borrow from banks or other financial institutions. In 
Korea, the stock market did not develop sufficiently to 
match the rapid expansion of economy. Consequently, 
there was a chronic over-demand for capital. The 
corporations had to solve this problem by borrowing, 
relying especially on public finance with very low rates 
of interest. As mentioned earlier, through the operation 
of key policies such as the Export-oriented 
Industrialisation strategy (hereafter EOI), and the 
measures to promote heavy and chemical 
industrialisation, high value, low rate interest finance 
was given to certain corporations which met the 
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government's criteria. Through these procedures, these 
selected companies became giant conglomerates. As Table 
VII. 1.1. shows, the amount of money loaned by the banks 
to the top 30 chaebols reaches more than 21 trillion 
won, which was 29.2% of the total of the money lent by 
banks in 1990. It should be noted that the five largest 
chaebols- Hyundai, Samsung, Lucky-Goldstar, Daewoo and 
Hanjin account for almost half of the total loaned to 
the 30 largest chaebols'. More importantly, within the 
secondary financial sector made up of institutions, such 
as the insurance companies, the portion going up the 
chaebols increases rapidly. In 1988, the money lent to 
the short-loan companies and insurance companies to the 
top 30 chaebols accounted for 41.3% and 41.4% of the 
total in the respective sections. However in 1989, 
excluding the financial business, the value added by the 
country's top 30 business groups accounted for only 
10.5% of the gross national product. 
Table. VII. 1.1. also shows the ratio of self-capital of 
top 30 chaebols. The mean ratio in 1991 was 21.0. The 
lower the ratio of self-capital, the greater the 
dependence on money borrowed the banks and the secondary" 
financial institutes, the weaker financial 
infrastructure of the corporation. 
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Table VII. 1.1. Money Loaned to the Top 30 
Chaebols and Ratio of Self-capital (unit: hundred 
million, %) 
Chaebol Amount 
1 
Ratio of Self- 
Capital* 
Samsun 26,136 21.9 
Han ' in 25,137 8.8 
Daewoo 19,787 25.0 
Hyundai 18,638 21.9 
Lucky-Goldstar 16,829 24.2 
Sunk un 11 698 18.9 
Hanil 8,535 16.9 
Ssan on 8 005 28.2 
Kia 7 808 25.2 
Daelim 6,638 19.4 
Kumho 6,304 28.6 
H osun 5 002 23.7 - 
Doosan 4 834 19.8 
Korea Explosive 4 725 23.4 
Don kuk Steel 3,624 35.0 
Kukdon Oil 3,385 -0.3 
Kukdong 
Costruction 
3,301 20.5 
Dong A 
Construction 
3,294 10.3 
Lotte 3,218 40.4 
Don bu 31,104 25.3 
Sam an Sa 3,068 26.8 
Kolon 2,833 26.6 
Sammi 2,489 29.0 
Byuksan 2 460 18.7 
Woosun 2 394 14.9 
Kohap 2,248. 19.9 
Halla 2,103 17.5 
Cho an Ship 1,956 4.0 
Jinro 1 932 9.6 
Don an Chemical 1,869 24.9 
Total/ Mean 213,354 21.0 
1) between 1990 October and December 
* It was calculated except ones of Financial/Insurance 
Companies. 
Source: Dong A Daily, May. 1.1991 
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Parliamentary Inspection of the Administration. 
September, 1991. 
Work Forces 
Secondly, the concentration of qualified man-power 
within the chaebols should also be noted. According to 
one report complied in 1989 and covering all university 
graduates over 4 years in Korea, except for those who 
went on to military service or to postgraduate schools. 
46,219 graduates had jobs. 52% were employed by the top 
50 chaebols. The top four largest chaebols2 - Samsung, 
Hyundai, Lucky-Goldstar and Daewoo accounted for 29.1% 
among them. This concentration is even more marked among 
graduates from the elite universities. Among of the 
total graduates from the top six universities who 
commenced work, 83.4% went to the top 50 chaebols (see 
Table VII. 1.2). 
Table VII. 1.2. 
The Distribution of Graduates who Commence Work, 
1989 
4-year 
University 
Top Six 
University 
Total employed* 74,646 11,160 
General/ Financial (100.0%) 
Companies Employees 46,219 
Employees of the 50 
Chaebols 24,046 9,308 
Employees of the Top 4 (52.0%) (83.4%) 
Chaebols 13,468 
29.1 
2 "The Big Four" (Steers, Shin, and Ungson 1989: 49-70) 
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Total employed*: including civil servant, teachers, 
self-emplyed, etc. 
Source: Recruit, January. 1990 , 
Technology 
Thirdly, technology and know-how are also important 
elements of production. In a situation which emphasised 
rapid growth, Korean companies preferred to introduce 
ready-made foreign technologies rather than to develop 
innovations themselves. According to one report (Kwak, 
1989) Korea introduced 4,055 items of foreign technology 
between 1962, which was the starting point of concerted 
planning for economic development, and 1986. The pattern 
of introduction of technology was very similar to the 
pattern for overall economic development. Hence, 26.4% 
of all items introduced during those years were 
introduced by the six largest chaebols, Hyundai, 
Samsung, Lucky-Goldstar, Daewoo, Sunkyung and Ssangyong. 
During this period, then the chaebols did not make much 
effort to develop their own technology and did not 
invest money for Research & Development. They preferred 
to import foreign technology (see Table VII. 1.3. ). 
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Table VII. 1.3. 
The Introduction of Foreign Technology 1962-1986: 
Percentage accounted for by the Top 6 Chaebols 
Year 1962 1971 1972 1981 1982 1986 Total 
Industry Top 6 Total Top 6 Total Top 6 Total Top 6 Total 
Agricul- o 6 1 5 2 15 3 26 
ture 0% 20.0% 13.3% 11.5% 
Light 3 38 21 155 39 281 63 474 
industr 18.8% 13.5% 13.9% 13.3% 
Heavy/ 48 247 345 1,331 538 1,597 931 3,175 
Chemical 19.4% 25.9% 33.7% 29.3% 
Industr 
Social 8 27 32 168 33 185 73 380 
Service 29.6% 19.0 17.8% 19.2% 
Total 59 318 399 1,659 612 2,078 1,070 4,055 
1 18.5% 1 1 24.1% 1 29.5% 1 1 26.4% 1 
*% means the share of top six chaebols among the total 
Source: Seungyoung Kwak, 'The condition of Origin and a 
course of Korean Conglomerates', KEI. 1989 
On the-issue of land and real estate, this has become 
one of the main reasons for popular hostility against 
the chaebols. In Korea, investment in real estate is the 
most lucrative area of business. It is therefore natural 
that the chaebols, which have large capital reserves and 
strategic information about trends, would choose to 
accumulate capital through real estate speculations 
rather than through manufacturing or other industrial 
business operation. 
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7.1.2. Markets for Product 
Table VII. 1.4. 
The Share of the Top, 30 Chaebols in Manufacturing 
unit: % 
1977 1981 1985 1987 
Share of 32.0 39.7 40.2 36.8 
Turnover (15.7) * (23.0) * (21.3)* 
Share of 20.5 19.8 17.6 17.6 
Em loy ment 
*() means the 'share of top five chaebols 
Source: Economy Planning Board 
Table VII. 1.4. shows the share of the top 30 chaebols in 
the manufacturing sector. This rises to 36.8% in 1987, 
up from 32.0% in 1977. Even though their share decreased 
slightly after 1985, the degree of the concentration 
remains high. It should be noted that in 1987 the five 
largest chaebols in terms of turnover - Hyundai, 
Samsung, Lucky-Goldstar, Daewoo and Ssangyong - are 
considerably larger than the others, accounted for 21.3% 
of all turnover manufacturing. This was approximately 
60% of the total share of the 30 leading chaebols. The 
striking difference between their shares in 
manufacturing and in employment may be caused by their 
capital-intensive methods of production and by their 
market power. 
By categorising more elaborately it is possible to show 
the concentration of economic power clearly. As shown on 
Table VII. 1.5., the share of the top 30 chaebols in 
category 35 (Chemicals, Petrochemical, Rubber and 
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Plastic) and category 38 (Machinery) reaches 49.0% and 
49.2% respectively in 1987. These categories include the 
raw material of petrochemical, machinery, but also 
durable consumer goods, such' as televisions, computers 
and automobiles. In category 38, the share of the - top 
five largest alone is 40.9%. This points to the 
crucially important role that the category 38 industries 
have taken both in the growth of the chaebols and 
concentration of wealth. 
Table VII. 1.5. 
The top 30 Chaebols' Share of Turnover in Various 
Manufacturing Categories, 1987 
unit: 
Chaebol 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 
Top 5 9.9 6.3 2.8 5.6 27.4 6.3 9.9 40.9 1.4 
Top 30 26.2 20.4 6.2 17.2 49.0 28.9 39.2 49.2 1.5 
Source: Lee & Lee, 'Conglomerates and the Concentration 
of the Economic Power', KDI, 1990. 
Categories: 31: Food & Beverage, Tobacco 
32: Textile, Clothing and Leather 
33: Wood 
34: Paper, Printing and Publishing 
35: Chemicals, Petrochemicals Coal Rubber 
and Plastics 
36: Non-ferrous Metal 
37: the First Metal 
38: Machinery 
39: Other Manufacturing 
Here it is important to explore the market shares 
commanded by the top 30 chaebols in a little more 
detail. This group produces altogether, 1,499 
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commodities. 629 of these enjoy a market share of more 
than 20% (see Table VII. 1.6) . Moreover, as shown on 
Table VII. 1.7., 911 items (60.7%) stand first, second or 
third in their respective markets. In the case of the 
top five chaebols, 224 of the items they produce stand 
first in the domestic market. Although they only account 
for 34.6% of the companies' total production they 
contribute 59.2% of turnover. In the same way, among 
1499 items produced by the top 30 chaebols, the 37.2% 
that are ranked fourth or lower in their respective 
markets accounted for only 10.8% of turnover. These 
figures confirm that the chaebols produce intensively 
concentrating on products which hold major shares in the 
market. However, the fact that the chaebols do not 
confine their production only to main items is the 
source of another major complement. They are often 
compared to the arms of an octopus, grasping every 
economic opportunity in sight - "from Air planes to 
Salted Shrimp" in the words of one newspaper editorial 
(Chosen Daily July 21,1988) - and driving small and 
medium-sized businesses out of existence. 
Table VII. 1.6. 
Market Shares Commanded by Top 30 Chaebols, 1987 
Chaebol Less 
than 20% 
20 - 40% 40 - 60% 60 - 80% More than 
80% 
Total 
1- 5 345 141 82 38 42 648 
6-10 149 45 16 9 22 241 
11-20 244 64 38 22 30 367 
21-30 166 41 15 12 9 243 
Total 873 291 151 81 103 1,499 
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Source: Lee & Lee, 1990, op. cit.; KEI, Annual Report, 
1987. 
Table VII. 1.7. 
Rank of Products by Top 30 Chaebols- in Market, 
1987 
unit: items, % 
Rank 1 2 3 Others Total 
Chae No. % of No. % of No. % of No. % of No. % of 
bols of Turn of Turn- of Turn- of Turn of Turn 
Items over Items over Item over Item over Items over 
To p5 224 59.2 133 26.2 68 6.5 223 8.1 648 100 
Top 475 55.5 296 25.1 170 8.9 558 10.8 1499 100 
30 
Source: Lee & Lee, 1990. op. cit.; KEI, Annual Report. 
1987. 
Table VII. 1.8. which lists the value added by the top 30 
chaebols is attached as a further indication of the 
concentrated economic power of the Korean chaebols. 
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Table VII. 1.8. 
Value Added by the Top 30 Chaebols, 1990 
(unit: hundred million, % 
Chaebol Ratio of 
Value Added 
Amount of 
Value Added 
Share of 
GNP 
Hyundai 19.76 33,556 2.3787 
Daewoo 22.28 20,925 1.4833 
Luck -Goldstar 18.18 22,619 1.6034 
Samsun 18.59 
_33,045 
2.3425 
Ssan on 18.76 7,365 0.5221 
Hanjin 41.27 
_10,924 
0.7744 
Korea Explosive 26.52 5,666 0.4017 
Kukdong 
Costruction 
52.80 887 0.0629 
Sunk un 14.26 8,630 0.6118 
Daelim 33.13 4,392 0.3113 
Lotte 25.77 6,622 0.4817 
Kia 
Dong A 42.51 5,419 0.3841 
Don kuk Steel 23.24 2,978 0.2111 
Kumho 33.38 3,244 0.2300 
H osun 14.16 3,342 0.2369 
Doosan 26.24 4,311 0.3056 
Hanil 38.30 3,378 0.2391 
Don an 44.48 2,032 0.1440 
Sammi 17.80 2,055 0.1457 
Don bu 16.16 2,173 0.1540 
Miwon 19.57 1,723 0.1221 
Kukdon Oil 10.67 589 0.0417 
Kolon 20.28 3,057 0.2167 
Halla 41.44 2,748 0.1948 
Pan Ocean 
Shipping' 
40.24 2,239 0.1587 
Kohap 26.57 1,781 0.1262 
Woosun 31.14 1,766 0.1252 
Ton il 32.73 1,528 0.1083 
Han an 37.38 1,528 0.0785 
Total/ 
Mean Mean 26.92 
Total 200,517 Total 
14.21% 
Mean 0.4732 
Source: KIS, 1990; KEI, Annual Report, 1990. 
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7.1.3. Ownership and Management 
The concentration of economic power in Korea has another 
important characteristic, the concentration of 
ownership. According to Scott's study about British 
ruling class (Scott, 1991), capitalist economic 
locations involved participation in the structure of 
control and corporate rule in business. This 
participation may be immediate and direct, through 
personal property holdings in business enterprises, or 
it can involve administrative participation in the 
patterns of control through which business enterprises 
are ruled. These locations are most clearly identifiable 
where direct personal ownership of capital exists, but 
they may also be found within the system of 'impersonal' 
capital which have developed during the twentieth 
century. In the case of Korea, previous studies have 
shown that the main family's holdings in publicly traded 
companies belonging to the ten largest chaebols averaged 
32.4 percent, 13.4 percent of which was directly held 
and the remaining 19 percent held through corporate 
cross-ownership (Hattori Tamio, 1986: 182; cf) Kim & Kim, 
1989; Shin & Chin, 1989). 
Taking a typical chaebol from the top 10,32.1% of its 
total equity is owned by its subsidiaries and 13.4% 
directly by an individual shareholder who also controls 
those subsidiaries producing a total of 45.5% (see Table 
VII. 1.9. ). Moreover, there is evidence that this 
concentration is increasing. According to one report 
which was submitted to the Parliamentary Inspection of 
the Administration in 1991, internal share holding 
(shares of individuals plus shares of subsidiaries) in 
the 61 conglomerates which were approved as official 
'chaebols' by the government by 1991 averaged for 46.9%, 
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up from 45.4% in 1990. This suggests that concentration 
of ownership is intensifying despite the efforts of the 
government, which seeks to prohibit concentration of 
ownership through anti-trust laws. 
The extent to which business investment is opened to the 
general public is still very restricted with only 28% of 
the top 30 chaebols allowing it. 
In order to avoid the bitter experience of the past 
which produced intensified competition among the 
chaebols, most now try to specialise in some main 
industries. Social demands for a more democratic 
economic system, in which small and medium-sized 
companies can also enjoy the fruits of prosperity while 
contributing to long-term economic stability, require 
that the chaebols abandon non-competitive businesses or 
transfer them to smaller firms. Moreover, to survive in 
the international market place, specialisation is 
desirable. Accordingly, from 1991, the government urged 
the chaebols to concentrate on particular industries and 
offered incentives to induce rapid specialisation. These 
included exclusion from the limits placed on bank credit 
and light taxation. By May 1991,88 companies had been 
selected as main interests by the 30 largest chaebols. 
However, the degree of concentration of ownership for 
these 'specialised main companies' is remarkable. 
The average internal share holding of these 88 companies 
is 51.0% (see Table VII. 1.10. ). 12 are not even open to 
the public. Once those companies are designated as the 
main industries by the government, they enjoy various 
privileges. These lead to greater concentration of 
wealth and economic power both at the corporate level 
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among the leading chaebols, and the individual levels 
among major owners. 
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Table VII. 1.9. 
From Dominance to Symbiosis 
Distribution of Share Holding, 1991 unit: number 
Chaebol 1) 2) Total 3 4 
Samsun 8.5 44.7 53.2 48 13 
Han in 27.7 24.3 52.0 22 8 
Daewoo 9.8 40.6 50.4 24 8 
Hyundai 27.5 40.3 67.8 42 15 
Lucky-Goldstar 7.6 30.6 38.3 52 18 
Sunk un 21.5 29.1 50.6 26 3 
Hanil 15.6 42.9 58.5 13 4 
Ssan on 7.6 34.4 42.0 22 10 
Kia (28.6) 22.8 31.7 10 5 
Daelim 7.6 31.6 39.2 14 4 
Kumho 4.4 33.7 38.0 22 4 
H osun 15.5 28.2 43.7 14 2 
Doosan 16.1 40.5 56.6 23 8 
Korea Explosive 10.5 30.8 41.4 27 9 
Don kuk Steel 20.0 36.6 56.6 14 6 
Kukdong Oil 24.9 10.9 35.8 4 0 
Kukdong Constr. 5.6 14.3 19.9 9 2 
Dong A 26.9 14.6 41.4 16 4 
Lotte 3.6 20.0 23.6 32 4 
Don bu 19.8 22.5 42.2 11 5 
Samyang 15.8 29.3 45.1 6 3 
Kolon 12.4 34.9 47.3 21 4 
Sammi 14.9 26.7 41.6 15 2 
B uksan 16.2 17.5 33.8 21 5 
Woosung 22.3 46.9 69.2 6 2 
Kohap 5.8 40.9 46.8 7 2 
Halla 36.3 26.5 62.8 9 2 
Cho an Ship 46.9 30.8 77.7 10 0 
Jinro 4.2 72.8 77.0 20 3 
IDonqyang 
Chemical 15.9 32.9 48.8 13 1 
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1) Share holding Ratio by One individual or Special 
Relatives 
2)-Share holding Ratio by other Subsidiaries 
3) Number of Total Subsidiaries 
4) Number of Opening Business to the Public 
Source: Parliamentary Inspection of the Administration, 
1991, September 
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Table VII. 1.10. 
Ratio of Main Share Holding of 88 Companies which 
Have Requested to be Selected as Main Companies 
by the Top 30 Chaebols 
unit: % 
Chaebol Main Companies Ratio 
Samsung Electronics 30.7 
General Chemical 83.6 
Shipbuilding & 
Heavy Industries 98.3 
Hanjin Korean Air 28.4 
Hanjin Sealink 91.2 
Hanil Estate 24.1 
Daewoo Daewoo Corporation 14.9 
Daewoo Shipbuilding 83.9 
Daewoo Electronics 7.1 
Hyundai Hyundai Motors 29.3 
Hyundai Electronics 100.0 
H undai Petrochemical 100.0 
Lucky-Goldstar Goldstar 15.3 
Lucky Ltd. 10.8 
Goldstar Electron 100.0 
Sunkyung Yokong Oil Refining 26.3 
SKI 23.0 
SKC 84.1 
Hanil Hanil Textile 47.7 
Kyungnam Woollen 40.8 
Kukle Trading 43.2 
Ssangyong Ssangyong Trading 20.7 
Ssangyong Oil 44.7 
Ssan on Motors 17.3 
Kia Asia Motors 36.8 
Kia Machinery 89.6 
Kia Steel 66.7 
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Daelim Daelim Motors 100.0 
Daelim Ceramic 100.0 
Daelim Concrete 66.3 
Kumho Kumho Ltd. 19.8 
Kumho Petrochemicals 23.4 
Asiana Airlines 57.5 
Hyosung Hyosung Trading 17.2 
Hyosung Heavy Industries 62.5 
Ton an N lon 26.8 
Doosan Doosan Beer 36.3 
Doosan Machine Tools 58.8 
Doosan Glass 38.2 
Korea Explosive Korea Explosive Ltd. 31.5 
Hanyang Explosive 29.3 
K un in Ener 44.3 
Dongkuk Steel Dongkuk Steel 44.2 
Hankuk Steel 63.7 
Don kuk Industr 83.6 
Kukdong Oil Kukdong Oil 32.4 
Kukdong Gas 34.3 
Seil Oil 100.0 
Kukdong Kukdong Construction 19.2 
Costruction Kukdon Ceramic 99.9 
Dong A Daehan Ship Delivery 35.8 
Dong A Construction 30.4 
Lotte Lotte Shopping 100.0 
Lotte Confectionery 42.9 
Honam Petrochemicals 50.0 
Dongbu Dongbu Chemicals 45.3 
Dongbu Steel 32.6 
Don bu Construction 24.5 
Samyang Sa Samyang Sa 41.8 
Samnam Petrochemicals 40.0 
Sunil 55.5 
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Kolon Kolon Ltd. 18.1 
Kolon Trading 52.8 
Kolon Engineering 70.7 
Sammi Sammi Ltd. 16.4 
Sammi Metal 99.3 
Sammi Multimetal 35.7 
Byuksan Byuksan Ltd. 22.3 
Byuksan Construction 17.2 
Don an Tradin 28.4 
Woosung Woosung Construction 66.8 
Woosung Industry 39.6_ 
woosun Trading 98.2 
Kohap Kohap Ltd. 11.6 
Koryo Chemical 100.0 
Kohap Trading 53.7 
Halla Mando Machine Tools 50.3 
Halla Cement 59.5 
Halla Heavy Industry 100.0 
Choyang Ship Choyang Ships Ltd. 53.9 
Nambuk Ltd. 64.8 
Jin 'oo Ham 40.0 
Jinro Jinro Ltd. 26.4 
Yunhap Wire 24.7 
Jinro Construction 100.0 
Dongyang Chemical Dongyang Chemicals 31.5 
Hankuk Kari Chemical" 100.0 
Oxi 100.0 
Mean 51.0 
* Ratio of Main Share holding By one individual or 
special relatives 
Source : Hangyeoreh Daily, May 7.1991. Financial Times 
April 23.1991. 
Chapter VII From Dominance to Symbiosis 
a) The Succession of Ownership: 
There is another index which can be used to demonstrate 
the degree of concentration of ownership; succession of 
ownership. As Table. VII. 1.11. shows, of the 36 chaebols 
which have already decided on the line of succession or 
have at least confirmed who will succeed, only one has 
nominated a professional manager. In contrast, over 
three quarters (77%) have proposed the first son of the 
founders. 
Table VII. 1.11. 
Succession of Ownership Among Leading Chaebols 
Succession Chaebol Successors; Number 
Finished to Success 21 First son ; 15 
Other sons; 3 
Brother; 1 
Son in law; 1 
Professional Mana er; 1 
Confirmation of 15 First son ; 13 
Succession Other son ;2 
Source: Monthly Chosun, p. 96. February, 1990 
b) Pattern of Ownership and Management 
On the basis of the available evidence it is impossible 
to know with any degree of certainty how owners control 
their firms. Most of the chaebol groups organise so 
called 'councils for members of presidents' regularly. 
In case of Hyundai, for example, every Monday and Friday 
about 40 presidents from each of the subsidiaries 
gather, and Chung Joo-Young, the founder of company, 
checks and decides on significant issues. Daewoo holds a 
similar meeting for the 10 presidents from their more 
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important subsidiaries in general trading, construction, 
ship building, electronics and automobiles (Kang, Choi 
and Chang, 1991: 50-2). This style of routinised control 
system is made possible by widespread use of some form 
of organisation covering all subsidiaries. According to 
one report, 95.8% out of 108 leading business groups 
have such organisations with the power to exert 
influence over the range of subsidiaries. These 
organisations are usually designated as 'offices of 
planning and co-ordination', 'offices of management and 
administration' or 'group centres' and so on. They are 
under the direct control of the owner, and function to 
ensure business co-ordination and corporation among 
subsidiaries, together with information collection and 
inquiry into contemporary trends including political 
analysis. In summary, although every president of 
subsidiaries can decide on matters of general 
management, such as the planning of production, the 
prices of products and advertising strategies, matters 
of personnel management and long-term planning are 
beyond their remit and are decided centrally. 
As a result, it is difficult to categorise the Korean 
chaebols as modernised conglomerates. Their systems of 
control and ownership remain at the stage of 
characteristic of early industrial capitalism. All 
important lines of control and management are centred in 
one owner's hands rather than those of the professional 
managers'. The chaebols therefore cannot be 
characterised by their main products or business 
morality. Rather, they are seen as instruments of their 
owners' interests. 
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7.1.4. Share Holdings in Banks and Financial 
Institutions by the Chaebols 
The Korean chaebols have supplemented their weak 
financial base structure with an enormous amounts of 
money borrowed from the banks and secondary financial 
institutions throughout the period of rapid growth. As 
seen in the previous section, the amount of money loaned 
by the banks to the top 30 chaebols reached more than 21 
trillion won in 1990. This was 29.2% of the total money 
loaned by the banks. In 1988, the money borrowed by the 
top 30 chaebols from the short-loan companies and 
insurance companies (which are designated as 'secondary' 
financial institutions) accounted for 41.3% and 41.4% of 
the total money loaned by these sectors. 
As historical examples elsewhere have shown, industrial 
capital has a tendency to be transformed into finance 
capital. During the 1950's for example, `the banks 
became the foci for the re-establishment of many of the 
pre-war group affiliations' in Japan (Scott, 1986: 62). 
Lenin argued in his famous book, 'Imperialism' that 
concentrated production leads to monopoly and this in 
turn, through connections to the banks produces finance 
capital. Concentrated in a few hands, finance capital 
exacts enormous and ever-increasing profits from 
floating companies, issuing stock, guaranteeing state 
loans, and so on. These activities strengthen the 
domination of the financial oligarchy and levy a tribute 
upon the whole of society for the benefit of monopolists 
(Lenin, 1975: 17 & 50). 
However, in the Korean case, this process was delayed 
for some time. As part of the strong intervention of the 
state in economic development and planning, bank capital 
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was under strong government control. As a consequence, 
business groups which had managed to become giant 
industrial corporations could not merge with financial 
institutions. In April 1981, however, faced with 
limitations in the mobilisation of capital caused by 
poor service and the petty scale of financial business, 
the government decided to privatise the five nation-wide 
commercial banks. This provided the chaebols with a 
great chance to acquire major stakes in the banks. Being 
a main shareholder meant that the chaebols could exert 
much stronger influence than previously both on the flow 
of bank capital and on financial policies. The Bank Law 
limits the share holding in each main bank to 8% for 
any one individual or company. But as Table VII. 1.12. 
shows, Samsung evades this stricture with its share 
holding in the Commercial Bank. This is possible because 
Samsung holds the stock through its insurance company, 
and other subsidiaries separately. This is a loophole 
which can produce giant shareholders in the banks. In 
the case of local banks, this situation is exacerbated 
further since there is no limitation on holdings of bank 
stocks. Instead of small scattered share holdings, in 
local banks, - some chaebols (notably Hyundai) possess 
more than 20% of the shares of particular banks. This is 
a very contradictory situation since most chaebols have 
substantial debts to the banks. At the same time they 
can still have more, than 10%, of the shares in each of 
the 5 main banks and the 9 local banks. Our previous 
analysis of pro-chaebol policies, such as the Export- 
oriented strategy and the policy for heavy and chemical 
industrialisation, showed that they were given the 
privilege of borrowing money at very low rates of 
interest from the banks. Therefore, it is entirely 
possible that the chaebols have purchased bank stock 
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with the money which they have borrowed from the same 
banks. 
Table VII. 1.12. 
Bank Share Holding of the Top 30 Chaebols, 
December, 1989 
(unit: ý) 
Chaebols National Banks Local Banks 
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 
Samsun 7.04 10.56 5.25 4.49 3.20 Daeku ; 5.11% 
H undai 1.92 1.37 2.17 Kan won; 24.11% 
Daewoo Chun buk; 3.21% 
Ssan on 2.24 
Lucky- 
Goldstar 
3.08 
Han'in K eon ki; 10.05% 
Korea 
Explosive 
Chungcheong; 
16.44% 
Sunk un K eon ki; 5.95% 
Kumho Kwan 'u; 12.25% 
H osun K eon nam; 5.47% 
Kia 1.05 
Daelim 3.72 
Dong A 
Const. 
2.48 
Dongkuk 
Steel 
1.50 
Kolon Daeku; 3.54% 
Miwon Busan; 1.36% 
Chunbuk; 4.78% 
Lotte Busan; 23.56% 
Total 10.46%* 12.87% ** 
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1) Choheung Bank 
2) Commercial Bank 
3) Korea First Bank 
4) Hanil Bank 
5) Seoul-Trust Bank 
* Total Share holding percentage of 5 main commercial 
Banks by Top 30 Chaebols 
** Total Share holding Percentage of 9 local banks by 
top 30 chaebols 
Source: Parliamentary Inspection of the Administration, 
Office of Bank Supervision and Examination, 
1990. 
Recently, the definition of the 'one individual' who can 
possesses bank stock has come under discussion. One 
suggestion is that when the law specifies 'one 
individual', this must include all the subsidiaries of 
each business group (Kang, Choi and Chang, 1991: 280). 
The fact that the chaebols have enjoyed privileged 
access to bank credits and loaned money has attracted 
public censure on the grounds that this has meant that 
small and medium enterprises have experienced 
difficulties in borrowing money from the banks and that 
this has damaged their operations and growth. 
Furthermore, since the legalisation of extra-market 
private finance was announced in 1972, it has become 
possible to establish short-loan financial businesses 
and insurance companies. Not surprisingly, given the 
prospects of substantial profits the chaebols started to 
participate as main shareholders in these 'secondary' 
financial institutions. By the end of 1989, the top 30 
chaebols were reported to own 27 financial corporations, 
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12 insurance companies and 24 stock companies (see 
Table. VII. 1.13. ). 
Table VII. 1.13 
Financial Institutions owned by Top 30 Chaebols, 
1989 
Chaebol Financial 
Corp. * 
Insurance 
Company 
Stock 
Company ** 
Total 
Samsun 1 2 1 4 
H undai 1 1 3 
5 
Daewoo 1 3 4 
Lucky-Goldstar 5 1 2 8 
Ssan on 1 3 4 
Han ' in 1 1 1 3 
Korea Explosive 1 1 3 5 
Don A 1 1 2 
Daelim 1 1 
Kia 1 1 2 
Lotte 2 2 
Don kuk Steel 2 2 
Dongbu 3 2 5 
Kumho 1 
1 
Hanil 1 1 
Kolon 1 1 
Miwon 2 
2 
Kukdon Constr. 2 3 5 
Don an 1 1 2 
4 
Halla 1 1 
Ton il 1 1 
Top 5 8 5 12 25 
(39.7%) 
Total 27 12 24 63 
* `Financial Corporation' includes `investment capital 
companies' and credit card companies 
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** `Stock Company' includes investment consultant 
companies 
Source: KIS, 1990 
More importantly, the financial institutions which are 
owned by the chaebols have functioned as a capital 
depository for the chaebols themselves. In this way, the 
chaebols have escaped from the legal limitations placed 
on bank credits and loans, and have built on alternative 
in the form of the financial institutions they control, 
particularly in the 'secondary' sectors. 
Table VII. 1.14. 
Money Loaned to the Top 30 Chaebols by the 
Secondary Financial Institutions, December, 1988 
unit: ten million won, %) 
Chaebol Short-Loan Company Insurance Company 
Top 5 24,290 19.7 10,682 (22.7%) 
To 30 50,999 (41.3%) 19,474 41.4 
Total Loaned Money 123,484 ( 100%) 47,039 1009-1 
Source: Reset from Kang, Choi and Chang,, 1991: 32. 
The pattern emerges particularly clearly if we focus on 
the top 5 chaebols. In 1989, these companies (Samsung, 
Hyundai, Daewoo, Lucky-Goldstar and Ssangyong) owned 25 
financial institutions; 8 financial corporations, 5 
insurance companies and 12 stock companies. These 25 
financial institutions together accounted for 39.7% of 
all the financial institutions possessed by the top 30 
chaebols. The higher the chaebol's rank, the stronger 
their desire to control their own financial 
institutions. But it should not be seen as just 
'desire'. To establish financial corporations demands a 
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huge amount of capital and a nation-wide information 
network. As shown in Table VII. 1.8., in 1990, the top 5 
chaebols accounted for 8.33% of GNP, which was 58.6% of 
the total GNP produced by the top 30 chaebols in that 
year. Polarisation between chaebols of differing size is 
a clear feature of the system. 
Conclusion 
From the preceding analysis of the chaebols in Korea 
today,, the following suggestions can be made for the 
formulation of relevant policies. 
First, the concentration of economic power must be 
correctly understood in order to establish a true market 
system and to encourage economic and political 
democracy, which are the foundations of capitalism. 
Government intervention, however, may fail as a result 
of badly formulated policy objectives and inadequate 
means. 
Second, in setting the basic direction of policy to 
regulate the concentration of economic power, we have to 
distinguish and harmonise the issue of efficiency and 
equity. Since the concentration of economic power is 
partly a result of given market conditions, it may be 
desirable to mitigate its negative effects while 
preserving the competitive spirit and efficiency. The 
issue of social equity therefore, should first be 
approached by guaranteeing equal economic opportunities 
to all agents, with other policy measures being 
mobilised to supplement this goal. 
Third, unless the current level of concentration in the 
ownership of business groups is reduced, the seeds of 
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discontent will remain. General policies of income or 
wealth redistribution can have only a limited effect on 
this score because they are not designed to address the 
majority share holdings in business groups. We must 
therefore devise a policy aimed specifically at 
dispersing ownership. Such a policy must entail a 
requirement that the subsidiaries of business groups are 
publicly floated coupled with inducements to the general 
public to participate more fully in the stock market. 
This step must be preceded, however, by an improvement 
in the general level and distribution of income, an 
upgrading of the corporate financial structure, an 
enhancement of managerial professionalism and a 
reduction in the opportunities for other speculative 
investments. 
The requirement for a more equal distribution of wealth 
coupled with restrictions on the undue concentration of 
economic power are a necessary basis for democracy. 
These demands have usually been attributed to socialism 
and communism, but a fair distribution of wealth and of 
ownership can also be presented as the starting point 
for a more just form of capitalism. 
7.2. The Social Networks of the Chaebols 
The effects of economic power are not confined to the 
economic sector. Rather, as we see everywhere, it can 
exercise significant control over the political, social 
and cultural environment. The system which connects 
specific modes of power can be defined as a `power 
structure'. Creating and sustaining a power structure 
favourable to their interests is an important activity 
for capitalists. It has to be not only established but 
also continually consolidated. 
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In the Korean case in contrast from the western case 
studies (Domhoff 1978 & 1989b; Zeitlin & Ratcliff, 
1988), because of the history of strong state-guided 
economic development planning, foreign capital has not 
played such a strong autonomous role as it has in south 
American countries. Since it was always introduced by 
the state, foreign capital has generally functioned to 
strengthen the power of the government. At the same 
time, national capital in the form of the chaebols has 
actively sought to its power by ensuring the succession 
to their properties and by using their economic power in 
the political and cultural sectors. These links can be 
seen in individual linkages in corporate support for 
cultural institutions and in corporate donations to 
political funds. In this section, analysis will focus on 
the social networks linking capitalists. 
In order to uncover the power structure within and 
between the major chaebols, three main factors must be 
studied; educational background, past job experience, 
and marital linkages. 
The owner of the chaebol, who is also usually the 
founder, or founder's son, is the central figure (see 
section VII-1. ). It is therefore very difficult to adopt 
the modes of interlocking directorships developed in 
American works in Korean society. A much more important 
basis for corporate networks are blood ties. Alumni who 
graduate from the same school or institute or people who 
come from the same province, also often have very strong 
bonds outside of blood ties, especially in Korea which 
has a Confucian tradition. 
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7.2.1. Educational Background 
Graduation from the same school or university can be an 
important factor in cementing common interest. Alumni 
share similar memories, and a certain emotional bond. 
Even the most official conversations can be started with 
reminiscences or trifling anecdotes based on common 
experiences. In Korea, there are three top universities; 
Seoul National, Korea, and Yonsei. As Table VII. 2.3. 
shows, most graduates from these three universities 
prefer to work for the chaebols. Moreover, promotion 
within these companies is strongly linked to educational 
background. Table VII. 2.1., 2.2., and 2.3., show the 
distribution of university graduates who have already 
taken important positions in the main economic sectors 
in Korean society. People who graduated from the three 
top universities hold 67.3% of the executive positions 
in the top 10 chaebols, 73.9% in the main government 
economic departments (the Ministry of Finance, the 
Economic Planning Board, and the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry) and more conspicuously, 89.6% in the ten 
main banks. The three key economic sectors therefore, 
consisting of production, the devising and execution of 
economic policies, and funding, are linked through the 
alumni who graduate from the three major universities. 
Moreover, the chaebols have used this network very 
effectively. 
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Table VII. 2.1. 
Distribution of Graduates from Leading 
Universities Occupying Executive Positions in the 
Top 10 Chaebols, 1989 
unit: number, % 
Seoul Korea Yonsei Others Total 
Univ. Univ. Univ. 
Chairmen* 104 12 27 61 204 
(51.0) ( 5.9) (13.2) (29.9) (100) 
Vice 81 20 17 49 167 
President (48.5) (12.0) (10.2) (29.3) (100) 
EM 187 22 44 140 393 
Director** (47.6) ( 5.6) (11.2) (35.6 (100) 
Total 372 54 88 250 764 
(48.7) ( 7.1) (11.5) (32.7) 100 
NB. Owners' Relatives are Excluded 
* 'chairmen' includes chairmen, vice chairmen, president 
** EM Director; Executive Managing Director 
Source: Daily Economic Newspaper, "New people's flow of 
management", March-December. 1989. 
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Table VII. 2.2. 
Distribution of Graduates from Leading 
Universities Occupying Executive Positions in the 
Main Government Economic Departments 1) 
unit: number, % 
University Seoul Korea Yonsei Others Total 
Universit Universit University 
Ministry of 75 16 6 22 119 
Finance (63.0) (13.5) (5.0) (18.5 (100) 
EPB 2) 49 14 10 31 104 
(47.1) (13.5) (9.6) (29.8) (100) 
Ministry of 45 12 5 29 91 
C&I 3) (49.4) (13.2) (5.5. ) (31.9) (100) 
Total 169 42 21 82 314 
(53.8) (13.4) (6.7) (26.1) 100 
1) over the rank of chief (head) of section 
2) Economic Planning Board 
3) Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
Source: Monthly Sin Dong-A, February, 1990 
Table VII. 2.3. 
Distribution of Graduates from Leading 
Universities Who are Executives in the Main Banks 
1), 2) 
(unit: number, %) 
Seoul U. Korea U. Yonsei U. Others Total 
78 
(67.8) 
14 
(12.2) 
11 
9.6) 
12 
(10.4) 
115 
100 
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1) 'Executives' includes executives, directors, 
managers, auditors 
2) Main banks; 5 special banks and 5 General Commercial 
banks 
Source: Directory of Bank Executives, Federation of 
Banks, 1990 
7.2.2. Past Occupational Experience 
Past job experience is another important factor shaping 
the social network. If the people who worked in 
different areas of society, came to the chaebols, their 
previous experience and working skills can be very 
helpful for the business. But a more important point is 
that these people can act as a human bridge connecting 
their previous working institutions with their present 
employer through social relationships. One of the most 
conspicuous examples can be found in the organisation of 
FKI. 
FKI is the non governmental 'Federations of Korean 
Industries' which was launched in August 1961, just 
after the Military Coup that ushered in the Park Regime. 
Instead of confiscating illicitly accumulated property 
from major capitalists, the military junta asked them to 
help in developing the economic situation which was 
vital duty for getting legitimation of the military 
coup. From this moment, a coalescence between the regime 
in the power and leading capitalists commenced. Since 
then, the FKI has functioned as a pressure group working 
for the general interests of the major capitalists. The 
FKI has developed several official and regular channels 
through which it can influence government policy 
formation. To be the member of FKI a company must 
achieve a certain level of annual turnover. In 1991, the 
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FKI has 461 member companies, accounting together for 
65% of GNP and 80% of the total amount of exports (Dong- 
A Daily, 15/ August, 1991). 
Table VII. 2.4. 
Distribution of Past Job Experiences of FKI 
Executive' Members, 1989 
unit: number 
Chairman/ President/ Executive TOTAL 
V. Chairman V. President Managing 
Director 
Bureaucrat 46 84 47 177 
(20.0) (12.6) 8.6) (12.2) 
Financial 28 102 60 190 
Institution (12.1) (15.3) (11.0) (13.1) 
Economic 55 55 5 115 
Institution (23.8) ( 8.2) ( 0.9) 8.0) 
Academic 27 41 20 88 
Institution (11.7) ( 6.1) ( 3.7) ( 6.1) 
Military 3 44 15 62 
( 1.3) ( 6.6) ( 2.7) ( 4.3) 
others 72 342 399 813 
(31.1) (51.2) (73.1) (56.3) 
Total 231 668 546 1445 
(100) (100) (100) (100) 
Source: Chungja Kong, 1989: 209 
Table VII. 2.4. shows the distribution of executive' past 
job experiences of FKI members. The biggest number 
(13.1%) had previous employment in financial 
institutions. Working as a bureaucrat is the second most 
frequent past job. Altogether, 20.0% of company chairmen 
and vice chairmen came from the bureaucratic sector. 
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This is not particularly surprising since in the Korean 
case, it is almost impossible to become a chairman 
through continuous promotion within the company. Usually 
chairmen are invited and selected from other sectors. 
This is because a chairmen's job places particular 
emphasis on improving relations with other companies, 
and with government, in other words, lobbying. 
Another example is the selection of the chairman of the 
FKI itself. In 1989, the FKI, for the first time, 
invited the former Prime Minister, Yoo Janghyun, to be 
its chairman instead of relying on internal candidates 
drawn from the members. Yoo Janghyun selected Choi 
Changnak, former minister of Energy & Resources, as his 
co-operator. Including these two men, 11 former 
ministers worked as chairmen of FKI member companies in 
1991 (Kyunghyang Daily 5/March, 1991). 
There is another indicator which can be used to show the 
degree of interlocking that Korean capitalists have 
developed. As Table VII. 2.4. shows, there is evidence of 
career mobility between the economic sector and other 
social sectors, in particular, to the government sector. 
However, there seems to be a particular direction to the 
flow. Table VII. 2.5. shows that chaebol members 
frequently hold positions in both the government and 
civic sectors, but are more highly active in the civic 
sector. The governmental sector includes only two 
positions, the Peace Unification Advisory Committee and 
the Korean Olympic Committee neither of which are 
influential on core policy making. Capitalists are most 
actively involved in the executive positions of social 
organisations, and more than half of these are sports- 
related. Although Table VII. 2.5. shows that chaebols are 
highly active in business associations and policy groups 
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within business organisations, these operate within the 
business community rather than reaching out to other 
sectors of the society. 
Table VII. 2.5. 
Frequencies of Interlocking Positions of Leading 
Businessmen From the Top 50 Chaebols in the 
Government and Civic Sector, 1988 
Positions Chaebols; Number 
Government Advisory 11 
Government Public Board 17 
National Assemblymen 0 
Social Organisation 
Sports 27 
Others 20 
Socio-Cultural Foundations 7 
Educational Foundations 24 
Mass Media 3 
Business Associations & Policy Groups 93 
Business Foreign Relations Or anisations 37 
Note: Frequencies refer to number of positions rather 
than persons 
Source: Adopted from Suh, 1988: 246 
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7.2.3. Intermarriage Linkages 
Table 7.2.6. 
Marital Relations of Founders of Top 30 Chaebols 
unit: number, 
Son Daughter Total 
Family Executives of Chaebols 12 9 21 
(19.3) 
Big Businessmen (non chaebols) 7 
Family Executives 3 4 ( 6.4) 
Big Businessmen (non chaebols) Non 12 
Family Executives 12 (11.0) 
High Positioned Bureaucrats From 21 
Executive Department 16 5 (19.3) 
High Positioned Bureaucrats From 
Legislature/Judiciary Department & 15 
Military (Over Vice Ministers) 10 5 (13.8) 
Academic Figures 7 
5 2 ( 6.4) 
Others 12 14 26 
(23.9) 
Total 70 39 109 
( 100) 
Source: Chungja Kong, 1989 
Even though some features of the interlocking models 
developed in relation to western societies are difficult 
to adapt to the Korean power structure, intermarriage is 
an exception. Table VII. 2.6. shows the marital relations 
of the founders' offspring in the top 30 chaebols. 
Moreover, if we expand the analysis to the whole cluster 
of dominant groups, we find that they are even doubly 
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related by marriage to each other (Kong, 1989: 110; Kang, 
Choi and Chang, 1991: 80-10) . Domhoff defines social 
class as "a group of families with similar aspirations 
and values, to families who perceive each other as 
equals and freely intermarry" (Domhoff, 1967: 3). As 
Zeitlin and Ratcliff argue, links through marriage can 
be far deeper than any constituted by a cash nexus alone 
(Zeitlin and Ratcliff, 1988: 229). 
7.2.4. Conclusion 
In this section, various social ties which the 
capitalists developed have been explored. Within the 
chaebols, there are strong blood ties and 
interconnections through educational background and past 
job experiences. These three features combine to 
structure the corporate interaction pattern of the 
chaebol in Korea. 3 
Secondly, the traffic between different sectors, 
economic and bureaucratic sectors or, economic and non- 
profit organisations, has been steadily reinforced. The 
chaebols are eager to invite leading former bureaucrats 
to act as their chairmen because they can be helpful 
when the company needs to deal with government. The 
chaebols have also been reaching out, seeking positions 
in social organisations such as sport-related 
3 The variable of 'Hometown' can also be a very 
important factor for the same reason as others; As 
noted earlier, it shares an ideological base in 
Confucianism in a sense that it is accepted as an 
extension of the 'family'. However, in this thesis, due 
to difficulty of collecting relevant material, it has 
had to be omitted. 
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organisations and in social, cultural and educational 
foundations. These moves serve both to solidify their 
common interests and to permeate their power into other 
sectors. 
Finally, the chaebols have been seeking to consolidate 
their class interests by cementing ties through 
intermarriage, both among the chaebols themselves and 
between themselves and government or other dominant 
groups. Since marital relations are today much more 
pervasive, it is no longer a matter of a single bond 
between two families. Almost every Korean chaebol family 
and the families of other dominant groups are connected 
by double or even multiple marriages. Even though the 
history of capitalists as a class is comparatively short 
in Korea, through these various methods, the 'chaebols' 
have successfully established their position as the most 
powerful group in Korea. 
In summary, the Korean chaebols have developed social 
networks which covers all the major social sectors. They 
have consistently tried to increase their power not only 
within the economic sector, but also in the other 
sectors of society, thus, transforming themselves into 
something approximating to a ruling class. 
7.3. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the main concern has been with the 
concentration of wealth in the hands of the chaebols. 
Even though in the first period of the development of 
economy, concentration could be promoted as the most 
efficient way to achieve rapid growth, there were also 
inevitable side-effects. 
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First of all, since much of the illicit wealth 
accumulation occurred with tacit or active official 
support, criticisms of the chaebols are closely linked 
with criticism of the state. In return for carrying out 
government directives, and in many accounts, for 
contributing funds to political chests, the 
conglomerates were given exclusive rights to certain 
industries and other special licenses, as well as low- 
interest foreign loans. Rather than invest all their 
funds for productive uses, they have bought real estate 
and occasionally lent money at high interest rates (Cole 
and Park 1983: 186). 
Other criticisms of the chaebols focus on their 
ownership and management by a single family or groups of 
relatives, as shown in the tables in previous sections. 
Their "nepotism" is understood both to hinder more 
talented persons from attaining the uppermost ranks, and 
in long-term, to be detrimental to the future dynamism 
of the chaebol and the national economy. 
The last criticism concerns the extent of their control 
over the economy and its extension to other social 
domains, including to political and cultural sectors. 
This criticism is fuelled by the fact that (as we have 
seen) they have consolidated their position as the 
dominant power group through a range of linkages, such 
as the educational background, hometown, social 
mobility, and marriage. 
In conjunction with consideration of the ground theory 
of this thesis, some comments should be added. The 
period of the Korean economic development can be 
equivalent as the period of the economic growth of the 
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Korean chaebols. As noted throughout this chapter, the 
Korean state has chosen the development path different 
from its Asian NICs counterparts and chose 'chaebols' as 
its partner for the growth. As a consequence, the 
position of the chaebols has grown according to economic 
development, and from the mere domestic commercial 
capital when they began, today, Korean economy cannot 
comprehend without them. This shift of their position 
has influenced on the state autonomy as well. As 
discussed earlier, the components of the state autonomy 
in the early phase contains the absence of the existing 
power and consequently, due to mere industrial 
development, the state autonomy enjoyed the benefit of 
the weak base of the capitalist class. In the 1990s, the 
capitalist class has grown and they are about to fill up 
the empty seat of the ruling class which was, in 
general, occupied by previous land-owned ruling class, 
the state autonomy is seeking for the new era which 
requires the negotiation and different way of policy 
execution. This change can be found even in the 
communication sector which is used to be monopolised by 
the state power. The following chapter will explore this 
relation at length. 
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CHAPTER VIII. 
CULTURAL CONTESTS: THE NEWS MEDIA 
8.1. Introduction 
In previous chapters, I have attempted to delineate the 
power structure and the dynamics operating amongst the 
major power blocs in post-war Korea. As in any other 
society, it would be unwise to try to explain the social 
situation using any that proposes a mono causal 
approach. Levels of the society are intertwined and have 
developed interdependently, and in Korea this is even 
more strongly the case. When examining the sphere of 
mass media, as a terrain of cultural struggle, such an 
attitude is crucial. 
As noted in detail in the previous part of the thesis, 
in spite of the delayed start of rapid capitalist 
development, during the 170s and 180s, Korea reached a 
certain level of economic growth relatively, quickly. 
However, since this movement was not based on long-term 
accumulation, the country now faces many problems within 
politics, the 'economy and society. These difficulties 
have impacted on the system of mass communication, 
because the major power blocs have been trying to use 
the mass media both to 'reproduce their dominant power 
by signs, meanings and values' (Terry Eagleton, 
1991: 221), and to generate high level of profit. 
In 1980, the Korean media operated under strong 
government control. At the same time, they suffered 
financial difficulties. After the new military regime 
took power, General Chun restructured the whole system, 
abolishing small and unsympathetic media concerns and 
prompting mergers among big concerns. This process known 
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as the 'Rearrangement of Mass Media', conferred 
substantial advantages on the companies that survived. 
Since this period, there has been a great chance for the 
remaining mass media companies to make profits without 
harsh competition. Consequently, through the 80s, the 
power of the mass media grew and relations with the 
government improved markedly. 
The Korean government had been accustomed to operate 
strong censorship of the mass media in the past, but 
more and more, relationships with the communications 
companies became more positive. The government no longer 
felt the need to wield wide spread and obvious controls 
over content. Indeed, at times, the power dynamics 
between the government and the mass media has shown the 
reverse pattern to the past. It is possible to explain 
this, as in any other economic sphere, as a consequence 
of the fact that the economic power of the mass media 
has increased. At the same time, the attempts by major 
capitalists to increase their ownership of mass media 
have become more salient, as have their efforts to 
extend their power amongst all social spheres. This 
process is illustrated by the small scale of interview 
study reported in the next section. 
However, on a structural level, within the mass media 
sector itself, the government still holds the critical 
balance of power based on the legal system, strong 
regulations on ownership, and supported by the personnel 
flows of executives, both amongst the mass media 
companies themselves and between these companies and the 
government. 
Another point to note is that even though the economic 
sector has developed rapidly, the speed of development 
219 
Chapter VIII Cultural Constests: The News Media 
of other social sectors has been uneven, especially 
amongst those belonging to the so called 
'superstructure'. Thus, although we see the chaebols as 
exercising increasing hegemony in the economic sector, 
it would be very dangerous to assume the same situation 
has been reproduced in other areas. As we saw in the 
previous chapters, the political sphere offers a good 
example of this uneven development. 
In this chapter, I shall try to make clear'whythe mass 
media is one of the most salient sites for an 
exploration of the power dynamics amongst the main 
blocs. Throughout modern history, mass communication, 
especially the news media, has been a major focus of 
power struggles. However, some time in contemporary 
Korea, the mass media could not be explained as a simple 
battlefield among power blocs because they have always 
been strongly located under the control of the 
government rather than being a reflection of changes in 
the power structure. One plausible explanation of this 
situation is that in Korea, before 1980, the power 
structure itself did not change enormously, rather, it 
remained under one powerful hand - the military. 
However, with continued economic development, 'business 
interests have made efforts to spread their power more 
widely. As a result, the mass media and the cultural 
environment they create have increasingly become a site 
of contest. 
This chapter will be divided into two-sections. An 
exposition and explanation of the 'Rearrangement of'Mass 
Media' (Abbreviation; Rearrangement) in 1980 has to come 
first to help us understand the system as-a whole. This 
Rearrangement was carried out by the military regime in 
the name of the government in order to control the mass 
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media, after General Chun took power.. It functions in 
two ways; on the one hand, the government could cut off 
all unwanted, - critical voices through the abolition of 
registration for alternatives and oppositional mass 
media; on the other hand, it was a, great chance for the 
remaining mass media to flourish both economically and 
in terms of social power. 
In addition, I shall try to document all of the 
procedures of Rearrangement up to the completion of the 
financial structure through the establishment of KOBACO 
(The Korean Broadcasting Advertisement Corporation) and 
the enactment of the 'Fundamental Law for Journalism and 
Mass Media'. 
Secondly, I shall provide an account of the surviving 
mass media, in particular, the news media, -as one of the 
most flourishing enterprises in Korea over the ten years 
between 1980 and 1990. In this section, the recent 
phenomena, in which capitalists realise their long 
cherished intention to own mass media industries will 
also be discussed. In contrast to other advanced 
capitalist societies, due to strong prohibition by the 
government, Korean Chaebols could not possess their own 
mass media until quite recently. For this reason, they 
searched for other ways to influence the mass media, and 
discovered that owning advertising companies was the 
answer. This will be fully explained in the next 
chapter. 
In addition, a map of the relations-between the cultural 
industries and other power groups and of the main 
personnel flows between the mass media and the 
bureaucratic sector will be delineated. This latter 
phenomena is significant because such flows between 
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areas, and the exchanges of values, expertise and 
contacts they represent, help to shape the government's 
impact on Korean public culture. 
8.2. The Rearrangement of the Mass Media 
The purpose of this section is to show how the 
government intervened in the mass media sector and tried 
to control them according to its intentions. Such a 
situation can be found more or less throughout the 
world. However, what happened in Korea in 1980 was on a 
scale and with a degree of involvement that is highly 
unusual compared to other capitalist countries. It was 
achieved in four steps: a) an order for the 
discontinuation of selected critical magazines; b) the 
dismissal of dissident journalists; c) the integration 
of newspaper companies, news agencies and broadcasting 
companies; d) the enactment of the 'Fundamental Law for 
Journalism and Mass Media'. 
8.2.1. Background to the Rearrangement of the 
Mass Media 
After the assassination of President Park in October, 
1979, Korea was caught in a power vacuum and after 
General Chun assumed power by a military coup in 
December 1979, solid national support from the people 
for his government was still far from his. 
In response to this precarious situation, the new 
military junta firstly proclaimed martial law. This 
prohibited any sort of political meetings or political 
action, especially by politicians. The imposition of 
martial law was then used to justify strong censorship 
of all news media. However, at the same time, amongst 
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the four major news media; the Chungang Daily, the 
Kyunghyang Daily, the Hankuk Daily and the Hapdong News 
agency, most journalists agreed to co-operate to oppose 
the new censorship, since they considered that this was 
a now-or-never moment to establish freedom for reporting 
and comment. Journalists from different media were of 
the same mind, and they tried to revive the movement for 
the freedom of journalism through the activation of 
journalists' associations, the reinstatement of the 
journalists discharged in 1975 from the Dong A Daily and 
the Chosun Daily by the Park regime, and concerted 
opposition to censorship. The reformed journalists' 
association proposed an amendment to the constitution 
concerning press and information law. It contained 
several radical conditions, including; a guaranteed 
public right to know; objections against the limited 
freedom of the press, publishing, assembly and 
association; the negation of censorship of the press and 
publishing; the independence of editors; and the 
rejection of interference with the press by the 
government. However, these basic conditions were not 
realised in the Korean constitution, and still have not 
been, up until the time of writing. 
These attempts and movements for press freedom by 
journalists both threatened the new military regime, and 
antagonised them. And they reached the conclusion that a 
Rearrangement of the mass-media, according to their own 
intentions and convenience, was necessary to provide a 
'solution'. 
There was also a further reason for Rearrangement, which 
was the support from the owners of the major mass media. 
(We will see more clearly in the next section how the 
Rearrangement benefited the remaining mass media. ) 
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Before 1980, the mass media industries, especially 
newspaper companies and news agencies, were not 
profitable in a business sense. On the contrary, they 
faced harsh economic difficulties (Annual Report of 
Press and Broadcasting, 1978: 285; 1980: 376). In the late 
70's, they were caught up in the general stagnation in 
Korea with the result that revenues were either static 
or falling. As Table VIII. 1. shows, the total dealings 
in advertising had been declining during 1980-1981. 
Table VIII. l. 
Rate of Charge in Advertising Dealing, 1979-1982 
(unit: billion won) 
Year Total Dealinga) Rate of Char e b) 
1979 303.4 8.2% 
1980 275.2 -9.3% 
1981 264.3 -4.0% 
1982 343.3 29.9% 
a) The total of dealing in advertisements 
b) Rate of increase compared to previous year 
Source: Wonsoo Kim, Introduction to Advertisement (in 
Korean), 1987: 722, Seoul, Kyungmun Sa. 
* This total for dealing is based on the wholesale price 
index of the year 1980. Thus, it takes account of 
inflation, and the 1980 price index becomes 100%. 
In those days, newspaper companies relied more on 
advertising earnings than direct sales to readersl, 
therefore, the stagnation of the advertising industry 
very directly influenced their revenues. 
1 The Rate is 60: 40, Korea Newspapers Annual Report, 
1978,1979. 
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Added to which, incomes from newspaper sales were not 
flourishing either. Most newspaper companies were 
struggling under excessive competition. One reason for 
this is that circulation levels are used as an index for 
advertisers to estimate the number of potential readers 
and hence customers. Having large sales means that a 
newspaper company is worthy of advertising interest, and 
thus in a good position. However, the competition in 
sales was so excessive amongst newspaper companies that 
it led to a financial crisis. In August 1978, the 
newspaper association formulated three conditions of the 
so called "Announcement for Normalisation of newspaper 
Sales": objection to free distribution; negation of 
subscription fee discounts; and a ban on free gifts 
(Newspaper and Broadcasting, December, 1978: 97). 
The difficult financial situation for newspaper 
companies, gives us a clue as to why the new military 
regime's attempts to rearrange the whole system of mass 
media, was actively accepted amongst the owners of big 
newspaper companies rather than having to be enforced. 
They saw very clearly that if they were able to survive, 
there would be good chance that in a reduced market 
place they would escape many of the financial pressures 
besetting them, and thus, in the future, be able to 
establish a stable and advantageous relationship with 
the new government. 
8.2.2. The Suppression of Magazines and the Mass 
Dismissal of Journalists 
On the 31 July 1980, in the name of a 'purging of 
society', 12% of total magazines published were 
discontinued on the orders of the new military regime. 
They included 15 weekly, 104 monthly, 13 bimonthly, 16 
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quarterly, and 24 annual magazines, a total of 172 out 
of the 1443 titles in circulation ("Documentary of 
Hardship of Mass Media under the Fifth Republic", Dong A 
Daily, November 14,1988). The list of discontinued 
magazines included most of those which had been most 
critical of the government. They included, "Ssialeui 
Sori (Voice of Seed, monthly)", "Bburigipeun Namu (Deep 
rooted Tree, monthly)", "Changjakgwa Bipyeong (Creation 
and Critics, quarterly)", "Munhakgwa Jiseong (Literature 
and Intellect, quarterly)", the Journalists Association 
Review (monthly), Journalism (quarterly), the Hanyang 
Times (Hanyang University Newspaper), and the Seogang 
Times (Seogang University Newspaper). The discontinuance 
order for these magazines revealed very clearly the 
intentions of the new regime towards the Rearrangement 
of the mass media ("Undisclosed Rearrangement of Mass 
Media", Hankuk Daily, October 28,1988). 
Table. VIII. 2. 
Number of Magazines that Ceased Publishing 
Total Weekly Monthly Bimonthly Quarterly Annual of Total 
172 15 104 13 16 24 12% 
By its actions, the new regime could cut the major press 
channels open to critics and democratic intellectuals, 
and in doing this, could shut out of the public sphere, 
the spreading voices of the anti-regime movement 
(November, 14.1988. Dong A Daily). 
The second step was a massive dismissal of journalists 
between July and August 1980. In fact, this had already 
started in May, when the new regime proclaimed martial 
law, and arrested 9 journalists who had played important 
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roles in the Journalists' Association. Later, five of 
them were sentenced by the military court ("Movement for 
Press Freedom in the 1980's", Populace and Free Press, 
1987). In July however, activities against dissident 
journalists were stepped up, and the new regime 
introduced a three-stage-plan to 'purify' the 
journalistic sector: a) under supervision by the 
Ministry of Culture and Information, the Newspaper 
Association and Broadcasting Association called for an 
urgent meeting to formulate plans for a self directed or 
'autonomous' clean-up; b) under the owners' direction, 
after its establishment, a 'clean-up committee' would 
commence 'purification'; c) in the event of a lack of 
success or improvement, the military junta would 
intervene to carry out the neglected responsibilities of 
the owners (National Parliamentary Inspection, Hearing 
for Press and Broadcasting, November 1988). 
Under the so called 'autonomous clean-up', in every 
media company, many journalists were dismissed. The 
number eventually reached 933.298 journalists were 
discharged by military order, while 635 journalists were 
fired by the 'autonomous cleanup committee'. The 
National Security Committee sent a list to every media 
owner detailing 336 journalists for discharge. 88.7% 
(298 persons) were shown the door. More astonishingly, 
the 'Autonomous' Committee' added 635 more names (427 
journalists and-208 business operators) to that list on 
its own initiative (National Parliamentary Inspection, 
ibid. ). Thus 68.1% of the total dismissed journalists 
were discharged by their owners, rather than by the 
government. While it could be said that the three-step- 
plan by the military regime succeeded in threatening the 
owners, the scale of internal dismissals was so 
extensive that it would appear that the owners used this 
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opportunity for their own business purposes; ' rather than 
being coerced into it by the military regime. 
The massive dismissal of critical journalists removed 
all potential for professional resistance from the mass 
media by helping to transform the sector from taking a 
defiant attitude to being adaptive towards the new 
regime (Hankuk Daily, October 25 1988). As a result of 
this initiative, they were able to establish a secure 
platform from which to subsequently control the mass 
media whilst retaining good relations with its owners. 
8.2.3. The Integration of the News Media 
The plan for the 'Rearrangement' of the mass media was 
suggested to General Chun by Huh Mundo and his 'media 
planning team', and after his inauguration, it was 
approved in November, 1980 (National Parliamentary 
Minute for Ministry of Culture & Information, 144th 
Assembly, October 1988: 18). In accordance with this 
plan, the Korean Newspaper Association and the Korean 
Broadcasting Association called for an urgent meeting on 
November 14, at which they decided to rearrange the 
structure of the news media from 28 newspapers, 29 
broadcasting companies and 7 news agencies to 20 
newspapers (6 national papers, 2 financial papers, 2 
English papers and 10 local papers), 1 news agency, and 
2 broadcasting companies (Joowon Kim, 1989: 23) In 
consequence, 1 national newspaper company, 2 financial 
paper companies, 5 local newspaper companies, 27 
broadcasting companies and 7 news agencies were 
integrated into other existing media companies. The 
government tried-to arrange 3 national newspapers and 1 
financial paper, each for morning and evening, while it 
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permitted only 1 local paper for each province (thus, 10 
local papers). 
In the broadcasting sector, there was a large scale 
change to make the whole mixed system into a purely 
publically owned and managed system. Originally, there 
were three main TV companies; KBS (publically owned), 
MBC (private) and TBC (chaebol 'Samsung' owned). Each of 
these three broadcasting companies had 1 TV channel and 
2 radio stations. There were also DBS (bong A Daily 
owned), CBS (Christianity Broadcasting) and 3 other 
local private radio companies. Within an 
interrelationship with MBC, there were 21 locally 
independent TV broadcasting companies which exchanged 
programmes with MBC. Now, all systems became amalgamated 
into either KBS. or MBC creating a dual publically owned 
system, with no private companies allowed at all. MBC 
bought 51% of the shares of every one of its 
interrelated broadcasting companies and made them 
affiliates. KBS took over all the facilities and 
employees of TBC2, DBS and other local companies, making 
it the biggest broadcasting company in Korea, owning 3 
TV channels and 8 radio stations. It also held KBS 
possessed a 65% share in MBC constituting itself as the 
country's main centre of TV and radio. In addition, the 
plan commanded CBS to cease producing news programmes 
and entertainment programmes, making it concentrate 
solely religious broadcasting. 
In the area of news agencies, the government amalgamated 
all 7 existing operations and created a new government 
owned one; the Yeonhap News Agency. This made it 
2 It was taken over by the government under the pretext 
of maintaining the impartiality of mass media. 
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possible for the government both to check 'the 
distribution of all incoming foreign news and to send 
government-framed Korean news to foreign countries. 
Since 1980 then, the Korean broadcasting system has been 
concentrated around two main operating bodies; KBS and 
MBC. Both are publically owned, the first is financed by 
a mixture of TV license fees and earnings from 
advertising sales, and the latter is supported solely 
from advertising sales. To solve the financial problems 
besetting broadcasting systems, the new regime 
established KOBACO (the Korean Broadcasting Advertising 
Corporation) as an advertising sales agency for 
broadcasting media (See Chapter IX). 
Table. VIII. 3. 
Number of Integrated News Media 
Media National 
Newspapers 
Financial 
Newspapers 
Broadcasting News Agency 
Original 7 4 29 7 
Integrated 1 2 27 7 
New 6 2 2 la) 
a) All 7 news agencies were integrated into 1 new 
government owned news agency. 
8.2.4. The Fundamental Law for Journalism and 
Mass Media 
The 'Rearrangement of Mass Media' was completed via the 
enactment of the 'Fundamental Law for Journalism and 
Mass Media'. It was formulated by Huh Mundo and his four 
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person 'media planning teami3. It consisted of 57 
articles and 4 supplementary provisions. Whatever 
effective rhetoric it may possess, the main content can 
be simply summarised under three points: a) an emphasis 
on the public function of journalism and the mass media; 
b) an emphasis on the duty and responsibility of 
journalism and the mass media; c) the regulation of 
registration and cancellation of mass media licenses. 
Many of the articles concentrate on explaining how 
important the 'responsibility of the mass media in 
society is and how such a responsibility can be said to 
keep social in order and to aid democratic development. 
This exhortation is backed by a long list of conditions 
under which the government can cancel a registration 
license if a media outlet breaks the regulations. For 
example, in article 3, section 4 it says: 
The press should not encourage or applaud an 
illegal act whose violation would lead to a 
disturbance of public order. " 
And if the media infringe this action 
repeatedly, the Minister of Culture & Information 
may revoke the registration license of the media" 
Firstly, this stipulation is very ambiguous, leaving 
undefined what it means to "encourage or applaud" an 
"illegal act whose violation would lead to a disturbance 
of public order". If the article is vaguely written, 
there is a high possibility of its being subject to 
3 Their main occupation attributes belong to Blue House 
(Presidential Office), judges, and executive 
journalists. 
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variable interpretations, an ambiguity which is highly 
functional for the government since it allows them to 
use these regulations according to their own 
convenience. Another problem of this act is that it 
comes under the authority of the Minister of Culture & 
Information's. Once the regulation of the media is 
concentrated in a single minister's hands, there is a 
continual temptation for them to place their own 
immediate interests above the execution of their 
commission. 
Although by 1988, when the 'Fundamental Law for 
Journalism and Mass Media' was abrogated, no media 
outlets had actually had their licenses revoked, and no 
journalists had been punished, the powers contained in 
the act were threatening enough to put most journalists 
and media in shackles in order to avoid hostile action. 
In the American phrase, it introduced a substantial 
'chill factor' into reporting. 
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8.2.5. Conclusion 
The 'Rearrangement of Mass Media' was undertaken by the 
military regime in order to take over the whole system 
of the news media and to consolidate their power over 
it. It was finalised by the enactment of the 
'Fundamental Law for Journalism and Mass Media' which 
functioned not only as a justification for the 
'Rearrangement' but also as a further warning to 
journalists and mass media concerns to avoid any defiant 
action. However, again, the important point to be 
emphasised is that this. tremendous blow to the mass 
media sector was not dealt only through the military's 
command of force. It was made possible by the tacit 
consent of the owners of the mass media. Indeed, the 
coincidental intentions of the regime and of the owners 
become obvious when we reflect on the corporate 
dismissal of journalists. 
Once the process of 'Rearrangement' was completed, the 
new regime had greater freedom to control the country 
according to its own will, without the pressure of 
complaints or watchdogs, at least amongst the 
journalistic sector. The long honeymoon between the 
media owners and the regime continued up to 1988, when 
the 'Fundamental'Law' was abrogated and the 6th republic 
had to seek co-operation with other powerful sectors of 
society. 
In next the section, I shall show how this honeymoon 
allowed the news media industries to flourish and how 
throughout, there were sporadic attempts by journalists 
to move the news media onto the people's side, and away 
from the side of the regime and the owners. 
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8.3. The News Media 
This section will contain three sub-sections. First of 
all, as we mentioned in the previous section, after the 
"Rearrangement of Mass Media" by Chun's regime, in 1980, 
the Korean news=media enjoyed a most prosperous era, up 
to 1990. With the abolition of the previous levels of 
competition amongst the major news media, the surviving 
media could establish their own firm territories and 
keep their business flourishing. Using this base, they 
then started extending their cultural business to other 
areas, such as publishing, consolidating a strong 
interlocked network among the major news media. In this 
section, I shall concentrate on examining the news 
media, especially the newspapers, from a purely business 
angle, as some of the most successful enterprises of 
that time. 
8.3.1. The Newspaper Industries 
History and Ownership Structures 
The history of Korean newspapers begins in 1920, under 
Japanese colonialism. When in line with a change of 
ruling strategy, Korean were allowed to have their own 
newspapers. At that time, three newspapers (Chosen, Dong 
A, and Sisa) were established, but due to financial 
difficulties, only Chosun and Dong A survived. The 
characteristics of the newspaper press were, of course, 
affected by the political situation. However, throughout 
the difficult era of colonisation, these two newspapers 
remained alive, and felt themselves to be so-called 
'national and traditional' papers. 
By 1980, there were 7 main national papers, as we saw in 
the previous section. Sin A was integrated into the 
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Kyun ghyang newspaper. Of the 6 main papers (Dong A, 
Chosun, Chungang, Hankuk, Kyunghyang and Seoul Daily), 
Seoul and Kyunghyang are mainly owned by the government 
whilst the other 4 are privately owned. Table VIII. 4. 
shows their share holding distribution. 
Table VIII. 4. 
Share Holding Distribution for 4 Major 
Newspapers, 1990 
unit: % 
Title Ma or Shareholders 
Inchona) Relatives In-House Total 
Dong A 23.79% 45.08% 68.87% 
Chosun 95.89% 95.89% 
Chun an 30.69% 43.61% 74.30% 
Hankuk 100% 100% 
a) Inchon: Inchon Foundation 
Source: Parliament Inspection, August 1991 for the 
Ministry of Culture & Information 
The Inchon Foundation which owns almost a quarter of the 
Dong A newspaper is a non-profit making organisation 
mainly aimed at educational support. Inchon is the 
founder's title. In the case of the Chungang newspaper, 
the major share (43.61%) is held by other affiliates of 
the owning group (Samsung Chaebol), a typical method of 
ownership structure by a Korean chaebol, as shown in 
Chapter VII. 
As we can see from this table, the ownership structure 
of the main Korean newspapers is heavily concentrated 
amongst owners and their relatives. The mean share of 
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share holding by owners, their relatives and related 
foundations is up to 84.8%. Therefore, Korean newspaper 
companies, at a structural level, can be considered as 
nothing more than private consortia of their owners and 
their relatives by blood and marriage. We can see 
another example of this concentration if we examine the 
management level (See Table VIII. 5). 
Table. VIII. 5. 
Distribution of Main Shareholders at Management 
Level and Their Share Holding Percentage, March 
1990 
unit: 
Dong A Chosun Chun an Hankuk 
1) 11.76 
(2/17) 
40.00 
6/15 
none 32.00 
(8/25) 
2 9.64 
7 - 
88.67 0 100.00 
1) Percentage of main shareholders at the management 
level 
2) Percentage of shares held by big shareholders 
positioned at the management level 
Source: Parliament Inspection, Autumn, 1991 for the 
Ministry of Culture & Information 
Table VIII. 5. details the correlation between ownership 
and management. 'Today, most of the big companies claim 
that the ownership structure is separate from the 
management structure. This is the so-called 
'administrative 'revolution'. However, as seen in Chapter 
VII, in Korea's relatively short experience of 
capitalism, the gigantic scale of conglomerates, the 
degree of concentration of ownership, and the 
overlapping of ownership and management have all been 
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excessive. This is one of the reasons behind the rising 
anti-chaebol attitude amongst ordinary people in Korea. 
The same explanation can also be applied to Korean 
newspaper companies. If the company is owned by only its 
owner and relatives, and is administrated by those same 
people, it cannot avoid maximising its own profit, 
whatever their product is, whether purely commercial or 
combined with ideological content. 
Of the four major national papers (with the exception of 
the Chun gang Daily which is an affiliate of the Samsung 
chaebol), three show a high degree of coincidence 
between ownership and administration. In particular, in 
the case of the Chosun Daily and the Hankuk Daily, which 
are extremely exclusive companies, they do not 
distribute their company shares to anyone except 
relatives. Moreover, all their main shareholders occupy 
high positions at the administrative level, so that they 
can use their influence directly to increase their 
profit. 
Diversified Management 
As we discussed in the previous section, by 1980, as in 
other industries in this section of the Korean economy, 
newspapers faced harsh economic conditions (see section 
2.1. ). However under the Park regime, the six main 
national newspaper companies expanded and started to 
display the familiar pattern of concentration with 
several related/unrelated subsidiaries in other branches 
of enterprise, in this case, the cultural industries 
(see Table VIII. 6. ). 
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Table VIII. 6. 
Concentration of the Six Major National Newspaper 
Companies by December, 1980, after Rearrangement 
Horizontal Concentration Vertical Others 
Publishing Broadcast Advertising Con cen- 
Media Media. Industries tration 
Kyunghyang 1 NP1> 1 TVC4) 1 AA6) 1 hotel 
3 M2) 2 RCS) 1 stadium 
Dong A 2 NP 
3M 
Seoul 2 NP Government 
2M 
Chosun 2 NP 1 hotel 
3M 
Chungang 1 NP 1 AA Samsung 
8M Chaebol 
2 PC3> 
Hankuk 
1) N. P.; Newspaper 
2) M; Magazine 
3) P. C.; Publishing Company 
4) TVC.; Television channel 
5) R. C.; Radio channel 
6) AA; Advertising Agency 
Source: Korea Journalism Research Institute, 
Administration of. Newspaper Companies in the 
'90s , 1992: 99. 
These press companies were able to grow into medium- 
sized conglomerates because of the improvement in their 
financial position brought about by the rising revenues 
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from newspaper and advertising selling. While in 1969, 
the total circulation of daily newspapers in Korea was 
about 2 million, in 1979, that number reached 6.5 
million, 80% of which was published by the main 6 
national newspaper companies (Whaneui Lee, Communication 
Science, Vol. : 44.1980). 
The '60s could therefore be seen as the starting point 
of industrialisation for the newspaper companies, while 
the '70s was the settling down period of that structural 
phenomena. 
After the "Rearrangement of the Mass Media" 
After the 'Rearrangement of Mass Media', newspaper 
companies, which had been growing throughout the 60s and 
the 70s, accumulated additional profits through various 
forms of investment in publishing, magazines and other 
industries. Table VIII. 7. lends support to this 
conclusion despite containing datum from the year 1987. 
Table VIII. 7. 
Distribution of Turnover From Diversified 
Activities of the Major 5 National papers, 1987 
(unit *3) 
Newspaper Publishing Cultural 
Activity 
Estate & 
others 
Total 
Don A 20.1 4.5 none 24.6 
Seoul 13.0 0.3 4.3 17.6 
Chosun 10.2 0.6 0.4 11.2 
Chun an 25.1 18.6 none 43.7 
Hankuk 4.7 2.8 0.8 8.3 
Mean 14.6 5.4 1.1 21.1 
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Source: Jinro Lee, "Study of Growing Newspaper 
Industries after 'Rearrangement'", Journalism, 
Winter, 1988: 155. Seoul. 
According to this table, the mean percentage of turnover 
from diversified activities such as publishing or 
cultural activities''(concerts, ballets, galleries, ' etc. ) 
reached 21.1% of the total for the year 1987. This means 
that most of the big national 'newspapers made one-fifth 
of their profits through businesses other than newspaper 
and advertisement sales. The biggest share of these 
profits came from the publishing business, which is 
understandable, considering that for newspaper, 
companies, extra money is not required for running a 
publishing business because of their ownership of 
existing equipment for printing newspapers. 
Another important factor that should be pointed out 
concerns the numerous new magazines launched by 
newspaper companies. Under the 'Fundamental Law for 
Journalism and Mass Media' (Article 12, Action 1), it 
became illegal for the same owner to own both 
broadcasting and newspaper media at the same time. They 
therefore had to look to other media sectors for 
opportunities to diversify. This stipulation therefore 
significantly increased the share of the magazine market 
owned by newspaper companies, and jeopardised small 
sized magazines and publishing industries. In March 
1986,65 magazines were published by newspaper 
companies, which comprised 72.2% of the total number of 
magazines in Korea. Moreover, 26 of these titles (40%) 
were first issued after 1980 (Communication Development 
Study Group, 1987: 53-54). This surge can be explained 
by the fact that launching new magazines was the one of 
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the main avenues for making money available to the 
newspaper companies. 
Table VIII. 8. 
Annual Turnover of Major Newspaper Companies, 
1980-1990 
(unit: 100 million Won/%) 
Year Don A Chosun Chun an Hankuk Total Rate* 
1980 265.4 161.3 214.7 217.1 858.5 
1981 312.6 264.3 294.0 304.0 1174.9 36.9 
1982 373.1 335.0 375.6 343.6 1427.3 21.5 
1983 451.5 405.8 441.2 419.1 1717.6 20.3 
1984 519.7 475.4 534.2 479.1 2008.4 16.9 
1985 556.1 543.0 655.1 465.6 2219.8 10.5 
1986 611.3 572.2 736.9 501.3 2421.7 9.5 
1987 710.8 690.2 830.3 564.1 2795.4 15.4 
1988 885.7 914.4 1018.3 713.7 3532.1 26.4 
1989 939.7 1056.3 1224.1 800.5 4020.6 13.8 
1990 1206.3 1442.6 1501.6 1078.9 5229.4 30.1 
Mean 20.1 
Rate*: Rate of increase compared to previous year 
Source: KIS (Korean Industries Statistics), Annual 
Reports, 1980-1990, each year 
Now we can compare the yearly turnover of the four major 
national newspapers from 1980 to 1990 (See 
Table. VIII. 8) . There are two particularly notable 
periods for newspaper companies in increasing the rate 
of turnover - in 1981 and after 1987. 
In 1981, following the 'Rearrangement of Mass Media' by 
Chun's government in December, 1980, the increase in the 
rate of turnover reached 36.9%, the highest in the 10 
years leading up to 1990. This rate of increase becomes 
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even more notable when we compare it to the figure for 
general manufacturing industries, which between 1980 and 
1981, was 19.3% (Jinro Lee, 1988: 149). Thus, the four 
major newspaper companies achieved rates almost doubles 
these of the general manufacturing industrial sector. 
Only the 'Rearrangement of Mass Media' which provided 
newspaper companies with a less competitive market, tax 
exemption, and other guarantees of legal privileges, can 
explain this differentiation4. 
During 1987 and 1988, and from 1989 to 1990, newspaper 
companies seem to have had a second lucrative era. As 
mentioned in Chapter V, during 1987, the steps taken 
towards a more democratic society in Korea influenced 
many levels of. society, even the mass media. The 
4 There were a couple of anomalous applications of tax 
exemptions for the news media by the government. For 
example, in late 1981, the Taxation Law was amended in 
an appendix cutting down custom tax from the normal 
rate 20% to 4% for one year (1982) for limited items, 
such as a rotary press machine. The result was that 
during this period, 12 newspaper companies imported 30 
rotary press machines and saved thousands of millions. 
Another legal privilege which newspaper companies 
enjoyed concerned estate and property. When newspaper 
or broadcasting companies sold or bought their estate 
property, their profits were exempted from taxation, 
as part of a cultural subsidisation policy. 
Sources: Korean Association of Newspaper and 
Broadcasting Companies, Annual Report of Korean 
Newspaper and Broadcasting Companies, 1982; Minutes of 
Culture & Information Committee, Parliament Hearing, 
December, 1987. 
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'Fundamental Law For Journalism and Mass Media' was 
abrogated and accordingly, the regulations for 
establishing news media loosened. 
From 1980 to 1987, due to the 'Fundamental Law', the 
number of newspaper companies had been confined to 30. 
After the law was abolished in 1987, there was a sudden 
boom in the establishment of new newspaper companies. In 
1988, only one year later, the number had already 
increased to 65, while by 1990,78 newspaper companies 
could be counted -a rise of 2.6 times more compared to 
1980 (See Table. VIII. 9. ). 
Table. VIII. 9. 
Number of Daily Newspapers, 1987 - 1990 
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Number 30 65 70 78 
Source: Korean Association of Newspaper and Broadcasting 
Companies, Annual Report, each year, 1987,1988, 
1989,1990. 
What is more, the restriction which limited the space 
available within newspapers was also removed at this 
time. This meant that newspaper companies could publish 
as many pages as they wanted to, allowing them unlimited 
space for editorial content and, more practically, for 
advertising. In 1990, the year in which the rate of 
increase in turnover of the 4 major newspaper companies 
was at its second highest during that ten year period - 
30.1% - newspapers succeeded in locating themselves as 
the top media for selling advertising amongst the four 
major mass media: television, radio, magazines and 
newspapers. Table. VIII. 10. demonstrates that newspapers 
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account for more than half the market share of total 
advertising dealings - 51.27%. The newspapers' position 
was strengthened considerably by the fact that the other 
major advertising medium -television- was still limited. 
Broadcasting hours were still set at under 13 hours per 
day (except at weekends and public holidays), and the 
number of channels was also limited. Thus, television 
stations could not sell more air-time to advertisers 
even if they wanted to, unless advertisements replaced 
normal programmes (Korean Journalism Research, 1992: 112- 
119). 
Table. VIII. 10. 
Distribution of Shares in total Advertising 
Dealings, 1990 
unit: million won %_ 
Media TV Radio Newspaper Magazine Total 
Amount W 598,191 95,318 852,663 116,879 1 663 051 
Share (%) 35.97 5.73 51.27 7.03 100.00 
Source: KOBACO, Ad. Trend, February, 1991. 
Since 1989, the rate of total gains from advertising has 
been increasing - from 32.6% in 1989 to 38.9% in 1990, 
when it amounted to 42.6% of the total volume of 
advertising revenue (which is about 2000 billion won) 
while television only made up 33.6% of the total, and 
its rate of increase compared to the previous year was 
13.7% (KOBACO, Ad. Information, January, 1991). 
New Power over the freedom of speech? 
In the previous sections, we have examined how state 
power was exercised over the Korean newspaper industry 
in the past, and how after the difficult 
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'rearrangement', the surviving press companies co- 
operated with the state and enjoyed growing power. In 
this section, we aim to explore where, in the prosperous 
period of the Korean mass communication system, real 
influence over newspaper content and its construction, 
lay. As pointed out earlier, one of the aims of this 
thesis is to chart the changes in the degree of state of 
autonomy. In 1980, the state was able to redesign the 
whole mass communication system. A decade later, with 
the rapidly growing power of the newspaper companies 
themselves and of other social sectors, do relations 
still reflect the same dynamics? 
In order to examine the process of change at the level 
of everyday news production, interviews were conducted 
with 48 journalists working for the Dong A Daily 
newspaper, between 1st and 5th of February, 1993 in its 
cafeteria using a prepared questionnaires (This is 
reproduced in Appendix B). Respondents were randomly 
chosen on the basis of length of working experience in 
order to compare differences before and after the 
'Rearrangement'. The sample comprised 24 persons with 
less than 4 years experience (50.0%), 15 persons with 
between 5 and 11 years working experience (31.3%) and 9 
persons with over 12 years experience (18.7%) Only 
three out of the total of forty eight were female. 
Most interviewees thought that press freedom had 
improved (72.9%) compared to period of the 5th Republic 
(1980-1987) and a majority felt that newspaper content 
had also improved (52.5%). They identified the most 
influential group in press reporting as the 'editorial 
board and journalists' (41.7%) followed by the 'owners 
and the management section' (31.2%). In other words, 
three quarters of the journalists interviewed thought 
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that power was exercised primarily within the newspaper 
company rather than from an external source. Only 10.4% 
answered that 'the government' played the most important 
role with another 6.2% nominating the advertisers'. 
Following the same line of argument, the second question 
asked about responsibility for unfair and non objective 
press reporting. The largest portion of blame was 
'owners and the management section' (31.3%) or the 
'editorial board' (29.2%), with a further 14.6% agreeing 
that unfair reporting was due to the journalists' own 
failings. On the other hand, only 10.4% thought that 
, the government' was the main cause and a further 6.2% 
pointed to 'the advertisers'. 
These results can be explained by the fact that at the 
time, in Korea, the press were relatively free from 
political pressure, and even though the advertisers had 
become the main revenue source for newspapers, economic 
pressures had not invaded the everyday practices of 
newspaper production. Another important thing to note 
concerns the question of responsibility in press 
reporting. The growing power of 'owners and the 
management section' has largely replaced the government 
as the primary locus of control and newspaper companies 
now make it clear that they are primarily enterprises 
devoted to making profits rather than being beacons of 
democracy. The Korean press is therefore grappling with 
the issue of responsibility as well as of freedom . 
This point of view leads to other questions about the 
new era of 'control by capital'. The expansion of the 
broad sheet newspapers and some companies' intention to 
introduce complementary tabloid titles may intensify 
competition and debilitate the ongoing movement for more 
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democratic reporting. This was a concern for 64.6% of 
respondents. Moreover, 58.3% journalists interviewed 
were worried that this kind of competition might be used 
by government to attempt to control of news media. 
The shorter their working experience, the more likely 
journalists were to see possibilities for increased 
control: 
Concern About Working Experience 
less than 4yrs 5-11 yrs over 12 yrs 
Government Controla) 70.8 %(17) 53.3%(8) 44.4%(4) 
Ca ital Controlb) 87.5%(21) 80.0%(12) 55.6%(5) 
a) concern about the possibility that competition could 
be used as an excuse by the government to exercise 
control 
b) concern about the possibility that competition could 
be used as an excuse by capital to exercise control 
* (): the number of the persons 
There is also a growing awareness among journalists 
about the intention of newspapers to publish twice a 
day; morning and evening. Four fifths answer that it is 
not necessary (82.5%). Moreover, in response to the 
question 'who do you think wants twice daily publication 
most? ' 72.9% journalists nominated 'the owners of 
newspaper companies'. Relatively few nominate 'the 
reader' (14.6%), or 'the advertisers' (4.2%). 
Nor do journalists agree that the expansion of the 
broadsheets has helped to improve the quality of the 
press. Indeed, 45.8% answered that the quality 
newspapers had deteriorated. Objectivity had not 
improved, nor had the expansion of space reflected the 
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various groups' point of views more adequately. However, 
the most obvious change pointed to was the worsening of 
working conditions nominatedly 60.4%. This answer was 
more likely to come from journalists who had been 
working for between 5 and 11 years [less than 4 yrs: 
45.8% (11), 5-1lyrs: 66.7% (10), over 12yrs: 55.6% (5)]. 
This pattern might be explained by the fact that the 
people who started work in that period assumed that 
journalists were treated as relatively privileged even 
though the government pressurised freedom of speech. 
They are therefore in a better position to compare 
changes than anybody else. 
Conclusion Remark 
Three basic points can be made on the basis of the 
results of interview with the 48 journalists of Dong A 
Daily Newspaper. First of all, in terms of control over 
news production, there is increasing evidence of the 
withering away of state power, at least from the daily 
process of newspaper making. Secondly, the central 
positions of control previously filled by the military 
regime are passing into the hands of capital: the owners 
and the senior management of the newspaper companies. As 
a consequence, the main centre of the conflict has 
shifted from the struggle between the regime and 
journalists lobbying for more democratic reporting, to 
battles between the owners of newspaper companies and 
journalists wanting more objective reporting and better 
working conditions. In other words, the newspaper 
industry is no longer in the privileged position in 
which it was protected by government in exchange for the 
suppression of critical reporting. After the 
liberalisation of the law in 1987, numerous new 
newspapers were created or republished for the first 
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time since their demise in 1980. This has intensified 
competition among newspapers. Thirdly, however, there is 
a still an obvious limit at the structural level which 
will be examined in the next sections. 
Conclusion 
Korean newspaper companies have enjoyed an affluent era 
since 1980. Due to the very exclusive character of the 
ownership structure, not only at the share holding 
level, but also at the management level, it is very 
difficult to imagine that these companies would produce 
unbiased, impartial commodities unconnected to their own 
profit concerns. Moreover, throughout this time, the 
Korean news media have located themselves as highly 
lucrative businesses, having good relations with their 
rulers, rather than as a frontier for social democracy - 
even under conditions of harsh dictatorship. Their 
failure to speak on behalf of the people or to act as a 
watchdog on abuses of political power was well 
recognised by their readers. On August 17,1988, one 
political opinion poll sponsored by Hankuk Daily asked 
which group people thought had contributed most to the 
democratisation of Korea (Hankuk Daily, August 17 1988). 
The results disclosed people's attitude towards the 
press very clearly. Only 1% nominated it while the 
effort of students groups was appreciated by 42.2% and 
those of the opposition party gained 19.9%. 
The more recent change inside the newspaper companies 
should also be noted as well. As the interview results 
shows, there has been a shift in the locus of control 
since 1988, at least in the newspaper companies, 
following more democratic political change. This 
situation is further illuminated when we compare the 
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privately own newspaper companies to the publically 
owned broadcasting companies. Accordingly a discussion 
of the broadcasting companies follows in the next 
section. 
8.3.2. The News agency 
There has been only one news agency in Korea since 1980: 
the Union News Agency. Before that time, seven agencies 
competed against each other, but due to the limitations 
of the market, they suffered from financial 
difficulties. Thus, most were supported by chaebols on 
the condition that they exchange international 
information with them (Soonwon Paeng, 1988: 89). 
As noted earlier, in 1980, as a part of the 
'Rearrangement of Mass Media', the seven operating 
agencies were integrated into a single organisation. At 
first, the share holding structure was divided more or 
less equally, with 49% going to two of the previous 
major news agencies (24.5% each), and 51% to the 
'Newspaper association and Broadcasting Association'. 
After a period however, two other previous news agencies 
demanded shares at which time the share holding 
structure was consolidated 
into the pattern shown below 
(See Table. VIII. 1l). 
250 
Chapter VIII Cultural Constests: The News Media 
Table VIII. 11. 
Distribution of Share holdings in -the Union News 
Agency, 1988 
% unit: 
Shareholder Distribution 
KBS 42.35 
MBC 32.15 
6 main national papers 14.04(2.34x6) 
local newspaper association 11.461 
Total 100.00 
Source: Union News agency, Annual Report, 1988 
The Union News' agency is operated by a membership 
system. Ideally speaking, this means that every member 
invests a certain amount, each possesses some shares and 
they all have a hand in organising the committee board 
which makes all the executive decisions. In this 
structure, it is particularly important to distribute 
shares fairly among members, otherwise, as in other 
business companies, a few main shareholders come to play 
an unduly influential role. As shown in Table. VIII. 11., 
however, shares in the Union News agency are 
concentrated in the hands of two main shareholders: KBS 
and MBC, both of which are publically owned broadcasting 
companies. Together, they own 74.50% of the shares. 
Therefore, even if, according to regulations, the 
chairman of the Union News agency is elected by a 
members' committee board, it is easy to predict that KBS 
and MBC might use their shareholder power to ensure 
decisions favourable to their interests. Moreover, 
because KBS and MBC are publically owned, they are de 
facto government controlled. Thus, the government can 
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exert control over the news agency in a legal manner 
through KBS and MBC. In addition, among the 6 national 
newspapers, two remain government owned; Seoul Daily and 
Kyunghyang Daily, each of which has 2.34% of the shares. 
As a result, the total share which the government can 
mobilise to exert control approaches 79.18%. 
One further structure cementing the strong liaison of 
Union News agency with the government stems from the 
personnel flows between the two. Figure VIII. 1. is a 
simplified diagram showing the career record of the 
chairmen of Union News agency since it was established 
in 1980. There have been five chairmen over the last 10 
years, 4 started their careers as journalists for the 
press, and three went into the government. After their 
experience of working for the government sector as 
spokesmen of the Presidential Office or Ministry of 
Culture & Information, they then became the chairmen of 
the Union News agency. 
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Figure. VIII. 1. 
Personnel Flow of Chairmen of the Union News 
agency, 1980-1990 
PRESS GOVERNMENT* 
UNION 
NEWSAGENCY 
T 
BROADCAST 
CULTURAL 
INSTITUTE 
Government*: This category includes Presidential 
spokesman, Minister of Culture & 
Information, diplomatic working, liaison 
secretary for the President, and some 
government operating organisations. 
3) & 4): Number of People 
As represented in Figure VIII. ].., we can see that there 
is an emerging career pattern to becoming a chairman of 
the Union News Agency; which is 1) experience in the 
press, 2) being picked out by a governmental section, 3) 
then, after they understand the ideology of the 
government, they are given the position of chairman of 
the agency. 
Since 1980, the Union News agency has enjoyed a 
monopolistic information exchange contract with the 
domestic and international press and news agencies, it 
253 
Chapter VIII Cultural Constests: The News Media 
has distributed international news to the domestic press 
and broadcasting companies, and sold domestic news to 
the international press. The fact that it is the only 
news agency in Korea, in itself does not necessarily 
mean that it would become a dominant power. Nowadays, 
most countries have only one news agency, in order to 
avoid wasted competition and because of limited markets. 
However, the monopoly of news agency business in the 
Korean situation has particular implications. As shown 
in Table. VIII. 11. and Figure. VIII. l., controlling power 
over the agency lies in the hands of the government. 
Even the chairmen come from the government. The 
government can therefore install the 'right' man for the 
job, one who is 'domesticated' and familiar with 
governmental thinking and procedures, and who might 
therefore be obedient to the ruling power of the 
government when conducting their duties at the news 
agency. With the Union News agency as the only available 
channel for certain key categorises of information, it 
can act as a governmental gate keeper. It can screen 
international news before delivering it to the domestic 
news market. It can also frame news about Korea for 
foreign countries in ways favourable to the government. 
The most critical requirements of a news agency are 
'objectivity' and impartiality of information. The Union 
News agency, however, does not have a suitable structure 
to underwrite these standard. Three steps are necessary 
to achieve this ideal goal. First of all, the share 
holding structure should come under re-examination. It 
is not conducive to balance to allocate a large 
proportion of shares to the broadcasting companies 
alone. Although each of the main Korean national 
newspaper companies possesses 2.34% of the total shares, 
this is too little compared to the stakes held by the 
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broadcasting companies, which, taken together, account 
for 74.50%. Whatever the case, the news agency has to 
avoid allowing its major shareholders to maintain a 
power balance over the other members. 
The second point, which comes out of the first,. concerns 
the rights of personnel. When a news agency has majority 
shareholders, naturally, they can also play a powerful 
role in personnel management. In the current situation 
therefore, the chairmen and other important 
administrators are designated by the major shareholders 
in accordance with the intentions of the government. If 
power were distributed more evenly amongst shareholders, 
they would be in a position to choose the best people in 
pursuit of their interests through a democratic 
procedure. 
Finally, financial independence is crucial for the Union 
News agency. However, the financial situation has not 
been sound enough for the agency to claim freedom from 
government subsidy, and as a result, the relationship 
between the government and the Union has not be on an 
equal footing. Only through a balanced distribution of 
shares and financial independence can one guarantee to 
take the first step towards the ideal goal of a news 
agency - the distribution of unbiased and impartial 
information. 
8.3.3. The Broadcasting Industries 
The most distinctive characteristics of the Korean 
broadcasting structure are that the state owns the major 
broadcasting organisations and can control the 
advertising market through KOBACO. In Korea, after the 
'Rearrangement of Mass Media' in 1980, private ownership 
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of broadcasting organisations was prohibited, 'except for 
small-scale radio stations. In 1990, in accordance with 
new regulations for broadcasting and the press, one 
commercial television company did succeed in getting a 
license. Up until that time however, there had been only 
two government controlled, publically owned broadcasting 
companies: the Korean Broadcasting System (hereafter 
KBS) and the Munwha Broadcasting company (hereafter 
MBC). (For further explanation, see 8.2.3. ) 
In this section an analysis of the Korean broadcasting 
system from 1980 to 1990 will mainly concentrate on two 
different structural levels. An exploration of this 
period in the history of the Korean broadcasting system 
is essential in, order to understand its power dynamics 
and its influence among the power blocs, such as the 
government, the owners of the broadcasting companies and 
other capitalists. 
First of all, a basic financial analysis will be 
undertaken. Due to the bureaucratic attitude towards 
government-owned companies, there is not much 
information available about their financial structures. 
However, this fact in itself could be considered 
meaningful. 
In the second sub-section, a personnel analysis will be 
presented. A typical model of personnel management can 
be extracted, and compared to the alternative models 
within the cultural and social sectors. 
a) Historical Background 
In Korea, the first broadcast sound was transmitted 
under the Japanese Colonial government in November 1924. 
After the success of this test initiative, the 
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establishment of a broadcasting station became the 
central focus of interest for numerous organisations. 
However, the Japanese colonial government permitted the 
foundation of only one Korean broadcasting station out 
of co-operation between all of these organisations. On 
November 30 1926,2 years after the first broadcast, the 
'Kyeongsung I' (the previous name of the present 
capital, Seoul) Broadcasting Station finally gained 
permission to establish itself and the next year, on the 
16 February, it launched its regular broadcasting 
programmes (KBSý, 1977: 18). Although the broadcasting 
atmosphere under 'normal' colonial conditions might be 
considered acceptable, during World War Two, Korean 
broadcasting was treated as a mere propaganda tool for 
Japanese interests, with no autonomy whatsoever 
(Choi, C. S. and Byeon, D. H., 1989: 21-25). 
After decolonialisation from Japan, the US military 
government took over the Kyeongsung Broadcasting 
Station, but in terms of broadcasting freedom, the 
situation hardly improved. All content was strongly 
censored and controlled in line with the interests of 
the US military government. In 1948, in accordance with 
the terms of Korean independence, the Korean government 
placed the broadcasting system under direct government 
management, with the workers belonging to the Department 
of Information. This nationalised monopoly continued 
until 1954, when the first private broadcasting company, 
the Christian Broadcasting System (CBS) opened its 
transmissions to the nation-wide network. At this point 
the financial structure of CBS should be outlined. An 
American evangelical mass media organisation called 
RAVIE MCCO, donated the all of expenses to establish CBS 
in Korea, and announced its significance as 'an infusion 
of Jesus Christ's blood into the Korean people's hearts' 
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(Daihan Sinmun Yeongam, 1956: 185). This continued Korean 
broadcasting history's deep dependence on the interests 
of imperial countries, with only a switch from Japanese 
to American influence. By the time the first television 
broadcasting company was launched in May 1956, the 
situation had not changed much. On this occasion, the 
American company RCA played a major role, and from this 
point on, it built up a formidable influence over most 
other television and radio stations-in Korea 'in the 
future through the provision of technical equipment 
(Kim, S. S., 1989,: 150). 
Substantial commercial broadcasting started from 1959, 
and by 1964, there were 4 major nation-wide commercial 
radio stations. In 1961, KBS-TV transmitted its first 
broadcasts since the temporary stoppage of HLKZ-TV in 
1959 due to a fire. By 1969, the Korean broadcasting 
structure had settled down into the modern duopolistic 
system of two commercial TV/Radio companies, MBC and 
TBC, and the state-owned KBS, and until 1980, the 
'Rearrangement of Mass Media' by the Chun military 
regime, this structure did not change. In 1973 however, 
KBS shifted from state-ownership to being a publically 
owned corporation in line with social development and a 
change in the broadcasting atmosphere (Chung, J. S., 1990). 
b) Financial Analysis of KBS and MBC After the 
'Rearrangement of Mass Media' 
The oligopoly of the triumvirate of KBS, TBC and MBC was 
terminated in December 1980 by the military coup, and 
replaced by the state based system focused on KBS. All 
the local semi-independent branches of MBC were 
integrated into'the central MBC company which became a 
joint corporation bf KBS. In addition, KBS took over TBC 
and all its local stations by means of property 
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confiscation5 in the name of social purification - on 
the pretext that the Chun military regime could not 
allow any private, commercial system to operate in such 
a 'crucially important' broadcasting sector as a matter 
of national interest. 
As a result of the "Rearrangement of Mass Media" in 
1980, the Korean broadcasting system was unified into 
one state-owned, so called 'public broadcasting system' 
operated by two main networks: KBS and MBC. Even though 
KBS and MBC are presented as public owned broadcasting 
systems, both of them are primarily dependent on 
advertising revenue. KBS, in particular, has suffered 
from an operating contradiction because it still insists 
on collecting TV license fees even after starting to 
sell broadcasting time to commercial advertisers. 
Moreover, because it has two channels available for 
advertising (KBS 1 and KBS 2) 6, it can earn more money 
from advertisements than MBC which relies solely upon 
advertising revenue for its profits. 
Table VIII. 12. shows the sharp increase in profit for 
both KBS and MBC in the 80s. This table tells us two 
interesting facts. First of all, from the second year of 
offering air-time to advertisers, KBS had already 
positioned itself in front of MBC in advertising sales 
as a result of having two television channels and more 
radio stations. This double financial support scheme was 
5 TBC was owned by Samsung Chaebol which also possesses 
Chungang National Newspaper. 
6 After 1980, KBS has had 3 channels; KBS 1, KBS 2 and 
KBS 3. Channel 3 is aimed for educational purposes 
only. 
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bound to raise fundamental questions about KBS. From 
1984, we see that the revenue from advertisements 
started to overtake than gleaned that from license fees. 
A partial reason for this was people's resistance to pay 
as they started to question the status of a government 
owned broadcasting system, and its unbalanced pro- 
government attitude to the content of programmes. In 
response, the government sought for other ways to 
collect its license fee more efficiently, and since 
1988, it has combined the fee with other bills such as 
electricity and water rates. 
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Table. VIII. 12. 
Revenue Sources of KBS and MBC in the 1980s 
KBS (unit: 100 million won, %) 
Year License fee Ads. Revenue Others Total 
1981 642 (59.8) 397 (37.0) 35 (3.2) 1 074 
1982 909 (57.5) 639 (40.4) 32 (2.1) 1 0 , 58 
1983 11, 081 (51.0) 1 , 001 (47.3) 36 (l. 7) 2 , 118 
1984 1, 256 (46.2) 1 , 367 (50.3) 95 (3.5) 2 r718 
1985 1, 196 (44.9) 1, 365 (51.7) 102 (3.8) 2 , 663 
1986 1, 013 (39.3) 1, 487 (57.7) 76 (3.0) 2, 576 
1987 918 (34.2) 1, 696 (63.1) 73 (2.7) 2r 687 
1988 790 (28.7) 1, 722 (62.6) 238 (8.7) 2, 750 
1989 1, 040 (31.5) 1 2, 103 (63.7) 1 160 (4-8) 3 303 
1990 1 1, 230 33.0 
1 
2, 426 (65.2) 67( l. 8) 
1 3, 723 
MBC (unit: 100 million won, %) 
Year Ads. Revenue Others Total 
1981 512 (90.0) 57 (10.0) 569 
1982 574 (96.0) 24 4.0 598 
1983 690 (94.5) 40 5.5) 730 
1984 825 (95.6) 38 4.4 863 
1985 902 96.9 29 3.1) 931 
1986 1, 040 98.1 20 1.9) 1, 060 
1987 1, 256 (98.2) 23 1.8) 1, 279 
1988 1, 490 98.1 29 1.9) 1 519 
1989 1, 593 (98.3) . 27 ( 1.7) 1 
620 
1990 
-t -1, 
998 98.0 40 2.0 2, 018 
Source: Office of Planing & Co-ordination, KOBACO, May, 
1991. 
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Table. VIII. 13. 
Share Holdings by KBS of Other 
Corporations 
Corporation % 
KBS co. 100 
MBC co. 70 
Seoul Daily Newspaper 99 
Union News Agency 42 
Hankuk Data Communication 30 
Related 
Source: Reset from Annual Record of Korean Business, 
1991. 
As an additional advantage, KBS possesses a large number 
of share holdings in other related mass media businesses 
(See Table. VIII. 13. ). As we saw earlier, since 1980, KBS 
took over the most of the shares of MBC, when it became 
the latter's parent company7. KBS also owns 99% of the 
shares in one of the main 6 national newspapers, the 
Seoul Daily, and, holds 25% of the shares for Hankuk 
Data Communication, one of the fastest growing data bank 
companies in Korea. 
Therefore, since 1980, KBS has succeeded in building its 
own cultural kingdom through not only having MBC and 
taking over TBC, but also by expanding its business to 
other mass media sectors. KBS and MBC have also earned a 
great amount of money by selling magazine textbooks for 
their educationäl programmes, and from selling video 
tapes. In contrast to the public broadcasting companies 
7 KBS owns 70% of the shares of MBC. Another 30% is in 
the hands of "Chungsoo" Foundation which is owned by 
the late President, Park Chung Hee's descendants. 
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of other countries, which have been suffering from 
chronic financial difficulties, KBS and MBC have enjoyed 
prosperous growth. MBC achieved a rate of growth in 
turnover of 25.8% between 1989 and 1990, while KBS 
achieved 12.7% (Office of Planning and Co-ordination, 
KOBACO, Monthly Report, May. 1991). 
C) Personnel Connections with other Social 
Sectors 
In the previous section, analysing the newspaper 
industry, personnel flows were not the main focus of 
exploration as the scale of business is much smaller 
than for broadcasting companies, and the ownership 
structure is extremely exclusive with Korean newspaper 
companies still being run by the family members of the 
founding families. Broadcasting companies, on other 
hand, operate on much larger scale and are presented as 
'public-owned' systems, supported by the government. 
Hence, we can map important aspects of the internal 
power system and its connections with other modes of 
power, firstly, by compiling a social profile of key 
figures in positions of control, and secondly, by 
tracing their inter relations with the occupants of core 
positions in other sectors. 
I have chosen to look at 110 members of staff in 
executive positions at KBS (53 persons), and MBC (57 
persons)8 in 1990. Two variables9: i) hometown, and ii) 
8 The category of 'executive' includes personnel up to 
the Director of each department. 
9 Actually three variables were chosen; past jobs, 
hometown, and educational qualification. However, the 
variable, past jobs turned out to be of little value, 
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educational qualifications, showed significant results. 
According to the findings shown in Table. VIII. 14., 
executives for Korean broadcasting companies have a very 
high level of educational qualifications. In both KBS 
and MBC, more than 20% (MBC 21.4%, KBS 25.0%) have 
postgraduate degrees. Among the 110 executives, there 
are only two high school graduates. The most salient 
factor is the remarkable concentration of graduates from 
a certain type of university. Only 18.8% of KBS staff 
graduated from universities located in local provinces, 
while the remainder graduated out of universities in 
Seoul. Moreover, 52.9% of them were concentrated out of 
the 6 main universities in Seoul. The case of MBC is 
even more centred. There was no one who came from a 
local university, and 71.9% were graduates of one of the 
6 main universities. 
Table. VIII. 14. 
Distribution of University Graduates Among KBS 
and MBCStaff, 1990 (unit: number of person/ %) 
Universit KBS MBC 
6 Mains in Seoul a) 28 52.9) b) 41 71.9) 
Others in Seoul 13 24.5) 14 24.6) 
Others in local province 10 18.8) 0 0.0) 
Hi h school Graduates 0 0.0) 2 3.5) 
Unknown 2 3.8) 
Total 53 100.0 57 (100.0) 
Post raduates c) 12 21.4) 13 25.0 
a) 6 main universities; Seoul National, Korea, Yeonsei, 
Seogang, Sungkyunkwan and Hanyang university. 
because 99.9% of them had past job experiences solely 
in television, radio and other related media. 
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b) per cent of distribution 
c) postgraduates or more. 
Source: KOBACO, Korean Broadcasting Annual Report 190, 
Appendix; Directory, May, 1991. 
Table. VIII. 15. 
Hometown Origins of XBS and MBC Staff, 1990 
(unit: number of persons/ %)_ 
Province KBS MBC 
Seoul 14 26.4) 14 24.5) 
K eon i 3 5.6) 5 8.8) 
Choon Chun 7 13.2) 7 12.3 
Kan won 1 1.9 0 0.0) 
Chunla 6 11.3) 9 15.8) 
K eon san 16 30.2) 13 22.8 
Che u 0 0.0) 0 0.0) 
North 6 11.4) 9 15.8) 
Total 53 100.0 57 100.0 
Source: KOBACO, Korean Broadcasting Annual Report 1990. 
Appendix; Directory, May, 1991. 
As shown in Table. VI I I. 15 ., the hometown of 
both of KBS 
and MBC staff does not show a balanced distribution. If 
we divide Korea geographically into 8 provinces 
(representing North Korea as one 'north' category), 
51.8% of staff come from Seoul or Kyeongsang Province. 
Even admitting the advantage of the capital city, this 
data still supports the widespread belief that 
Kyeongsang Province has been treated in a very 
privileged manner, particularly as 4 out of the 5 Korean 
long-term Presidents came from that same area. It would 
be compared this pattern to those of other social 
sectors but regrettably, such as exercise would take us 
beyond the scope of the present thesis, and as yet, 
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there is no reliable secondary date that can be called 
upon. Even so, the following conclusions can be drawn 
for Korean broadcasting: by 1990, the people in powerful 
positions were university graduates, especially from the 
6 main Seoul universities, and just over half came from 
either Seoul or Kyeongsang Province. These 
characteristics might, it could be plausibly argued, 
create a degree of solidarity, esprit de corps, and 
shared outlook with figures from other sections sharing 
similar educational, and geographical backgrounds. But it 
is at the level of chairmen - the highest position in 
the broadcasting organisations, that the pattern of 
interconnections with other sectors becomes most clearly 
visible. 
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Figure. VIII. 2. 
Personnel Flow of Chairmen of KBS and MBC, 1980- 
1990 
Press 
-q 
mmmillop. Government 
Broadcasting Co. 
7 
Other Organisations 
ý _ý 
ý 
M* 
Ruling 
Party 
movements of one person 
movements of two persons 
; movements of four persons 
; movements of five persons 
Figure VIII. 2. is a diagram showing the personnel flows 
of the chairmen of KBS and MBC in the decade from 1980 
to 1990. There were 10 chairmen (5 in each organisation) 
in these ten years, and we can see an obvious pattern in 
this diagram. As in Figure. VIII. l. in the previous 
section concerning the personnel flow of the chairmen of 
Union News Agency, here, the same triangle of power 
flows is reaffirmed. The three key nodes are the press, 
the government and the mass media. Indeed, one could 
consider this almost as an assembly line, in which the 
'press' is the original location which produces many 
gifted bureaucrats amongst its journalists. A selection 
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of these one-time journalists then go into the 
government to learn how to use power: how to control the 
mass media which was their previous working field, how 
to realise the ideology of the government, and how to 
use the mass media for the purposes of the government 
rather than the people. After this period as 
apprentices, they are sent back into the mass media, but 
now as controllers. And, in many cases, they return to 
the government section as Ministers of Culture & 
Information - the position that controls all the other 
related sectors as can be seen in Figure VIII. 3. showing 
the personnel flow of the seven Ministers of Culture & 
Information between 1980 and 1990. 
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Figure. VIII. 3. 
Personnel Flow of Ministers of Culture S 
Information, 1980-1990. 
Press/ 
Broadcasting 
Minister 
ý -i 
ý 
ý000- 
Others 
-p 
Government 
Ruling Party 
movements of one person 
movements of two persons 
movements of three persons 
Government*: here refers only to Presidential office as 
spokesman, liaison secretary for 
Presidential Protocol Affair Bureau, 
Presidential Chief Secretary, etc. 
Source: Reset data derived from the Directory of Korean 
Celebrities, from 1980 to 1990, each year. 
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d) Conclusion, 
Korean Broadcasting companies share a history of 
subjugation with modern Korean society itself. They have 
never been able to enjoy independence. From the birth of 
the broadcasting system in Korea, it was designed to 
educate Koreans as a 'docile people under Japanese 
colonisation and it functioned as the tool of'a militant 
Japanese ideology. After Korea was liberated from Japan, 
broadcasting was seized by the US. military government. 
When, finally, Korea won independence as a -sovereign 
state in 1948, it became a government department. From 
1969, with two private commercialised broadcasting 
companies launched as nation-wide networks, there was 
severe competition for command of prime time audiences 
amongst the three main broadcasting companies, and even 
KBS could not distance itself from the ensuing logic of 
capitalism which was seeking for profit through 
broadcasting activities and ignoring its social and 
cultural responsibility to society. In 1980, through the 
'Rearrangement of mass media' by the military regime, 
the Korean broadcasting system was once again delivered 
into the hands of the government. As shown in this 
section, the Korean government not only owns 
broadcasting companies under the guise of publically 
owned systems, and has used this base to extend its 
controlling power into other related mass media sectors 
such as the news agency and the data bank company. One 
other point needs to be emphasised, and that is the 
solid pattern that emerges within the personnel system 
established by the government. It is not particularly 
surprising to find exactly the same pattern in the 
broadcasting sector, the news agency and the sector of 
Ministers of Culture & Information. It suggests how 
comprehensively the Korean government has managed to 
control key nodes in the news media system. 
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8.3.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the main axis of our analysis of the 
Korean communication systems, especially the news media, 
has been located in the relationship between the 
government and the mass media. Capitalists were excluded 
from broadcasting media since 1980 by the Chun regime. 
Thus, they sought for. other routes to expand their power 
in the cultural, field. The solution was found in two 
ways. First of all, they took a strong interest in the 
new technological industries which require enormous 
amounts of money, which only the big conglomerates can 
afford, such as satellite communication and mobile 
communication. Although these sectors have not been 
properly launched yet on a fully practical basis, Korean 
entrepreneurs are still trying to seize the initiative 
in various ways. A second answer is to control the 
advertising market. Under capitalism, most news media 
rely financially on advertising revenue in whole or in 
part. In the case of the Korean news media this is 
particularly pertinent since even the so-called 
'publicly-owned' broadcasting companies derive more than 
70% of their turnover on advertising sales. The 
consequences of-this will be discussed in detail in the 
next chapter. 
Another possible power axis to be explored is that 
between the government and labour groups, in this case, 
those working for the news media - mostly journalists. 
The efforts to secure greater freedom of information by 
journalists from the '70s: -through to the late '80s 
should not be underestimated. Some activists were 
sentenced to prison because they offended the 'National 
Security Law' according to the standards of the 
authoritarian government. Since 1987 their efforts have 
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been both more organised and more widely accepted by the 
people in line with rising general demands for increased 
social democracy. 
Throughout the era of political dictatorship, the fight 
by journalists for freedom of information was centred on 
the government and the military regime. As shown in the 
case of the 'Rearrangement of Mass Media', however, the 
owners of newspaper companies were very active in 
dismissing their employees in accordance with the will 
of the military regime. Research reveals that a far 
greater number of news media employees had to leave 
their offices than were requested by the government. 
Because the owners of newspaper companies actively co- 
operated with the regime's intentions for so long, since 
1987, as the social and political mood has been shifting 
towards a more democratic society, as the results of the 
interview shows, the conflict between mass media workers 
and media owners has sharpened. The government has 
stopped giving guidelines to the press about what the 
news media can report to the people and what it can't. 
And in place of governmental intervention, the owners 
and managerial boards have become the new locus of 
control. The chairman of the trade union of one of the 
national papers concedes that there has not been obvious 
censorship and direct interference by the government 
since 1987 (Y. B Hwang, Chairman of Trade Union of Dong A 
Daily News Paper, Interview held on February, 1.1993). 
Consequently, media workers now have to face their 
owners in the battle for improved rights for the press 
and information , 
instead of struggling with the regime'°. 
10 Apart from the results of the interviews, we can find 
another supporting example in the last address by 
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However, as we have seen in this chapter, it is not as 
easy to draw a 'firm demarcation line between these two 
power nodes as it might appear. 
As shown in the Tables and Figures concerning personnel 
flows, a certain pattern of interrelation has been 
established between press/government/mass media (in 
particular, the broadcasting media) at the top 
management level. Indeed, this kind of personnel 
exchange among the three power blocs seems to have 
become systematised as a method to ensure the compliance 
of the mass media. 
Generally speaking, the Korean news media sector remains 
located under the strong influence of the government. 
The prosperous growth of newspaper companies would not 
have been possible without the protection and help of 
the government. In other words, the newspaper companies 
have been allowed to grow as one of the most lucrative 
businesses in the '80s in return for being pro-regime, 
pro-government and active co-operators with the military 
regime. However, at the same time, we should pay 
Jungbae Kim of September (Mal, October, 1993: 35-37) ; 
"The struggle for freedom of the press is no longer a 
matter between the regime and the mass media. Now, it 
has switched to a fight between capital and mass 
media". He was elected as the Chief editor of the Dong 
A Daily Newspaper through a democratic vote by 
journalists. However, he was demoted to the head of 
the Research office by the president of the company 
after 13 months of dissonance with the owner's 
committee board. He left the company as a display of 
resistance. 
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attention to the growing power of 'the owners and 
managerial board of the newspaper companies. The 
differentiation between the newspapers and other 
publicly owned -media, such as broadcasting media and 
news agencies should be analysed. In other words, the 
differences in the structure of ownership among the 
various media can play an important role. The privately 
owned newspaper companies work in a similar way to other 
enterprises. However, the publically owned media can be 
subjected to considerable direct influence from 
government through appointments to executive posts and 
interventions in the process of making news. 
The evidence presented in this chapter shows that the 
mass media in Korea have not been a field of harsh 
ideological struggle amongst the main power blocs in the 
past. On the contrary, the power blocs have collaborated 
in order to obtain maximum advantages for themselves 
under the superior power of the government. However, 
there has been a struggle over the ownership of mass 
media between state power and the major capitalist 
groups. And for several years, as journalists themselves 
have pointed out, there has been a certain power shift 
inside newspaper companies which creates internal 
conflicts and struggles over the censorship of content. 
One final point concerns the apparent contradiction 
between the results of the interviews with newspaper 
journalists and the facts of continuing governmental 
influence over the rest of the mass media, in 
particular, the broadcasting media and the news 
agencies. Again, this can be explained in two ways. 
First of all, as noted earlier, the uneven development 
between the different sectors of society should be 
emphasised. Secondly, the privately owned newspaper 
companies should be analysed in similar ways of other 
274 
Chapter VIII Cultural Constests: The News Media 
industrial enterprises. Therefore the growing conflicts 
between journalists and owners can be seen as an 
instance of the general problem of industrial relation. 
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CHAPTER. IX. 
The Advertising Market 
REGULATING PROMOTION: THE ADVERTISING MARKET 
9.1. Advertising Agencies 
Throughout the last part of this thesis, special 
attention has been given to the structural features of 
the mass media system rather than the contents it 
produces. Since I believe that the overall range of 
content is fundamentally shaped by structural dynamics 
which set boundaries to editorial and creative 
manoeuvre, a structural analysis needs to be undertaken 
first, in order to discover what these limits are and 
how they are sustained. 
Chapter VIII showed that more than 80% of the total 
revenues of Korean broadcasting companies come from the 
profits which they earn from selling air-time to 
commercial advertisers even though most of the 
broadcasting system is based on a so-called 'public' 
organisation. In this chapter, I will examine the 
structure of the advertising industry in more detail. In 
Korea, advertising is not only a matter between 
advertisers and the media. As we will see, it represents 
a good example of how every sector reacts with every 
other, in other words, how the economic, cultural and 
political levels are interwoven. More specifically, 
advertising can be described as a 'bridge' which 
connects each individual level. 
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9.1.1. Advertising Procedure 
In Korea the advertising procedure is quite distinct and 
rather complicated. If one company/person wants to 
advertise its commodities or services through the 
broadcasting media, it first of all, has to contact one 
of the government affirmed advertising agencies. No non- 
affirmed agency may do this job, neither may any 
individual advertise something directly by' him or 
herself without going through an agency. The next step 
is for the agency to negotiate their advertising 
business with KOBACO, the government agency, not with 
the mass media themselves. Because of the unique 
character of Korean advertising procedure, KOBACO plays 
a substitute role for the mass media, such as selling 
broadcasting time to the affirmed advertising agencies 
and arranging and distributing the advertisements to the 
broadcasting media. Through these activities, KOBACO 
receives a certain amount of commission. Thus, Korean 
advertising procedure has to pass through a double- 
agency system. A more detailed discussion of the 
functions and role of KOBACO will follow in the next 
section but for now we can represent advertising 
procedure as follows (Figure IX. 1. ). 
Figure IX. 1. Advertising Procedure 
Individual 
company/ wom-ý 
Affirmed Ad. 
Agencies KOBACO r-ºI 
TV/ 
Radio 
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9.1.2. The Development of Advertising Agencies 
Korea's advertising industry, in common with all other 
industrial sectors in Korea, underwent dramatic changes 
in the 1980s. In Korean won* (the Korean currency), 
total advertising outlay grew from around 270 billion in 
1980 to 1.56 trillion in 1989, in other words, a 580 
times growth in ten years (Business & Industry Yearbook, 
1990). These days, advertising has become one of the 
most promising and dynamic industry sectors in Korea. 
In Korea, there are four main mass media which most 
advertisers use; television, radio, newspapers, and 
magazines. Although choosing an advertising medium 
depends to some extent on the characteristics of the 
item which the advertiser wishes to promote, if we 
consider the simultaneity and ubiquity of the message, 
television can be seen to take the top position among 
media (See Table. IX. 1). Therefore, limiting the number 
of affirmed advertising agencies by the government can 
result in the formation of a kind of enclosure, as well 
as delivering substantial privileges to the approved 
agencies. The matter of getting affirmation and its 
recognition criteria will be explained later. As a 
result of recent changes . in recognition criteria, 
in 
what can be described as a type of liberation which 
relaxes the original strict rules, the number of 
affirmed advertising agencies is getting larger. In 
1992, there were 95 affirmed advertising agencies in 
Korea. This is quite a large number if one considers the 
number of potential advertisers. However, originally, 
when KOBACO was established in 1981, there were only 
four advertising agencies which could deal with 
advertising business through the broadcast media. They 
were Cheil Communication, Oricom, Union and the Nara 
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Advertising agency. Every year, the number of affirmed 
advertising-agencies hasýbeen increasing: from four to 
eleven by 1987. But after the democratic movement this 
process accelerated, and the number increased in a 
dramatic way up to 36 in 1988, by which time KOBACO had 
broken its long-term limitation on numbers. Table IX. 1. 
shows that, even though KOBACO has affirmed many new 
agencies since 1988, there remains a sharp concentration 
in billings amongst the eleven longest standing 
agencies. In total, taking all four main media 
(television, radio, newspapers and magazines) the eleven 
major agencies still shared 47.8% of total billing for 
the year 1990. Within the TV and radio sectors, the 
share of these major agencies was even higher, reaching 
74.7% and 65.2% of the respective totals. It might, be 
hypothesised that within a generally very conservative 
advertising market, having accumulated techniques, 
skills and contacts, these 11 long-standing agencies 
retained a number of major clients with whom relations 
had been established before 1988. Indeed, as Table IX. 1. 
shows, there are often closer links, with key agencies 
being owned by leading chaebols. 
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Table IX. 1. 
1990 Total Billings by the Main Eleven 
Advertising Agencies 
(unit: million won) 
Adverti In-House TV Radio News- Magazine Total 
sing paper 
A enc 
Cheil(1) Samsung 77,077 9,832 44,710, 8,932 140,551 
LG AD L. G. (2) 61,156 6,887 29,791 11,340 109,174 
Daehong Lotte 64,441 11,313 24,545 7,171 107,470 
Oricom Doosan 41,970 5,662 22,085 9,016 78,733 
Korad Haitai 48,432 4,124 13,163 4,007 69,726 
Samhee Korea(3) 31,795 4,327 20,157 3,274 59,553 
Diamond Hyundai 22,922 6,192 25,749 3,888 58,751 
Don ban P. C. 4 32,805 5,293 14,378 2,069 54,545 
All chaebol owned 
A encies (5) 380,598 53,630 194,578 49,697 678,503 
Union 33,840 5,348 12,280 2,705 54,173 
Seoul Ad 23,728 1,353 14,326 4,114 43,521 
Nara 8,396 1,774 6,562 1,484 18,216 
Total Billings 598 191 95,318 
' 
852r663 116,879 1,663,051 
(6) 63.6 56.3 22.8 42.5 
_ 
40.8 
(7) 74.7 65.2 26.7 49.6 47.8 
(1) Cheil Communications 
(2) Lucky Goldstar 
(3) Korea Explosive 
(4) Pacific Chemical 
(5) Chaebol owned Advertising Agencies : Total 
(6) All Chaebol Owned/Total Billings (%) 
(7) Eleven Advertising Agencies/ Total Billings (%) 
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Source: reset from Advertising information, (in Korean), 
1991, January. KOBACO 
9.1.3. Chaebol-owned and Independent Agencies 
The most interesting point which Table IX. 1. shows is 
not the concentration of the advertising market around 
the 11 main agencies. As Chapters VI and VII revealed, 
Korean society has a strong chaebol-centred 
characteristic with the chaebols continually trying to 
expand their power not only within the economic sector 
but throughout all sectors including the political and 
cultural sectors, via various routes and methods. Such a 
phenomenon is again illustrated within the advertising 
market, where it is particular consolidated. 
According to the viewpoint of political economy, 
corporations dominate the cultural landscape in two 
ways. Firstly, an increasing proportion of cultural 
production is directly. accounted for by major 
conglomerates with interests in a range of sectors, from 
newspapers and magazine, to television, film, music and 
theme parks. However, as chapter VI shows, direct 
ownership by the Chaebols of broadcasting media was 
prohibited by law in Korea until 1990. On the other 
hand, investment in the other cultural industries, such 
as the film and music industries, which have been 
continually struggling with financial crises, has been 
dominated by people working for those sectors. Thus, the 
first method of domination was relatively underdeveloped 
in Korea during the period under discussion. There is, 
however, another type of control which can be applied to 
the Korean situation. 'Corporations which are not 
directly involved in the cultural industries as 
producers, can exercise considerable control over the 
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direction of cultural activity through their role as 
advertisers and sponsors. The financial viability of 
commercial broadcasting together with a large section of 
the press depends directly on advertising revenue' 
(Golding, P. & Murdock, G. 1991; 20). In Table IX. 1., we can 
see that among the 11 main advertising agencies, the top 
8 were owned by chaebols in 1990. These agencies 
together accounted for 40.8% of the total advertising 
billings in 1990. There is no available data concerning 
how much the top 30 chaebols spend on advertisements in 
a year. However, there is no doubt that chaebols 
themselves are the main clients and that they have lots 
of items in need of advertisement and can afford to pay 
enormous amounts of money. 
Table. IX. 2. 
Distribution of Billings By In-House Subsidiaries 
Of Chaebol Owned Agencies 
unit: %, million won 
Agency '90(%) 189(%) '90 Total Billing 
LG Ad(3) 65.5 67.0 109,174 
Diamond(7) 58.2 56.3 58,751 
Daehong(2) 57.1 47.6 107,470 
Cheil Communication(1) 55.0 56.8 140,551 
Dongbang(8) 38.4 43.2 54,545 
Korad(5) 31.3 26.6 69,726 
Samhee(6) 30.5 30.6 59,553 
Oricom 4 20.1 22.6 78,733 
Mean 44.5 43.8 Total 678 503 
() Rank order of advertising agencies by total annual 
billings. 
Source: KOBACO, '1991 
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Even though most of the chaebol-owned advertising 
agencies conduct more than 40% of their parent company's 
advertising business, Table IX. 2. shows that there is 
some differentiation among the top eight agencies. For 
example, while LG Ad, a Lucky-Goldstar owned company, 
leans strongly on its parent for 65.5% of its business; 
Oricom, a Doosan owned agency, derives only 20.1% of its 
total custom from the owning company. Explanations for 
this difference, may be derived from the differentiation 
of their main clients. Table IX. 3. shows the top 30 
advertisers for broadcasting media in 1990. Together 
these spent 239.4 billion won, which was 34.5% of the 
total billings of broadcasting adverts. Among the top 30 
advertisers, 10 are subsidiaries of chaebols which have 
their own in-house agencies. Thus, the question is, how 
the remaining 20 top advertisers are distributed amongst 
the main chaebol-owned agencies. Thirteen of the 
remaining 20 advertisers have advertising business 
relations with the top 8 chaebol-owned agencies. 
However, this distribution is quite even (See Table 
VII. 4. ). In contrast with the first assumption, in which 
there would be some difference between LG Advertising 
and Oricom, with Oricom having more non in-house clients 
among the top thirty, LG Advertising actually had 3 
clients among the top thirty whilst Oricom had 2. 
Therefore, there does not appear to be a meaningful link 
between the number of major clients an advertising 
agency has and the degree to which they deal with in- 
house business. 
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Table IX. 3. 
Top 30 Advertisers for The, Broadcasting Media in 
1990 
unit: million won 
Advertiser In-house Agency Charge 
Lucky LG Ad 21,681 
Pacific Chemical Dongbang 14,373 
Lotte Confectionery Daehong 13,210 
Dong Suh Foods 13,041 
Lotte-Chilsung Beverage Daehong 11,835 
Samsung Electronics Cheil Comm. 11,412 
Aekyung Ind. 11,007 
Goldstar LG Ad 10,984 
Haitai Confectionery Korad 10,325 
Nongshim 9,961 
Cheil Sugar-- Cheil Comm. 8,642 
Daewoo Electronics 7,147 
Namyang Dairy 6,833 
Baekyang 6,418 
Haitai Beverage Korad 6,296 
Daewoong Pharmaceutical 6,147 
Ssangbangwool 5,709 
Dong-A pharmaceutical 5,705 
Samyang Food 5,578 
Bingguere Samhee 5,283 
Dongwon 5,117 
Mail Dairy 4,969 
Dongyang Confectionery 4,959 
Chongkundang 4,825 
Ilyang Pharmaceutical 4,792 
Ildong Pharmaceutical 4,787 
Yuhan Corp. 4,750 
Hankuk Cosmetics 4,628 
Hankuk Yakurt 4,588 
Ilhwa 4,363 
Top 30 Total 239,365 (A) 
Total Billing 693,167 B 
(A): Top 30 Total 
(B): Total Amount of Broadcasting Advertising Charge 
(A)/(B) 34.5% 
Source: KOBACO, Advertising Information, January, 1991 
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Table. IX. 4. 
Number of the Top 30 Clients Commanded by Chaebol 
Owned Agencies 
Advertising Agency Number of Top 30 Clients 
LG Advertisin 3 
Diamond 
Daehon 2 
Cheil Communication 2 
Don ban 
Korad 3 
Samhee 1 
Oricom 2 
Total 13 
Source: KOBACO, Advertising Trends, 1991, February. 
However, this situation of concentration is., not_a matter 
only for the big conglomerates. Since 1988, when it 
became easier to establish advertising agencies, as we 
saw, the total number of agencies increased as did the 
number of in-house agencies. In order to save the 
commission fee which usually goes to agencies, many 
medium sized conglomerates have formed their own 
agencies, which, are essentially simple transformations 
of the advertising departments operating inside their 
companies, into separate agencies. In 1991, among the 
top 40 agencies, 19 were in-house agencies (Monthly 
Advertising Journal, September, 1991: 69). After 1988, 
when one of the recognition criteria, which limited the 
total dealings 'on behalf of the parent company to a 
certain percentage, was abolished, 16 agencies were 
established by medium sized conglomerates. Most 
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concentrated their advertising business only on their 
own products (See Table. IX. 5. ). 
Table IX. 5. 
Newly Created In-house Agencies: Percentage of 
Billings for Parent Companies (1991, December) 
unit: % 
AGENCY PARENT COMPANY SHARE 
New Core 
Advertisin 
New Core Department Store 99.8 
MAPS Esquire Shoes 99.5 
Sunwha Daewoon Pharmaceutical 98.5 
Ad World Dail Pharmaceutical 96.7 
Berad Ssan ban wool 96.1 
Ad K Keumkan 95.1 
Kim's Com Boryunq Pharmaceutical 89.4 
Creacom Sam an Food 67.7 
Jin 
Advertisin 
Youngjin Pharmaceutical 59.4 
Daebang 
Advertisin 
Ilyang Pharmaceutical 54.8 
MEAN 85.7 
Source: Maeil Economist, December, 23,1991. 
Because of this new trend inside the advertising market, 
the independent non in-house agencies have been 
suffering. As I mentioned earlier, considering the 
market size, 95 agencies can already be considered too 
many, meaning as it does that excessive competition is 
inevitable. Moreover, given the established advantages 
of the long-standing chaebol owned agencies (which 
accounted for 40.8% of the total market), the remaining 
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agencies are competing for a restricted share of the 
market. Table IX. 6. shows that even the advertising 
business of the original three main independent agencies 
have all faced a decline in their volume of business 
and, therefore, profits. 
Table IX. 6. 
Total Billings of The Main Independent 
Advertising Agencies through 1990-1991 
(unit: billion won/ i 
AGENCY '90 '91 % Change 
Seoul 44.8 40.2 -10.2 
Advertising 
Geoson 28.5 26.7 - 6.3 
Nara 19.8 15.0 -24.2 
Source: Maeil Economist, February, 20.1992. 
According to one report by "The Association of Korean 
Advertising Agencies", even the top six in-house 
Advertising Agencies (Cheil Comm, Oricom, LG Ad, 
Daehong, Korad and Samhee) experienced a decrease in 
their rates of net earning, despite the fact that their 
volume of business increased by 13.3%. This was mainly 
because of fierce competition from the growing number of 
newly established agencies. For the independent agencies 
on the other hand, the most crucial cause of 
difficulties was the boom in new agencies established by 
medium sized conglomerates/ companies. Whereas in the 
past, these enterprises had been major clients for the 
independents, they now switched to dealing with their 
new, in-house, agencies. For the leading in-house 
agencies attached to the major chaebols, this 
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development caused less trouble because they already had 
a stable clientele in the shape of their parent 
company's subsidiaries. 
The Rise of Multinational Foreign 
Advertising Agencies 
Another new development which has altered the terms of 
competing for both in-house and independent agencies is 
the opening of the Korean advertising market to 
multinational foreign agencies. Unlike other English 
speaking third world countries or South American 
countries, before 1987, there were no foreign agencies 
operating in Korea. However in response to the growing 
international pressure to open the Korean domestic 
market including the advertising market to the world, 
especially from the US government, in 1988, KOBACO 
abolished its- recognition criteria relating to the 
domestic capital base of advertising companies. 
Under American pressure to cut the 8 billion dollar 
trade imbalance, Korea dismantled barriers to foreign 
investment, opening the way to equity ventures between 
US and Korean agencies. In July 1987, investment by 
foreign agencies became legally permissible after 
threats of retaliation against Korean exports to the US. 
forced Korea to open up its service industries, which 
had been one of the last sectors to allow foreign 
investment. The delay in defining the scope of foreign 
participation is attributable to last-ditch attempts by 
the domestic advertising industry and political leaders 
to stall until they had the opportunity to reap the full 
benefit of the boom in business around the 1988 
Olympics. Key figures in the industry feared that 
foreign agencies would steam roller over local concerns 
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once they were allowed in (Oles Gadacz, Advertising Age, 
November, 39,1987: 62) . 
There are four main ways of introducing foreign 
investment into the advertising market. The first is to 
establish a joint venture with overseas advertising 
companies as independent or majority shareholders. 
Compared to other options, this is relatively risky 
because the foreign companies shoulder the major share 
of responsibility for the company's financial ups and 
downs. Thus, it. is more usual to find, as in the case of 
McCann-Erickson or J. Walter Thompson, that where their 
major clients were already running businesses in Korea, 
the big foreign agencies move to'establish their own 
branches. Consequentially, they do not have to worry 
about chasing local clients. 
Secondly, there is the attempt to reduce risks by 
forming a joint venture with a Korean agency as a 
minority shareholders. Bozell, for example, established 
'Cheil-Bozell' with Cheil communication in 1989, the 
composition of share holding between Bozell and Cheil 
being is 30: 70. In this situation, both sides can enjoy 
mutual benefits. For the first time, foreign companies 
can start running businesses with the benefits of access 
to clients and support from major Korean companies, such 
as marketing information and aid with employment 
problems. Meanwhile, the Korean advertising companies 
can share the know-how of foreign companies and through 
then can gain access to world-wide markets. 
The third method involves buying a certain share of an 
existing Korean Agency on the condition that the foreign 
advertising company promises to hand over some of their 
clients to the Korean agency. 
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Table IX. 7. 
Multinational Advertising Companies in Korea in 
1991 
Method Agency Com osition of Share holding Client(a) 
Method 1 J. Walter 'Thompson JWT: Business World Service 13(1) 
93: 7 
Method 2 D. Y &R Korea D. Y. & R: Oricom* 19(7) 
49: 51 
McCann-Erickson MC Erickson: Creaworld* 12(0) 
51: 49 
Cheil Bozell Bozell: Cheil Communication* 16(8) 
30: 70 
DDD DIK Korea DDB: Dai Itchi: Daehong* 7(3) 
24.5: 24.5: 51 
Leo Bernett- Leo Bernett: Sunyeon* 5(0) 
Sun eon 40: 60 
Method 3 Ogilvy & Mather 30% share holding of Korad 
BSBW 10% share holdin of Diamond 
DMB &B 20% 'share holding of Seoul 
Ad 
(a): Number of the local (Korean) clients 
* .. Korean Advertising Agencies 
Source: Advertising Trend, June, 1991 
Advertising Information, December, 1991 
Polly, J., "Multinational Advertising Agencies", 
Monthly Ad. Journal, January: 46-49,1992. 
To have a relation of affiliated concern is the fourth 
method. Some multinational advertising companies do not 
feel the need to invest capital in Korea as yet, or 
their clients have not yet entered the Korean market. 
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However, they still want to establish contacts and wait 
for the proper time (See Table IX. 7). 
Contrary to initial concerns that foreign agencies would 
rapidly dominate the Korean domestic advertising market, 
in 1991, their share of billings made up just 2.23% of 
the total (The First Economist, January 13 1992). 
However, it is still too early to estimate the potential 
of foreign advertising companies in the longer term. 
Because Korea still retains some barriers to 
multinational industries, their products have not yet 
entered the main-stream of the Korean market. But, by 
2000, if the Korean domestic market opens its gate 
completely to world-wide industries, international 
products will surge into the Korean market, and 
consequently, the role of foreign advertising companies 
will increase dramatically. Of course, multinational 
advertising companies can already operate with relative 
freedom in the English speaking Asian countries, such as 
Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore, and this experience 
may well prove valuable to expansion in Korea. At the 
same time, Japanese advertising companies also stand to 
gain great benefits from the Korean market. Since 
advertising is strongly related to cultural roots and 
proximity of location, close attention will need to be 
paid to the potential future influence of Japanese 
advertising companies. 
9.1.5. Conclusion 
In Korea, by 1991, including the giant multinational 
foreign companies, there were 95 government affirmed 
advertising agencies which could advertise through the 
broadcast media. In contrast, ten years before, there 
were only a handful of agencies in this position, and, 
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these long-established agencies still receive many of 
the benefits of an early start. We can identify the top 
10 advertising agencies according to their total 
billings and the volume of their dealings. Eight of them 
are Chaebol-owned in-house agencies. They accounted for 
40.8% of the total advertising market. Although from 
1991, there has only been one private broadcasting 
station in Korea, the two public broadcasting stations 
strongly depend. on advertising revenue, which accounted 
for about 80% of income for both KBS and MBC. Thus, we 
can surmise that whoever controls the advertising 
business can exert considerable control over the 
broadcasting system as well. This argument applies with 
particular force in the Korean situation. The Chaebols 
are not only main advertisers, but also the owners of 
the major agencies. They can therefore direct other 
advertisers' advertising business. This is arguably a 
more effective method of control, than owning mass media 
concerns, given their reliance on the profits produced 
by advertising revenue. Hence, even though, due to the 
political situation, the chaebols were not able to own 
the mass media, they have found a very effective way to 
influence their operations within the context of the 
unique Korean situation. 
In Korea, unlike other Western countries, direct 
sponsorship of mass media production, especially, within 
broadcasting, is not- common. Sometimes, for special 
occasions such as sports or art events, big companies 
may donate materials which can be used in the events or 
gifts for the participants. However, the main route for 
sponsorship is through advertisers. 
Nowadays, advertising companies are seeking other ways 
to promote themselves through mass media related 
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business. In Korea it is rare to find programme trading 
between broadcasting stations and independent producers. 
In other words, programme production has been 
monopolised by the broadcasting stations themselves. 
Because of a lack of facilities, capital and human 
resources, establishing independent production companies 
has seemed almost impossible. However as section 1 
shows, these days, advertising companies have become 
substantial concerns which are in a strong position to 
produce individual programmes or joint programmes with 
broadcasting stations. Some of them, for example, Cheil 
Communication, LG Advertising and Union, have started to 
make the title programmes for some drama mini series 
(Chosun Daily, January 22,1992). But they do not sell 
these services for a profit. The broadcasting companies 
pay very little money, far below total expenses, but the 
advertising companies see these activities as offering a 
way of advertise themselves. 
To sum up; the advertising system in Korea exhibits a 
more complicated structure than in many other countries. 
There is a level of production, represented by the 
Chaebol-owned in-house agencies; a level of domination, 
operated on a day-to-day basis by KOBACO; and a level of 
communication, carried out by the mass media. These 
three spheres interact with one another in distinct 
ways. The next section will go on to explain the 
function and roles of governmental regulation through a 
detailed examination of KOBACO. 
9.2. KOBACO (The Korean Broadcasting Advertising 
Corporation) 
In the previous section, we have already seen how KOBACO 
has been exercising a crucial role in the advertising 
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process. In Korea, it is impossible to 'explain this 
process by looking only at the interplay between the 
media, the advertisers and-the agencies. Every step in 
the advertising chain, from getting recognition as an 
affirmed agency, to buying broadcasting time, is 
subject to the influence of KOBACO. In this section, I 
will explain the background to the establishment of 
KOBACO, and-detail its functions and its influence on 
the advertising business. In addition I will outline 
recent debate concerning the justification for KOBACO's 
continuing existence and the problems it faces for the 
future. 
9.2.1. The Background to the establishment of 
KOBACO 
The Korean Broadcasting Advertising Corporation 
(KOBACO), a government, agency, was established on 
January 22 1981, through the "Korean Broadcasting 
Advertising Corporation Law", enacted on December 31 
1980, after the forced mergers and closures of 
newspapers, and broadcasting stations around that time, 
as explained in, chapter VIII. 
After President Park was assassinated on October 26 
1979, as we saw in Chapter V, the Korean presidency 
passed to Major General Chun-Doo-Hwan through a peaceful 
coup d'etat. As Park had taken great" pains to gain 
legitimacy for his regime, when General Chun took power, 
he announced a clear out of the whole society. In 1989, 
Korea entered a storm of 'social purification', which 
ranged from government officialdom to minor gangsters. 
The journalistic sector was not able to escape from-this 
upheaval. As we saw in Chapter VIII, -therewere large 
scale mergers and the cancellation of registration for a 
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number of dissident journals. President Chun undertook 
these actions with double intentions. ' First of all, he 
wanted to convey a positive impression to those people 
who still had a suspicious and unforgiving attitude 
towards him. Atýthe same time, he aimed to create a new 
order amongst all of the social sectors under his 
control. Just prior to the assassination of Park, the 
unfavourable attitude to the government expressed by 
some journals and other media had become particularly 
annoying to the Presidency. Thus, after Chun achieved 
presidential office, one of the first things he did was 
to merge or abolish these offending media in the name of 
'purification'. The "Fundamental Law for Journalism and 
Media" was enacted to justify this policy. As we saw 
earlier, under this law, all 'private broadcasting 
stations were abolished and included within the public 
broadcasting media under the control of the state, 
except for religious media. Even then, the 'religious 
media were not permitted to ' broadcast political or 
social news. Thus, until 1990, there had been no private 
broadcast media for ten years. It was' within this 
context that the "Korea Broadcasting Advertising 
Corporation Law" establishing KOBACO was enacted, based 
on the "Fundamental Law for Journalism and Media". , 
The official aim of KOBACO was relatively benign. Since 
the broadcast media had been transformed "into 'public' 
organisations, they were required to have formalised 
frameworks which differed from their previous private 
forms. In fact, during` the period of private broadcast 
media, buying advertising time was both difficult and 
chaotic. There was no price regulation, so that the 
price of advertising time tended to rise dramatically, 
sometimes it doubled in a year. The problem, however, 
was not confined to price. Because there was only 
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limited advertising time available, the people who 
worked in the advertising divisions within the broadcast 
media were able to abuse their power over the agencies 
(Design Journal No. 3 May 1988: 32). In response to this, 
the newly announced aims of KOBACO were to eradicate 
such corruption and to devise a renovated advertising 
procedure. 
These general aims can be sub-divided into two. Firstly, 
KOBACO was set up to work for the creation of a public 
broadcasting system which separated the generations of 
the business sector from the operations of broadcasting 
(Korean Broadcasting System Institute report, 1990: 93). 
This was intended to counter the situation in which, in 
the previous period, the profit making concerns of the 
private media in the advertising business were in a 
position to adversely affect the quality and content of 
broadcast programmes. If the media were relieved of the 
need to compete for advertising revenue and decent 
profits could be earned using stable procedures, the 
broadcast media would be able to concentrate on the 
business of broadcasting itself. Thus, KOBACO was 
directed to carry out the business functions, including 
selling advertising time, and then to distribute the 
profits to the media organisations. Secondly, KOBACO was 
to develop advertisements suited to public broadcast 
media through prior deliberations on content and the 
establishment of a new advertising procedures. 
9.2.2. The Main Functions of KOBACO 
Before KOBACO began operations, the Korean advertising 
system operated according to the 'normal' commercial 
pattern familiar elsewhere. Advertisers who wanted to 
advertise something approached the advertising agencies, 
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who then produced adverts and negotiated with the 
broadcast media to buy advertising time. The agencies 
received a certain amount of commission as payment for 
these services. After KOBACO was established in 1981, it 
became the exclusive sales arm for the broadcast media, 
and all authority was concentrated in its hands. KOBACO 
began to sell broadcasting time on behalf of the media, 
so that the agencies had deal with KOBACO. In addition 
to its monopoly of air-time sales, KOBACO had a number 
of other functions which can be summarised as follows 
(Business & Industry Yearbook, 1990): 
1) granting recognition to advertising agencies 
recognition through its own criteria 
2) making price decisions and devising regulations 
for advertisements 
3) operating a funding programme related to the 
mass communication industries 
4) funding projects related to the enhancement of 
arts and culture 
5) undertaking research on broadcast advertising 
and publication on journals 
6) hosting and sponsoring events related to 
broadcast advertising' 
7) participating in the international exchange of 
information and data on broadcast advertising 
Before January 1989, KOBACO utilised a pre-deliberation 
committee which discussed and regulated the quality and 
content of advertisements before they could be 
broadcast. After that date, the broadcasting law was 
changed, and this job was transferred to the "Korean 
Broadcasting Committee". 
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Among KOBACO's various activities,, three important 
points merit particular attention. First of all, if only 
agencies affirmed by KOBACO can conduct advertising 
business through the broadcast media, then, receiving 
such recognition becomes decisive for the agencies. We 
may expect that there will be some conflict or at least 
some discussion over the recognition standard set by 
KOBACO. 
The second point concerns the commission rate. 
Functionally speaking, KOBACO was established to collect 
the profits from the broadcast media and use them for 
what it calls the "public service fund". Consequently, 
the less commission KOBACO paid to agencies, the more 
went into the fund. Before 1980, commissions were a 
matter to be decided between the broadcast media and the 
agencies. After KOBACO started its operations, it 
decided the rate of commission without any consensus 
from the agencies. They have complained that the low 
rate of commission has caused financial difficulties for 
them. 
The third question also concerns the matter of 
commission. KOBACO has been acting as a high level 
government agency for the broadcast media, selling 
advertising time to agencies and distributing adverts to 
the broadcast media. It not only charges commission for 
both of these services, but also shares a certain amount 
of commission with the agencies.. The commission income 
it retains allows KOBACO to support the other cultural 
and advertising related businesses which mentioned 
earlier. However, because of its sales, monopoly, the 
fund which KOBACO has accumulated has reached an 
astronomical figure. How it has been using it is, not 
surprisingly, the focus of debates and questions. 
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9.2.3. Changes in the Recognition Criteria for 
Affirmed Advertising Agencies 
Criteria for affirming the acceptability of-advertising 
agencies can 7be divided into those relating to 
registration and those deployed to estimate credibility 
and worth. Regarding registration criteria, the-central 
issue is whether agencies obey the advertising related 
regulations and ethical codes or not. Instead of 
applying a single standard to all the different types of 
the advertisement, the regulations need to be specified 
and categorised in accordance with the kind of 
commodities which are advertised. As for the criteria 
for estimating credence, these would generally include; 
the capital structure of the company; the business 
turnover; the number of clients; and certification of 
payment. This kind of evaluation system can be justified 
by its aims. -Firstly, it can help to enhance the quality 
of advertisements and stabilise the business of trade, 
thus, creating a systematic foundation to the exercise 
of social responsibility by advertisers. Secondly, for 
the media industries, profits from advertising revenue 
can be guaranteed. Finally, for the advertisers, the 
agencies which are affirmed by legal recognition are 
presumed to be reliable in terms of business relations 
(Chun-Young Cho, 1992: 4). 
As mentioned earlier, in Korea, before 1981, there were 
only 4 affirmed advertising agencies; Cheil 
Communications, Oricom, Union and Nara-., However,, being 
affirmed was not decided by regulations. Rather, it 
depended on mutual interests and convenience. Cheil 
Communications, Union and Oricom were the in-house 
agencies attached to the major mass media; TBC, MBC, and 
Union News Agency. Nara, meanwhile, had a significant 
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number of multinational clients, and these foreign 
interests pressurised the mass media to accord the 
agency recognition (Design Journal, May, 1988: 31). After 
KOBACO was established however, the approval of 
advertising agencies began to be decided by legal 
regulations - moreover, these regulations underwent 
periodic changes, especially after 1989. As a result of 
the changed regulations, the number of affirmed agencies 
increased dramatically. The main reason for this change 
was the advice from the Economic Planning Board 
regarding 'The' affirmation system of broadcasting 
advertisements, their time, sale and management'. This 
was based on the concept of fair trade. It argued that 
free competition among a greater number of agencies 
would aid the development of the country's advertising 
business. It also maintained that advertisers had the 
right to choose their agencies according to their own 
priorities and interests (Chun-Young Cho, 1992: 4). 
Table IX. 8. shows the changes in affirmation criteria 
and Table IX. 9. shows the dramatic increase in the 
number of affirmed agencies that resulted. 
300 
Chapter IX The Advertising Market 
Table IX. 8. 
Changes in Recognition Criteria (1981-1990) 
criteria 1981 1984 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
1 70% * 80 * 
2 No 6 mths*. 3 months Abrogati 
-on 
3 0.2 50 
billion* million* 
4 Annual Annual 5 Monthly Abrogati 
10 billion 0.3 -on 
billion* billion 
5billion for non 
for BD subsidia 
ad -ries 
5 30* 15* 3 non 5 non 
subsidia subsidia 
-ries * -ries* 
6 70 (a) 60(a) 50(a) Abrogati 
-on 
7 Domestic Abrogati 
Capital -on 
8 (b) 
9 60 days 70 days 80 days 90 days 
*... or more 
(a) ... less than 
(b)... By company and Financial Institute 
<Criteria> 
1. Share of Total Net Assets derived from Advertising 
Business 
2. Terms of Business Relations with KOBACO 
3. Capital Volume 
4. Business Turnover 
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5. Number of Clients 
6. Share of Advertising Business Derived from In-house 
Subsidiaries 
7. Composition of Capital 
8. Certification of Advertising Charge Payment 
9. Terms for Advertising Charge Payment 
Source: Kiryong Ku, "Diagnosis; Advertising Business in 
Korea", Advertising information (in Korean), April 
1991: 105. 
Table IX. 9. 
Number of Affirmed Advertising Agencies 
DATE NUMBER ADVERTISING AGENCIES 
1981 4 Cheil Comm., Oricom, Union, Nara 
1984 7 Daehon Korad, Seoul Advertising 
1986 8 Dongbang 
1987 11 LG Advertising Samhee, Diamond 
1988 36 
1990 64 
1991 78 
1992 95 
Source: Kiryong Ku, April, 1991: 106 
Advertising Trends (in Korean), February, 1992, 
pp. 12-13 
As we see from Tables. IX. 8. and Table. IX. 9., within the 
advertising sector, 1988 was a milestone. The 
advertising business is one of the most sensitive parts 
of the economic sector and responds rapidly to shifts in 
the other social, cultural and political levels. 
Throughout 1987, the Korean government was faced with 
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mounting demands for democracy, and in response they 
loosened many social regulations. The recognition 
criteria imposed by KOBACO on advertising agencies was 
one instance of this relaxation. Another reason for the 
changes in the advertising system was the 1988 Seoul 
Olympic Games. Nowadays, the Olympic Games has become 
not only a sports event, but also, a large scale 
influence on a country's economy. At the same time, 
Korea had to deal with foreign pressure to open up the 
domestic market. Therefore, from 1988, the regulation 
requiring a primarily domestic composition of capital 
was abolished. This had an immediate impact compared to 
1987, the number of affirmed agencies increased by more 
than 300%. By January 1992, in Korea, there were 95 
affirmed agencies which could operate through the 
broadcast media. However, this increased number raises 
other questions. Firstly, if being affirmed by KOBACO is 
the sole guarantee of the quality of an agency, does 
such a large number agencies still represent quality 
overall in the advertising business? Another matter is 
rather more serious for the agencies themselves. 
According to one report, the average number of clients 
of each agency has decreased from 46.4 in 1988, to 24.6 
in 1989, and to 23.2 in 1990. As Table. IX. 10. shows, 
excluding the top 10 agencies, the remaining agencies 
struggle to maintain a very small scale of business 
(Chun-Young Cho, 1992: 4-5) As in other capitalist 
sectors, capital has become more concentrated, rather 
than there being an even distribution, despite the 
greater number of active players. 
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Table. IX. 10. 
Distribution of Advertising Business Among 
Agencies in January 1992. 
Agency Rank Share of Total No. of Employees(M) No. of Clients (M) 
1-10 66.8% 281 72.3 
11-60 31.2% 40 21.0 
61-95 2.0% 17.3 14.6 
Total 100.0% Mean) 112.8 (Mean) 36.0 
Source: Chun-Young Cho, 1992: 5 
9.2.4. Commission Rates and The Public Service 
Fund 
The size of the commission rates which KOBACO 
distributes to the agencies in payment for the execution 
of advertising business is always crucial with the 
industry, because it is their major source of income. 
The principle which KOBACO operates in relation to 
commission is operationalised in two main steps. 
Firstly, when KOBACO sells broadcast advertising time to 
advertising agencies, it charges broadcast media 20% of 
total sales as commission. It shares a certain amount of. 
this income with the agencies, and retains the rest for 
the public service fund. The rates distributed to the 
agencies however varied over the decade 1981-1991 (See 
Table. IX. 11). 
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Table. IX. 11. 
Variation in Commission Rates, 1981-1991 
unit: % 
Time Media In-house A. A. Non In-house A. A. 
1981 TV 8 8 
Radio 8 8 
1984 TV 7 7 
Radio 8 8 
1985 TV 5 7 
Radio 5 7 
1986 TV 5 7 
Radio 5 8 
1988 TV 5 9 
Radio 8 10 
1989 TV 6 9 
Radio 8 10 
1990 TV 6 10 
Radio 8 10 
1991 TV 7 11 
Radio 9 11 
A. A.; Advertising Agency 
Source: Kiryong Ku, Advertising Information (in Korean), 
April, 1991: 105, KOBACO. 
Outside Korea the advertising industry is a three-way 
affair, involving interdependence between advertisers, 
agencies and media organisations. The lion's share of 
income for an, advertising agency comes from the 
commissions they receive from the media for performing 
their bridging role between the advertisers and the 
media. These fees vary according to countries, but the 
normal rate is around 15 percent. Yet, Korean 
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advertising agencies have no other choice but to accept 
half of the internationally customary rate. In the case 
of broadcast media, the maximum rate they are entitled 
to is eight percent. This represents a substantial cut 
in income since before KOBACO was established, the 
common rate of commission was in line with international 
standards at 15 percent leaving the broadcast media to 
take 85 percent of total advertising revenue. After 
KOBACO started operations, both the broadcast media and 
the agencies were financially disadvantaged by 
reductions in their profits. In in-house agencies were 
particularly hard hit, especially towards the end of the 
period under review, from 1988. KOBACO argues that the 
higher rates of commission paid to non in-house agencies 
are justified on the grounds that they have more 
potential financial difficulties serving in a highly 
competitive market place. 
The use of the so-called "public service fund" has 
always been at the centre of debates on KOBACO's 
performance. Between 1981 and 1990, KOBACO earned 440 
billion won for the fund. In 1990, it spent 18 billion 
for the quality enhancement of journalism and 52 billion 
for projects related to the enhancement of arts and 
culture (KOBACO 1991). The quality enhancement of 
journalism can include initiatives such as support for 
visits abroad by journalists, scholarships for the 
students of journalism, and for journalists' offspring, 
a housing fund for journalists, and support for the 
association of journalists (PD Association, No. 15. pp. 
8-9) . However, this type of seemingly altruistic 
business can be analysed through another frame. The 
support given to journalists could provide a channel for 
ideological education and pressure. Certainly, KOBACO 
has been accused of using the public service fund for 
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political aims (Korean Broadcasting System Institute, 
Report, June, 1990: 102) . Even support for projects 
related to culture and the arts has met with scepticism 
and criticism. KOBACO has spent public service fund 
monies on building an "Arts Hall" and on other cultural 
events which need substantial capital. But, if such 
projects are intended to benefit all the Korean people, 
critics agree that funds should come from government, 
not from KOBACO. At the same time, for the advertising 
industry itself, the public service fund has not 
provided any benefit. Only 4.26% of the accumulated fund 
has been spent on organisations related to the 
advertising business such as the 'Institute of 
Advertising Culture', and the ABC Association. In 1990 
only 0.39% (300 million won) of the total amount was 
used to support advertising business sector, a reduction 
from the 0.5% allocated in 1989 (Daily Korean Economy, 
1, December. 1990). 
Another question critics have raised concerns the 
procedures for ratifying KOBACO's budget. According to 
Korea Broadcasting Advertising Corporation Law, KOBACO 
has to obtain ratification of its budget and use of the 
fund, before and after use, from the Korean Broadcasting 
Commission. However, the Commission operates as a branch 
of government which can realise the will of government 
in the mass media sector. As Table. IX. 12. shows, in 
1990, after the Commission ratified the budget plans of 
KOBACO, there was only a 1.24% variation from the 
original plan. Of course, the amount by which the budget 
was reduced is not important in itself. Rather, it is 
the close inter-relation and coincidence of interests 
between a body charged with regulation and oversight in 
the public interest (the commission) and the body 
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responsible for exercising monopoly control over 
broadcast advertising. 
Table IX. 12. 
1990 Ratification of the Basic Plan for the Use 
of the Public Service Fund 
unit: million w 
Details Original Ratified 
' 
plan b K. B. C. 
Total 66,657 65,830 
Public Works for Press 20,890 20,140 
1)Supporting work for Broadcasting Culture 8,561 8,5 61 
2)Supports for Journalist Association 8,856 8,806 
3)Supports for Advertising Industries 3,473 2,773 
Promotion of Cultural Arts 45,767 45,690 
1)Funding for Enhancement of Culture & Art 23,000 23,000 
2)Supports for Cultural Facilities 18,000 18,000 
3)Supports for Cultural Association 4,767 4,690 
K. B. C.; Korean Broadcasting Commission 
Source: Korean Broadcasting Commission, '90 Annual 
Report, 1991. 
9.2.5. The Future of KOBACO 
One index that points to KOBACO's position within the 
network of power is the careers of its presidents. Since 
1981, KOBACO has had three presidents. The first, who 
occupied office from 1981 to 1986, was Hong Doopyo. He 
had been the President of Chungang Daily and TBC (which 
was merged to KBS after 1980), and is now the President 
of Korea Tobacco & Ginseng Corporation which is one of 
the most profitable government corporations. The second 
president, from 1986 to 1987 was Ha Soonbong. He had 
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been a parliamentary member and aý floor-leader of the 
DJP, (the Democratic Justice Party) which was governing 
at that time. After he finished work at KOBACO, he came 
back to the DLP (Democratic Liberty Party which was 
established as the ruling party through the fusion of 
three parties including DJP) and became the director of 
its regional constituencies. The case of the third 
president, who has been in office from 1987 until now, 
is a good example of the way in which militarism has 
spread over into even the cultural sector of Korean 
society. The President in office at KOBACO is Nam-Woo- 
Jong. He had been the chief of Staff of the Army, and 
later, became Secretary of National Defence. As these 
examples show, only people who have demonstrated their 
willingness to serve the government/state can be 
presidents=of - KOBACO, with the consequence that the 
organisation is, literally, a government agency. 
Nowadays, KOBACO faces demands for its abolition or at 
the very least., for substantial changes. Already in 
1990, the Korean Broadcasting System Institute proposed 
the disbanding of KOBACO by 1995 (Daily Kyunghyang, 
2, April, 1990) 
KOBACO operates a system unique to Korea. On the one 
hand, its activities can be positively evaluated on the 
grounds that it has helped to bring order to the 
advertising market. On the other hand, it can be argued 
that to-work effectively in a dynamic capitalist market 
place, advertising needs continuous creativity. 
Therefore, to freeze procedures by governmental control 
can be detrimental. As we noted earlier, the use of the 
public service fund'has been widely questioned, and the 
question of its use for political aims is still not 
settle even though from 1988, KOBACO has handed over its 
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authority in this area to the newly created 
'Administration Committee for Use of Public Service 
Fund'. 
9.3. CONCLUSION 
In western countries, advertising is often presented as 
a model of advanced capitalism at work. In Korea, 
however, as with other social sectors, it has been 
subjected to interference or control by the government 
and the state and, consequently, has created a unique 
mixture of influences from the different power groups; 
the chaebols and the state. 
Most major advertising agencies, however, are owned by 
chaebols, another situation unique to Korea among other 
developed countries. As noted earlier, the chaebols have 
been exercising increased power in the general economic 
sector, and can extend influence to the communications 
sector by providing core revenues for the key mass 
media, but only through the bridge provided by KOBACO. 
This means that when Korean capitalists went to exert 
power as controllers, or at least sponsors of the 
communication sector, they have to seek corporation with 
the government. As noted earlier, three steps of the 
advertising process reflect the unique situation of the 
Korean economy and society, and in addition, both sides 
have reached a point which secures the best interests 
for them, the state and the chaebols. 
In summation, if we consider only the general economic 
sector, Korean society appears to be under the control 
of major capitalists with their power spreading 
everywhere. Every social sector or level, however, has 
developed in various ways and at various speeds, with 
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the result that the mass communication sector reflects 
the interwoven powers of each sphere, rather than the 
simple exercise of the instrumental powers of big 
business. 
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CONCLUSION 
Conclusion 
This thesis has attempted to explore three main themes. 
It began with an overview of the main explanations that 
have been offered for the post-war economic success of 
the east Asian NICs stressing the need to take full 
account of the peculiarities of each country as well as 
the factors they share in common. Korea was chosen as a 
case study for detailed analysis. Its distinctive 
features include'; its strategies for dealing with 
foreign capital; the strong history of militarism; and 
its way of developing the private sector through the 
creation of large enterprises - the 'chaebols'. 
Given the key role played by the state in orchestrating 
economic development, the second focus of the thesis has 
been on mapping the nature of the state's relative 
autonomy and its developing power relations with other 
major social sectors, specifically with capital and 
labour. 
Finally the thesis has explored how the developing 
Korean state has attempted to exert control over public 
culture, and in particular, the mass communication 
system, and how this attempt has been shaped by the 
shifting economic and political situation in the 
country. 
The new wave of economic development in east Asian 
countries has stimulated an enormous amount of research 
from a wide variety of perspectives. Many studies, as we 
saw in the introductory chapter of this thesis, have 
focused single-mindedly on the central position of the 
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state and its guiding role in economic development, 
rather than taking a more holistic approach, and looking 
at the complex and evolving-interplay between the state 
and other social sectors. 
Therefore, this present work can claim to be original in 
the sense that through a detailed examination of the 
Korean case it has attempted to demonstrate the utility 
of a perspective that places the economic success of 
east Asian NICs within a broader context which takes 
account of the shifting international environment and 
its impact and the cultural factors which these four 
countries have inherited, and which explores the actions 
of the state in relation to the responses and strategies 
of other key groups of actors. 
In terms of the broader context, one of unique features 
of the East Asian NICs is their crucial position within 
international politics since World War II and more 
particularly, within the politics of the Cold War. 
Despite the negative impacts of this, particularly in 
Korea during and immediately after the civil war, this 
geopolitical position also bestowed advantages. The US 
government helped Asian nations in order to isolate them 
from Communist influence. These positive interventions 
included foreign aid (economic and military) and efforts 
to stabilise the post war economy as soon as possible. 
These were synchronised with shifts in the global 
division of labour which enabled the four east Asian 
NICs to export commodities and provided the major 
industrial base for their economic growth. As a group 
then, their success is partly attributable to their 
unique location in space (their geopolitical position) 
and in time (the politics of the Cold War). 
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The role ', of Confucianism as a shared cultural 
inheritance among the east Asian NICs is also an 
important general context to be explored. We agree with 
those scholars who argue that core Confucian elements 
such as the strong work ethic, respect for educational 
achievement, avoidance of conflict, and loyalty to 
hierarchy and authority have helped to provide general 
cultural supports for the East Asian 'miracle', though, 
as the Korean case shows, in elaborating this argument, 
it is important to take full account of the differences 
between countries. Whereas some states have incorporated 
selective elements of Confucianism into an official 
ideology with a strong institutional backing, in Korea, 
the tradition operates primarily at a vernacular level. 
Its impact is therefore likely to be more diffuse. 
However, this absence of state organisation is very much 
the exception in the Korean case. 
Consequently, in common with many other writers, we have 
laid particular, emphasis on the role of the state, 
paying special attention on the conditions and operation 
of state' autonomy. Generally speaking, the role of the 
state can be categorised under four headings: policy 
making; financial support; state ownership; and welfare 
policy. In practice, each Asian NICs is characterised by 
a distinctive combination'of these factors, generated by 
a specific combination of external and internal factors. 
At this point however, it is necessary to return to the 
general theories reviewed in earlier chapters. These 
theories can be grouped into three main categories. 
'Neo-classical' writers explain the economic success of 
NICs in terms of the operation of free-markets and the 
encouragement provided by international trade and 
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outward-oriented economic policies. These scholars argue 
that it is the existence of a free market environment 
that has provided the necessary mechanism to gear the 
economies towards the optimal points on the production 
possibilities frontier. For them the influence of the 
state is restricted to its initial 'night-watchman' 
role. However, this- approach is open to the obvious 
criticism that it overlooks the structural inequality in 
the relations between the developed and developing 
countries and its intimate links to the political 
organisation of international trade. In addition, their 
perception of the role of the state cannot explain how 
east Asian governments have executed export-oriented 
policies in practice, and have successfully adapted them 
to their own circumstances. 
The second major theoretical tradition relevant to this 
thesis is the work around the idea of 'dependent 
development'. This argues that the underdevelopment of 
third world countries results from their structural 
position in the world capitalist system. Therefore, even 
if they manage to obtain benefits from the system, 
development entails another form of dependence. However, 
once again, this approach is not well suited to 
explaining the economic 'miracle' of four east Asian 
NICs since these countries have achieved success without 
being incorporated into forms of dependent development. 
True, they occupied a complicated position within the 
international political system, but they found ways to 
turn this to their advantage. For example, Taiwan and 
Korea managed to delay opening their domestic markets to 
US products in the name of national security. Moreover, 
many of the problems each country has faced can be more 
accurately attributed to the choices they made at key 
junctures, rather than to the operations of 
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multinational companies'. As we saw, dependency thinking 
was recast to account for industrialisation in the large 
South American NICs where foreign investment has played 
an important role in the economy. However, in the case 
of the east Asian NICs, foreign direct investment is 
overshadowed by commercial borrowing, even in the case 
of Singapore, and in Korea, foreign direct investment 
was prohibited until recently. In sum, it can be said 
that this theory fails to take proper account of 
internal domestic politics or of variations in the 
state's response to a shared situation of dependency. In 
other words, it privileges macro structures and neglects 
situated action. 
In an effort to overcome this imbalance, we turned to 
the notion of the 'developmental state'. Despite the 
growing consensus on the key role of strong states in 
the economic success of the east Asian NICs, the 
theoretical supports for this view remained surprisingly 
weak. There was therefore a need for the new way of 
thinking which could demonstrate in what respects these 
states are different from others, and point to what made 
them so powerful, but which at the same time did not 
ignore the importance of the world system. The idea of 
the 'developmental state' recognises that these states 
enjoy the degree of autonomy necessary for the exercise 
of an extensive and positive role in economic 
development, and acknowledge that this autonomy is 
derived from historical features and conditions common 
to all the Asian NICs. This approach conceptualises 
'autonomy' by listing its major components. By adding 
one further component to the original frame, this 
procedure produces five important factors altogether. 
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The first is the absence of powerful landlords and the 
presence of only a small capitalist class in the initial 
phase. These two structural features combined to create 
a second feature -a 'power vacuum' which enabled the 
state to execute economic planning free from the need 
for extensive negotiations with other major social 
sectors. The practical operation of state autonomy was 
further supported by the regime's claim to a 'special 
historical mission' which was in the cases of the most 
of east Asian NICs identified with protecting their 
countries from Communist influence. This 'mission' acted 
as a 'spur' to capitalist development and legitimated 
postponing the widening of access to decision making and 
political activities. In the case of Korea, appeals to 
this 'mission' were repeatedly used by the military to 
justify their long standing direct intervention in 
politics. A fourth factor derives from the cultural 
inheritance of neo-Confucianism. As noted earlier, this 
furnishes a code of ethics to guide behaviour that is 
essentially paternal in nature and therefore consonant 
with extensive state intervention and direction. The 
fifth and final source of autonomy stems from the 
specific position of the Asian NIC's within the 
international political system. In particular, the US 
government's strong support for the Taiwanese and Korean 
regimes played the important role in sustaining these 
governments, with or without extensive popular support 
internally. By the same token, foreign aid helped these 
regimes to widen the scope of their policies. Even 
though there are persuasive arguments about its negative 
impacts more generally, it undoubtedly played a key role 
in providing the resources that allowed these 
governments to start industrialisation. 
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Having outlined the main sources of the state autonomy, 
we turned to an examination of how it operated in 
practice. If state autonomy is 'relative', it is 
important to note which factors affect the degree of 
'relativity'. Two principal axes are relevant to this 
analysis - the relation between the state and capital, 
and the relation between the state and labour. In Korea 
as we have seen, state intervention led to the emergence 
of the chaebols, huge family-based oligopolies. Given 
their centrality to the economy, much of the rest of the 
thesis has been devoted to a detailed exploration of the 
developing relation between the Korean state and the 
chaebols, and the gradual movement from the dominance of 
the state to a more symbiotic relation between two. 
With regard to state/labour relations, in all Asian 
NICs, the labour sector has suffered from extensive 
state intervention either directly or indirectly. 
However, in Korea, the direct deployment of the police 
fuelled anti-statist activity which has eroded its 
previous autonomy. 
What then, is a 'developmental state'? Despite all the 
differences, the basic feature they all share is the 
subordination of all values associated with 
'development' to a single privileged concern: economic 
growth. But is this project sustainable over time? 
Throughout the thesis, we have raised questions about 
the future of these 'miracle' economies. The central 
question is whether authoritarian forms of government 
will necessarily accompany economic successes in the 
next generation of late-industrialising economies or can 
they be uncoupled? The findings of the thesis suggest 
that they can. The experiences of some of the NICs show 
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that authoritarian rule followed rather than preceded 
industrialisation, suggesting that economic success may 
have been used to justify regime entrenchment, rather 
than the other way around. In addition, the social 
changes and divisions generated by the shifting 
relations between state, capital and labour in the Asian 
NICs have produced new contexts both for the continued 
exercise of state power and for the future industrial 
pathways available to each. 
In the case of Korea, we have seen how the more economy 
develops, the weaker state power becomes and the 
stronger the power of other social sectors, in 
particular, the chaebols'. 
This thesis does not disagree with previous research 
which emphasises the superior and relatively autonomous 
power of the state and its extensive control over other 
social sectors, including the capitalist group. However, 
simply repeating this basic story would not do much to 
advance social science. One important obligation of 
research is to identify currents of change and to 
attempt to explain emerging phenomena in a critical 
manner, and even to try to predict the possible lines of 
development which these changes may bring in conjunction 
with existing variables. 
In pursuit of this aim, this thesis has paid particular 
attention to the evolving power of the major Korean 
capitalist group, the chaebols, and to their shifting 
relations with state power and other social sectors. If 
somebody asks the question; Which is stronger, the power 
of capital or the power of the state?, and if we are 
allowed to reply with only one single word, even today 
in the '90s, the answer would be 'the state', without a 
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doubt. However, as pointed out earlier, accepting this 
permanent state of affairs would allow us neither 
inspiration nor further discussion. 
C. Wright Mills-argued that power is always relative: one 
man's powers are another man's weaknesses. Following 
this argument through it can be said that one sector's 
growing power means others' declining power. This 
applies with particular force to the relations between 
the Korean state' and the chaebols. This thesis is a 
modest attempt to demonstrate that the power structure 
is a historical and malleable formation produced by the 
changing relationships among power groups. In 
contemporary Korea, the key power centres are the state, 
the military, the major capitalist groups, and the 
growing power of labour groups. However, for a number of 
reasons which we have indicated in the thesis, the power 
of labour in Korea is still comparatively weak. The 
analysis of the last thirty years of political and 
economic development, therefore, inevitably centres on 
the history of shifts in the power relations between the 
state and the chaebols. 
The dynamics of this relationship are grounded in two 
structural features. The first is the state's ability to 
implement its economic policies relatively autonomously 
in the'-initial period of rapid economic growth. The 
second is the cumulative increase in the relative power 
of the chaebols - their ability to "not conform" to 
state economic policies. This produces a further feature 
which can be seen as an outcome of the first two -a 
shift* in the degree and direction of state intervention 
in the economy. 
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In the 1960s, the state enjoyed a clear advantage over 
the chaebols. It was able to implement its economic 
policies whilst relying on their complete subordination. 
As a result, state intervention in the economy was both 
far reaching and complex. The degree of autonomy it 
enjoyed was at its maximum. 
In the 1970s, state intervention in the economy remained 
extensive, as evidenced by the cases of the Export- 
Oriented Industrialisation and the Emphasis on the Heavy 
and Chemical Industrialisation. But the decade also 
displays a shift in the relationship between the state 
and the Chaebols underpinned by the granting of 
substantial privileges to major companies, such as a 
favourable taxation and the unrealistically low interest 
rates charged on foreign loans. But the state still had 
the upper hand-At the same time, it can be argued that 
one of. the primary outcomes of the development 
strategies pursued in the 1960s and 1970s was the 
promotion of the chaebols. This in turn produced a 
chaebol-oriented economy while neglecting the interests 
of other groups. 
By the 1980s, this shift was generating major changes in 
the relationship between the state and the chaebols. 
State policy tended toward less intervention in the 
economy, partly in response to the increasing size and 
complexity of the economy itself, and partly to mounting 
pressures from the chaebols for a free market economy. 
As a result of , 
the growth in the chaebol's power the 
state had to concede partial control over economic 
policy and to consult the major groups on important 
decisions. The overall trajectory was therefore marked 
by the decreasing power of the state and the increasing 
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power of the chaebols, and their growing independence as 
policy actors. 
As we have seen in detail in previous chapters, over the 
period covered by this thesis, the relative power of the 
chaebols has not only increased, it has also become more 
generalised. They have established social networks which 
now cover most of the major social sectors. They have 
been active in building linkages grounded in shared 
educational background, hometown ties, and inter 
marriage with political, financial, academic, and 
cultural figures. In addition, they have invited former 
politicians to become company chairpersons, or the 
president of their main business organisation (the FKI) 
in an effort t. o improve relations with government and to 
provide conduits for the exercise of pressure on policy- 
making in their own interests. In sum, they have 
consistently tried to increase their power not only 
within the economic sector, but also in other sectors of 
society, thus, transforming themselves into something 
approximating to a ruling class. However, the results 
also show that the chaebols have still not gained a 
central position within the political sector. This may 
be partly understood as a lag in the pace of development 
between the different social sectors, and partly 
consequence of the high degree of autonomy that the 
state still enjoys. 
Another important power flow was found between the 
political sector and the cultural sector, and more 
specifically, between the major publicly owned mass 
media and the Ministry of Culture and Information and 
the Presidential Office. As a consequence, by 1990 in 
Korea, the people who enact the regulations governing 
the mass media from the governmental side and the people 
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who represent the mass media as top executives are the 
same figures. This convergence has delivered substantial 
financial and social privileges to the media. It also 
helps to explain why the Korean mass media have been 
widely criticised as 'loyal spokes-people' for the 
regime and the state instead of protectors of democracy. 
Recent developments have produced little change in the 
situation revealed by the results of my survey. However, 
within the newspaper companies which are private owned, 
in contrast to the publicly owned broadcasting media, at 
least the owners and managerial board have assumed 
control for the censorship of news from the government. 
In addition, conflicts within newspaper companies have 
become similar to any other industrial dispute. 
As political economists of communication have repeatedly 
pointed out, the structures and strategies of ownership 
within the mass media can play a crucial role in 
organising relations between the state and the mass 
media. In the future the chaebols' growing power within 
the emerging fields opened up by the new technologies of 
communication might generate interesting new forms of 
struggle and accommodation. As this thesis has shown, 
one unique feature of the Korean media system which has 
already been produced by the interaction of a strong 
state and an emerging capitalist bloc intent on taking 
control in the communication sector, is the organisation 
of the advertising market. In a capitalist economy, most 
commercial news media rely heavily for their earnings on 
advertising revenue. In the case of Korea this reliance 
is extended because 'public' broadcasting companies 
derive more than 80% of their turnover from advertising 
sales. The case study of KOBACO has explored how this 
system of control operates. 
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So, what general conclusion can be drawn from this 
research? Firstly, although there have been many 
attempts to establish a neat prescriptive model for 
future would-be Asian NICs, the present study shows that 
this is a doomed combination due mainly to two reasons. 
Firstly, all the factors we have explored suggest that 
the success of the four Asian NICs is the product of a 
unique combination of factors - the international 
environment, cultural inheritance, and the role of the 
state, and that this combination cannot be reproduced or 
repeated. In addition, the more the study has developed, 
the more it has become clear that within the general 
context established by these structures each state has 
pursued a unique combination of strategies. 
The second conclusion that the Korean case strongly 
suggests that state autonomy and hence the state's 
centrality to the orchestration of economic growth is 
both conditional and contestable. The state enjoyed 
maximum autonomy and power in the initial phase of the 
drive of growth when there were no other major 
countervailing power groups and the politics of the Cold 
War provided a favourable political context for the 
retention of control. Now in the 90s, with the conflict 
between the -Communism and Capitalism becoming less 
salient (even though North Korea remains as one of very 
few socialist countries) and with the chaebols 
exercising much greater control over the Korean economy, 
the relations between the state and the chaebols are 
shifting again as evidenced signs, by the discussion 
about the defence budget. 
Finally, the findings of this thesis also suggest that 
in the Korean case, the mass media sector is one of the 
most salient sites within which to trace the unfolding 
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economic and political history of the country. This is 
not only because it is one of the most lucrative sites 
of enterprise in the society, but also because it is the 
'discursive arm' that represents 'the world' within 
public culture. 
Limitations and Further Suggestions 
The main limitation of the present thesis is that the 
research is confined to the period of between 1945 and 
1990. However, there is now no doubt that the late 1980s 
was -a very important moment for Korean society in 
relation to both the shift in the political situation 
and the consolidation of economic development. Once the 
long-standing military regime conceded the establishment 
of new political parties, a new dynamic of power 
relations was set in motion. By 1990, when the research 
ends,, - the state and the capitalist groups were already 
entering a new era in their interaction: a movement from 
state dominance to a more symmetrical and symbiotic 
relationship. Even as this conclusion is being written, 
those military leaders who once took power by coup are 
on trial for their lives on charge of mutiny, a 
situation that would have been unthinkable even in the 
comparatively recent past. In this new chapter of 
history, many things may become possible and some 
aspects of the past may need to be rewritten. Indeed it 
can be argued that the last thirty years have prepared 
and fertilised the soil on which negotiation and 
bargaining among the power blocs can take root over the 
next few years. 
Another limitation of the thesis is the heavy reliance 
on 'official' data. Though problematic, this can be 
justified by three reasons. First of all, much of this 
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data was collected and analysed by civil servants who 
hold tenaciously to a self-image of neutrality and 
reject political incorporation. This is of course an 
incomplete guarantee of 'objectivity' since governments 
retain the right to specify what information shall be 
collected, what will be left unrecorded, what 
definitions of key variables will be used, and what will 
be made available on the public record. But equally, it 
cannot be assumed that all official statistics are a 
simple reflection of government priorities and 
interests. Rather they are the site of continual 
struggles. They must be used with a due degree of care 
and scepticism but in the absence of comparable data 
from other sources they provide an important resource. 
Secondly, government data is both extensive in its 
coverage and available for the public inspection. It is 
collected and updated every year which is almost 
impossible for academic researchers, small independent 
groups or individuals. No other source can match the 
scale and scope of the information provided. 
Unfortunately however, the history of public disclosure 
is much shorter in Korea compared to many other 
developed countries and until recently, much valuable 
information was monopolised by government. To fill these 
gaps private research institute started collect and 
publish their own data. The most important source of 
this nature is the FKI funded research organisation. 
Their data has been drawn on extensively in the present 
thesis, for checking key indicators of the chaebols' 
growth for example. This material is also open to 
charges of 'bias'. However the important question is not 
whether I should, not use these data, but how I use them. 
All materials have been read critically with a proper 
awareness of the possibilities of selectivity and 
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distortion, and wherever possible information derived 
from one source has been cross checked against 
information from a second or their source. However, 
given the relative underdevelopment of independent 
research in Korea, particularly in the crucial initial 
period of post-war growth, it has not been possible to 
deploy this 'triangulation' procedure as often or as 
extensively as I would have liked. 
A number of other important studies remain to be done to 
carry forward the agenda of research begun in the 
present thesis. 
There is a pressing need for a new political theory 
suited to explaining contemporary Korea as a society now 
in the process of emerging. This thesis offers on 
initial attempt, based on the notion of the 
'developmental state'. However, this theory raises the 
question of where to draw the line between state 
'autonomy' and 'authoritarianism'. I would like to add 
one further comment before closing, on the matter of 
theorisation. Frequently the problems of modelling and 
theorisation in social sciences have resulted from 'over 
ambition', which tries to group a range of different 
factors and situations under one single, synoptic 
heading. To make things worse, one factor is often 
nominated as the most important and mobilised to explain 
everything. However, in practice, things are always more 
complicated. Most of the time, there are several 
important factors intertwined and interactive. The 
'parsimony' of a theory is not always the most laudable 
virtue. Not least, the attempt to single out a primary 
cause leads researchers to overlook and omit other 
crucial factors. 
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The other pressing need is for a more extended study of 
key networks. The more obvious models for this are the 
studies conducted in developed capitalist societies, 
such as John Scott's work on interlocking corporate 
(Scott, 1984; 1991) directorships. However these models 
cannot be simply transferred to the Korean case because 
the situation differs in two important aspects. Firstly, 
as noted earlier, because of the state's high degree of 
autonomy which lead to the monopolisation and 
nationalisation of banks and most of the financial 
sector, finance capital did not have chance to develop 
independently from the control of government. This 
situation is now about to change according to the 
liberalisation of governmental regulation towards this. 
But in the key period covered by the present thesis it 
precludes any extensive analysis of interlocks between 
manufacturing and finance capital or between the 
financial institutions and the state. 
Secondly, in Korea, mainly due to the relatively short 
history of capitalism and economic development, many 
founders of the major conglomerates are still alive and 
are grooming their offspring to take over their 
positions. It could be argued that this pattern is 
partially based on Confucian values which requires that 
most of the father's assets should be passed to first 
sons and that family wealth should be passed from 
generation by generation. At the same time, it means 
that very few major enterprises are quoted on the stock 
market. Again, this continued concentration of ownership 
produces relatively simple patterns of interlocks which 
involve relatively few people. 
When we consider the power structure in Korea, in the 
time period covered by present thesis, therefore, we are 
328 
Chapter X Conclusion 
looking at.. a_remarkably restricted and stable system. In 
the future, the capitalist group is likely to 
proliferate, fragment and further exceed its reach and 
democratisation progresses, power within the political 
field is likely-to*become more dispersed. Future network 
studies will therefore need to track broader and more 
attenuated connections. They will also need to discover 
whether or-not the power blocs addressed in this present 
work'are able to retain and reproduce their historical 
advantages, or whether they will come to be viewed as an 
'ancien regime', the product of a particular set of 
circumstance, at a particular moment in time, which has 
now passed. 
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF MAJOR SOURCES 
1) Korean Government and Parliamentary Sources 
Economic Planning Board (EPB), 1971 & 1975, Korea 
Statistical Yearbook. Seoul, Korea. 
EPB, 1986. Economic Planning Board Yearbook. Seoul, 
Korea. 
EPB, 1988, Korean Economic Indicators. Seoul. Korea. 
EPB, 1968-1987, The Military Balance for 1968 to 1987: 
Seoul. 
Ministry of Labour Affairs, 1987. '87 White Paper for 
Industrial Disputes, Seoul, Korea. 
National Parliament, 1988, Inspection and Hearing for 
Press and Broadcasting, November. Seoul. 
National Parliament, 1988. National Parliamentary Minute 
for'Ministry of Culture & Information, 144th Assembly, 
October, Seoul. 
National Parliament, 1991, Parliamentary Inspection of 
the Administration, September, Seoul. 
National Parliament, 1991. Parliamentary Inspection for 
Ministry of Culture and Information, August. Seoul. 
2) Sources from Public Organisations 
Bank of Korea, Annual Statistical Reports, for 1969, 
1974,1979,1980 and 1982. Seoul, Korea. 
Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbooks, from 1965 
to 1981. Seoul, Korea. 
Korean Broadcasting System (KBS), 1977 History of 
Broadcasting. Seoul Korea. (In Korean) 
KBS, 1977, KBS History (in Korean), Seoul. 
Korean Broadcasting Advertising Corporation (KOBACO), 
1991, Ad Trends. (In Korean), February & June, Seoul. 
KOBACO, 1991, Ad. Information (in Korean), January & 
December. Seoul. 
KOBACO, 1991, Korean Broadcasting Annual Report, 
Appendix: Directory. May. Seoul. 
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KOBACO, 1991, Monthly-Report, Office of Planning and 
Coordination, KOBACO. May. Seoul. 
Korean Broadcasting Commission, 1991, '90 Annual Report. 
Seoul, Korea. 
Korean Broadcasting System Institute, 1990, Monthly 
Report, June, Seoul, Korea. 
Korean Broadcasting System Institute, 1991. Report for 
the New Wave of Broadcasting Systems in Korea. Seoul, 
Korea. 
Korean Bureau of, Statistics, 1962, Korea Yearbook. Seoul 
Korea. 
Korean Industries Statistics, Annual Reports, 1980, 
1981,1982,1983,1984,1985,1986,1987,1988,1989, 
1990, KIS, Seoul. 
Press &- Broadcasting, 1978 & 1980, Annual Reports of 
Press and Broadcasting, Seoul, Korea. 
Union News Agency, 1988. Annual Report. Seoul. 
3) Sources from Business 
Korea Business Association, 
Yearbook, Seoul, Korea. 
and Trade Organisations 
1990, Business and Industry 
Korean Business Association, 
Korean Celebrities, Seoul. 
Korean Business Association, 
Korean Businesses, Seoul. 
1980-1990, 
1991, 
Korean Association of Newspaper 
Companies, 
Seoul. 
Directory of 
Annual Record of 
and Broadcasting 
1987,1988,1989,1990, Annual Reports, 
Korean Economy Institute (KEI), 
1988,1989,1990,1991. 
Annual Reports, 1987, 
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4)- Campaigning Groups 
Amnesty International, 1994, "Prisoners of Conscience", 
Amnesty International Journal, January/February. 
No. 65. p. 5. 
Asia Labour Monitor, 1988, 'Min-Ju No-Jo, South Korea's 
New Trade Unions', Hong Kong. Asia Monitor Resource 
Centre. 
Christian Society Research, 1987, White Paper for 
Working Condition in Korea, CRI, Seoul. 
Dong-A Daily Newspaper Trade Union 
Association for Realisation of Economic Justice 
Association of Trade Unions of C. G. Textile Companies 
5) Independent Organisations 
Korea Journalism Research Institute, 1978 & 1979, Annual 
Reports, Seoul, Korea. 
Korea Journalism Research Institute, 1978, Newspaper and 
Broadcasting. Seoul, Korea. 
Korea Journalism Research Institute, 1992. 
Administration of Newspaper companies in the 90's (in 
Korean), Journalism Research Institute, Seoul. 
Desingners' Association, 1988, Design Journal, No. 3. 
May. Seoul, Korea. pp 30-33. 
Association of the Producers of Broadcasting Companies, 
1991, PD Journal, No. 15. Seoul, Korea. 
6) Newspapers and Magazines 
Chosun Daily, 1988, July, 21, Seoul. 
Chosun Daily, 1992, January, 22. Seoul. 
Daily Economic Newspaper, 'New People's Flow of 
Management', March-December, 1989. 
Daihan Sinmun, Daihan Sinmun Yeongam (Newspaper Annual), 
1956. Seoul. Korea. 
Dong-A Daily, 1985. September, 11. Seoul. 
Dong-A Daily, 1988. Documentary of Hardship of Mass 
Media under the Fifth Republic, 14. November. Seoul. 
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Dong-A Daily, 1991. August. 15. Seoul. 
Dong-A Daily, 1991. May, 1. Seoul. 
Hangyeoreh Daily, 1991. May 7, Seoul. 
Hankuk Daily, 1983. July, 1. p. 5. Seoul. 
Hankuk Daily, 1988, October. 25, Seoul. 
Hankuk Daily, 1988, Undisclosed Rearrangement of Mass 
Media, 10. October. Seoul. 
Hankuk Daily, 1988. August. 17. Seoul. 
Hankuk Daily,. 1992, August. 28. "Debate: National Defence 
Expenditure". p. 3. Seoul. 
Koreaherald, 1991, "Interview with Ministers", 
17. August. 
Kyung-Hyang Daily, 1990, April, 2. Seoul. 
Kyung-Hyang Daily, 1991, March, 5. Seoul. 
Mail Economist, 1991, December, 23. Seoul. 
Mail Economist, 1992, February, 20. Seoul. 
Mail Korean Economy, 1990, December, 1. Seoul. 
Mal, 1992, February. Seoul. 
Mal, 1993, October: 35-37. Seoul. 
Monthly Chosun, 1985. May, Seoul. 
Monthly Shin Dong-A, 1985. May, Seoul. 
The First Economist, 1992, January, 13. Seoul. 
Recruit, "White Paper about Employment Situation of 
1989". Recruit, January, 1990. 
7) Non-Korean Sources 
Financial Times, April, 23.1991. London. 
SIPRI, 1968,1969,1975, SIPRI Yearbook of World 
Armaments and Disarmament. 
World Bank, 1987a. Annual Statistical Report. 
World Bank, 1993, The East Asian Miracle, Washington, 
D. C.: World Bank 
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APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIR 
Interview Questions 
1. Do you think that the press has more freedom after 
the 5th Republic? 
a)much more 9 (18.7) 
b)marginally more 6 (54.2) 
c)more or less the same 11 (22.9) 
d)marginally less 0 (0) 
e)much less 0 (0) 
f)don't know 2 (4.2) 
2. Do you think the quality of the newspapers has 
improved in terms of their content after the 5th 
Republic? 
a)much better 5 (10.4) 
b)marginally better 25 (52.1) 
c)more or less the same 15 (31.3) 
d)marginally worse 2 (4.1) 
f)much worse 1 (2.1) 
e)don't know 0 (0) 
3. Who do you think have the biggest influence on 
reporting at the present moment? 
a)the editorial boards including journalists 20 (41.7) 
b)the owners of newspapers and their managerial 
boards 
c)the trade union 
d)the advertisers 
e)the government 
f)major pressure groups 
g)don't know 
15 (31.2) 
1 (2.1) 
3 (6.2) 
5 (10.4) 
2 (4.2) 
1 (2.1) 
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*no answer 1 (2.1) 
4. Who do you think should be blamed the most for unfair 
and wrong reporting? 
a)the owners of newspapers and their managerial boards 
15 (31.3) 
b)the editorial boards 14 (29.2) 
c) journalists 7 (14.6) 
d)the advertisers 3 (6.2) 
e)the government 5 (6.2) 
f)don't know 1 (2.1) 
*no answer 3 (6.2) 
5. Do you think that it is necessary to publish 
newspapers twice a day (same newspaper but morning and 
evening)? 
a)yes 6 (12.5) 
b) no 36 (75.0) 
c)don't know 5 (10.4) 
*no answer 1(2.1) 
6. Who do you think wants this double publication of the 
newspapers the most? 
a)the advertisers 2(4.2) 
b)the readers 7 (14.6) 
c)the owners of the newspapers 35 (72.9) 
d)journalists 0 (0) 
e)don't know 3 (6.2) 
*no answer 1 (2.1) 
7. Do you think that the increase in the number of pages 
of the newspapers help to improve the quality of the 
paper? 
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a) much better 0( 0) 
b)marginally better 6 (12.5) 
c)more or less, the same 20 (41.7) 
d)marginally worse 9 (18.7) 
e)much worse 13 (27.1) 
*no answer 0( 0) 
8. Do you think that this increase helps to reflect more 
various groups' opinions? 
ayes 4(8.3) 
b)more or less the same 26 (54.2) 
c)no 17 (35.4) 
*no answer 1(2.1) 
9. Do you think that competition among newspapers might 
cause the debilitation of the ongoing democratic 
movement for free press? 
a) yes 31 (64.6) 
b)no 9 (18.7) 
c)don't know 6 (12.5) 
d)no answer 2 (4.2) 
10. Do you think that the working conditions have 
changed since the increase in numbers of pages in the 
newspapers? 
a)much better 0 (0) 
b)marginally better 3 (6.3) 
c)more or less the same 10 (20.8) 
d)marginally worse 10 (20.8) 
e)much worse 19 (39.6) 
f)don't know 6 (12.5) 
* no answer 0( 0) 
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11. Do you think there is a possibility that the harsh 
competition among newspaper companies might be used as 
an excuse by the government to intervene in freedom of 
speech? 
a) yes 29 (58.3) 
b)no 9 (18.7) 
c)don't know 9 (18.7) 
*no answer 2 (4.2) 
12. Do you think there is a possibility that the harsh 
competition among newspaper companies might influence 
freedom of speech by corporate intervention? 
a) yes 40 (83.3) 
b)no 3(6.3) 
c)don't know 4(8.3) 
*no answer 1(2.1) 
13. What do you think is the best way to achieve more 
democratic reporting? 
a)the independence of the editorial boards 20 (41.7) 
b)improvement in working conditions 8 (16.6) 
c)democratisation within newspaper companies 10 (20.8) 
d)the ongoing strength of the trade union 2(4.2) 
e)improved morality of. journalists 7 (14.6) 
f)don't know 0( 0) 
*no answer 1(2.1) 
I 
337 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abrahamsson, B., 1968, "The Ideology of an Elite: 
Conservatism and National Insecurity" in J. van Doorn 
eds, Armed Forces and Society, The Hague, Mouton. 
1971, "Elements of Military Conservatism: 
Traditional and Modern" in M. Janowitz & J. van Doorn 
eds., On Military Ideology, Rotterdam University 
Press. 
Amnesty International, 1994, "Prisoners of Conscience", 
January/February. No. 65. p. 5. 
Amsden, A. H., 1989, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and 
Late Industrialization, New York & Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
1993, "Asia's Industrial Revolution: 
'Late Industrialization' on the Rim", Dissent Summer, 
1993: 324-32. 
Asia Labour Monitor, 1988, "Min-Ju No-Jo, South Korea's 
New Trade Unions", Hong Kong. Asia Monitor Resource 
Centre. 
Association of the Producers of Broadcasting Companies, 
1991, PD Journal, No. 15. Seoul, Korea. 
Ayu, I. D., 1984, Militarism, Student Resistance and the 
Press in Nigeria, 1970-1979 , [Ph. D. Thesis] CMCR. 
University of Leicester. 
Baik, Seung-Hun, 1991, "White Paper of Prisoners of 
Conscience under the Sixth Republic" (In Korean), 
Mal, December. 
Balassa, B, 1991, Economic Policies in the Pacific Area 
Developing Coutries, London, MacMillan. 
1977, A Stage Approach to Comparative 
Advantage, World Bank Staff Working Paper 256, 
Washington, D. C. May. 
Bank of Korea, Annual Statistical Reports, 1969,1974, 
1979,1980 and 1982. Seoul, Korea. 
1 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbooks, from 1965 
to 1981. Seoul, Korea. 
Barrett, M., 1991, The Politics of Truth: From Marx to 
Focault. Cambridge, Blackwell. 
Bello, W. & S. Rosenfield, 1992, Dragons in Distress: 
Asia's Miracle Economic in Crisis, London, Penguin 
Books. 
Berger, L. P., 1988, "An East Asian Development Model? ", 
in in Search of an East Asian Developmental Model, 
P. Berger and H. M. Hsiao (eds. ) Transaction Books, New 
Brunswick, NJ. pp. 3-il. 
Berghahn, V., 1981, Militarism; The History of an 
International Debate 1861-1979. Berg Publishers. 
Castells, M., and L. Goh, & R. Y-W. Kwak, 1990, The Shek Kip 
Mei Syndrome: Economic Development and Public Housing 
in Hong Kong and Singapore, London. Pion Ltd. 
Cawson, A., 1988, Corporatism and Political Theory, 
Oxford, Basil Blackwell. 
Cha, Ki-Tae, 1991, "Forbidden Topic", Hangeoreh Daily 
Newspaper, August, 13,1991. 
Chan, W., 1963. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Chang, Myung-Kuk, 1985, "Footprint of Labour Movement in 
Korea after Liberation" (in Korean), in G. S. Kim & 
H. C. Park (eds. ), Theories of Labour Movement in Korea 
I, Miraesa. Seoul. pp. 113-145. 
Chen, E. K. Y., 1979, Hyper-Growth in Asian Economies: A 
Comparative Study of Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, 
Singapore and Taiwan. London. MacMillan. 
Chin, Duk-Kyu, 1985, "The Occupation Policies towards 
Korea in Early Stage of US Military Government. " in 
G. H. Song & H. C. Park (eds. ), Re-Understanding of 40 
Years After Liberation I, Dolbege. Seoul, Korea. 
pp. 111-138. 
9 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Cho, Chun-Young, 1992, "The Environment of Advertising 
Shoul be Improved" Dongbang Journal, January, pp. 3- 
5. 
Choi, Changsup and Byeon, Donghyun. 1989, Understanding 
of Korean Broadcasting. Seoul. Korea. 
Choi, Jang-Jip, 1983. "Interest Conflict and Political 
Control in South Korea: A Study of the Labour Unions 
in Manufacturing Industries, 1961-1980", (Ph. D. 
Thesis], Department of Political Science, University 
of Chicago. 
, 1987, "The Strong 
State and Weak Labor 
Relations in South Korea: Their Historical 
Determinants and Bureaucratic Structure" in Kim, K. D., 
(ed. ) Dependency Issues in Korean Development. Seoul, 
Seoul National University Press, pp. 305-325. 
Choi, K., 1991, "Point of View": Curtailment of National 
Defence Budget" (In Korean), August, 18. Hangyeoreh 
Daily Newspaper. Seoul. 
Chosun Daily, 1988, July, 21, Seoul. 
Chosun Daily, 1992, January, 22. Seoul. 
Chowdhury, A. and Islam, I., 1993, The Newly 
Industrialising Economies of East Asia. Routledge, 
London & New York. 
Christian Society Research, 1987, White Paper for 
Working Condition in Korea, CRI, Seoul. 
Chung, Jinsuk, 1990a. "Korean Broadcasting Structure: 
The History of Change", in Journalism. Spring/Summer. 
Seoul. Korea. pp. 33-51. (In Korean). 
, 1990b, The History of Korean Journalism, 
Nanam, Seoul. 
Chung, Young-Iob. 1987. "Capital of Chaebol in Korea 
During the Early Stages of Economic Development". 
Journal of Modern Korean Studies 3: 11-41. 
Cole, David C., and Park, Yung Chul. 1983. Financial 
Development in Korea, 1945-1978. Studies in the 
14 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Modernization of the Republic of Korea, 1945-1975. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, 
Harvard University. 
Communication Developemt Study Group, 1988. Capitalism 
and Korean Press (In Korean), Seoul National 
University, Hanwul, Seoul. 
Cotton, J., 1992, "Understanding the State in South 
Korea: Bureaucratic-Authoritarian or State Autonomy 
Theory? ", Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 24. 
No. 4, January, pp. 512-531. 
Crozier, B. 1964, "South-East Asia", in Evan Luard(ed. ), 
The Cold War: A Reappraisal, Thames and Hudson, 
London. pp. 163-190. 
Cumings, B., 1981. The Origins of Korean War: Liberation 
and the Emergence of Seperate Regimes, 1945-1947. 
Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. 
1987. "The Origins and Development of 
the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial 
Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequences. 
in Frederic C. Deyo, (ed. ), The Political Economy of 
the New Asian Industrialization. Ithaca, N. Y.: 
Cornell University Press. 
1989. "The Abortive Abertura: South 
Korea in the Light of Latin American Experience. " New 
Left Review 173: 5-32. 
Daihan Sinmun, Daihan Sinmun Yeongam (Newspaper Annual), 
1956. Seoul. Korea. 
Daily Economic Newspaper, 'New People's Flow of 
Management', March-December, 1989. 
Davis, D& Ward M., 1990, "The Entrepreneurial State: 
Evidence from Taiwan", Comparative Political Studies, 
23. pp. 314-333. 
Davis, L. E., 1974, The Cold War Begins, Priceton 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. 
Lt 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Dee, P. S., 1984, Economic Policy Making and the Role of 
Special Interest Groups: Some Evidence for South 
Korea, Kiel Institute of World Economics Department 
IV, Working Paper No. 217, October, DUsternbrooker Weg 
120,2300 Kiel 1. 
Desingners' Association, 1988, Design Journal, No. 3. 
May. Seoul, Korea. pp 30-33. 
Deyo, F. C., 1989a, "Labour System, Production Structure 
and Export-Manufacturing: the East Asian NICs", 
Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science 17: 8-24. 
1989b, "Labour and Development Policy in 
East Asia", The Annals of American Academy 505, 
September: 152-61. 
Domhoff, G. W., 1978, Who Really Rules?, New Jersey, 
Transanction Inc. 
, 1987c, "Where Do 
Government Experts Come 
From? " in Dye, G. W. Domhoff. &. A. D. Gruyter, (eds. ), 
Power Elite and Organisations, California, Sage. 
Dong-A Daily, 1985. September, 11. Seoul. 
Dong-A Daily, 1988. Documentary of Hardship of Mass 
Media under the Fifth Republic, 14. November. Seoul. 
Dong-A Daily, 1991. August. 15. Seoul. 
Dong-A Daily, 1991. May, 1. Seoul. 
Douglass, M., 1994, "The 'Developmental State' and the 
Newly Industrialised Economies of Asia", Environment 
and Planning A, Vol. 26. No. 4. pp. 543-566. 
, 1993, "Social, Political and Spatial 
Dimensions of Korean Industrial Transformation", 
Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 23. No. 2. pp. 149- 
172. 
Eagleton, T., 1991, ideology, Verso. 
Eckert, Carter J., 1990. "The South Korean Bourgeoisie: 
A Class in Search of Hegemony". Journal of Korean 
Studies vol. 7: 115-48. 
R 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
EPB, 1971 & 1975, Korea Statistical Yearbooks. Seoul, 
Korea. 
EPB, 1986. Economic Planning Board Yearbook. Seoul, 
Korea. 
EPB, 1988, Korean Economic Indicators. Seoul. Korea. 
EPB, 1968-1987, The Military Balance for 1968 to 1987: 
Seoul. 
Evans, P., 1978. Dependent Development: The Alliance of 
Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil, 
Princeton: Princeton University. 
Federation of Banks, 1990. Directory of Bank Executives. 
Seoul. 
Financial Times, April, 23.1991. London. 
Finer, S. E., 1962, The Man on Horseback. London, Pall 
Mall Press. 
Fiske, J., 1993, Power Plays, Power Works, London, 
Verso. 
Gadacz, Oles, 1987, Advertising Age, November, vol: 39. 
p. 62. 
Golding, P. & Murdock, G., 1991. "Culture, Communications, 
and Political Economy", in Curran, J. & Gurevitch, M. 
(eds. ), Mass Media and Society, Edward Arnold, 
London. pp. 15-32. 
Gutteridge, W., 1964, Military Institutions and Powers in 
the New States, Pall Mall Press. 
Haggard, S., 1988, "The Politics of Industrialisation in 
the Republic of Korea and Taiwan" in H. Huges (ed. ) 
Achieving Industrialisation in East Asia, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
1990. Pathways From the Periphery: The 
Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing 
Countries, Cornell University Press. 
Hall, S., 1986, "Media Power and Class Power" in J. 
Curran, J. Ecclestone, G. Oakley & A. Richardson, 
(eds. ), Bending Reality, London, Pluto, pp. 5-14. 
R 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Hamilton, C., 1986, Capitalist Industrialization in Korea, 
Westview Special Studies on East Asia, Boulder & 
London, Westview Press. 
Hangyeoreh Daily, 1991. May 7, Seoul. 
Hankuk Daily, 1983. July, 1. p. 5. Seoul. 
Hankuk Daily, 1988, October. 25, Seoul. 
Hankuk Daily, 1988, Undisclosed Rearrangement of Mass 
Media, 10. October. Seoul. 
Hankuk Daily, 1988. August. 17. Seoul. 
Hankuk Daily,. 1992, August. 28. "Debate: National Defence 
Expenditure". p. 3. Seoul. 
Harris, N., 1986. The end'of the Third World, Penguin. 
Hattori, Tamio, 1986. "A Comparison of Korea's and 
Japan's Large-Enterprise Groups (in Korean)", in Lee 
Hak-Chong, Jung Kuo-Hyun, et al. The Structure and 
Strategy of Korean Enterprises, Seoul: Bomumsa. 
1989, "Japanese Zaibatsu and Korean 
Chaebol", in Chung Kae H. and Lee Hak Chong, (eds. ) 
Korean Managerial Dynamics, New York: Praeger. 
Hayter, T. and Watson, C., 1985. Aid: Rhetoric and Reality, 
London, Pluto. 
Hayter, T., 1981, The Creation of World Poverty: An 
Alternative View to the Brandt Report, London, Pluto. 
Henderson, G. 1991. "Human Rights in South Korea: 1945- 
1953". in William Shaw, (ed. ), Human Rights in Korea. 
Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Legal Studies, Harvard 
University. 
, 1988, "Constitutional Changes From 
the First to the Sixth Republics; 1948-1987" in 
Y. W. Kihi & I. J. Kim (eds. ), Political Change in South 
Korea N. Y., A PWPA Inc., pp. 22-43. 
Hinton, H. C., 1983, Korea Under New Leadership: The Fifth 
Republic. New York, Preager. 
Hsiao, H-H M, 1988, "An East Asian Development Model: 
Empirical Explorations", in In Search of an East 
7 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Asian Developmental Model, P. Berger and HM Hsiao 
(eds. ) Transaction Books, New Brunswick, NJ. pp. 12- 
23. 
Huntinton, S., P., 1964, The Soldier and the State: The 
Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. 
Cambridge, Mass., The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University. 
Hyun, In-Taek, 1991a, Between Compliance and Autonomy: 
American Pressure for Defense Burden-Sharing and 
Patterns of Defense Spending in Japan and South Korea 
(Ph. D. Thesis] University of California, Los Angeles. 
, 1991b, National Defense Expenditure 
in 
Korea, Seoul, Hanul. 
Iriye, A., 1974, The Cold War in Asia, Prentice-Hall, 
Inc. N. J.. 
Janelli, R. L., 1993, Making Capitalism: The Social and 
Cultural Construction of a South Korean Conglomerate, 
Stanford, Cal., Stanford University Press. 
Janowitz, M., 1960, The Professional Soldier, Free Press 
of Glencoe. 
_______, 
1964, The Military in the Political 
Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative 
Analysis, The University of Chicago Press. 
Jessop, B, 1985, Nicos Poulantzas: Marxist Theory and 
Political Strategy, MacMillan. 
Jo, Sung-Hwan, 1987. Promotion Measure for General 
Trading Companies, Mimeo. 
Johnson, C., 1988. "Political Instititions and Economic 
Performance: the Government-Business Relationship in 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan", in The Poltical 
Economy of the New Asian Industrialism, F. Deyo (ed. ), 
Cornell University Press, Ithica, N. Y., pp. 137-164. 
Jones, L. P., and Sakong Il. 1980, Government, Business, 
and Entrepreneurship in Economic Development: The 
Korean Case. Studies in the Modernization of the 
R 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Republic of Korea, 1945-1975. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University. 
Kang, Chul-Kyu, Choi, Jung-Pyo and Chang Jee-Sang, 1991. 
Chaebol (in Korean). Bibong. Seoul. 
KBS, 1977. History of Broadcasting. Seoul Korea. (In 
Korean) 
KBS, 1977, KBS History (in Korean), Seoul. 
KEI, 1987,1988,1989,1990,1991. Annual Reports, 
Seoul. 
Kihl, Young-Whan, 1984, Politics and Policies in Divided 
Korea: Regimes in Contest, Boulder, Westview Press. 
Kim, C. I. E., 1968, "The South Korean Military Coup of 
May, 1961", in J. van Doorn (ed. ) Armed Forces and 
Society, Mouton: The Hague. pp. 298-316. 
1971. "The Military in the Politics of 
South Korea: Creating Political Order", in Morris 
Janowitz & J. van Doorn, (eds. ) On Military 
Intervention, Rotterdam University Press. pp. 362-386. 
1985, "The Meaning of Korea's 12th National 
Assembly Election", Korea Observer, XVI, 4. Winter. 
pp. 363-379. 
1988, "The South Korean Military and Its 
Political Role", Ilpyong J. Kim & Young-Whan Kihl, 
(eds. ), Political Change in South Korea, New York 
Korean PWPA INC. pp. 91-112. 
Kim, Eun Mee, 1987. From Dominance to Symbiosis: State 
and Chaebol in the Korean Economy. (Ph. D. Thesis), 
Department of Sociology, Brown University. 
Kim, In-Dong, 1985, "Its Development and the Evaluation 
of Democratic Labour Union Movement in the 70's" (in 
Korean), in G. S. Kim & H. C. Park (eds. ), Theories of 
Labour Movement in Korea I, Miraesa, Seoul, Korea. 
pp. 147-175. 
Q 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Kim, Joo-Eon, 1989, "Supression of the Press in the 
80's" (In Korean), Society Critics, Vol. 3. December, 
Nanam. pp. 154-198. 
Kim, Jung-Won, 1975. Divided Korea, Harvard University 
Press. Cambridge. Mass. 
Kim, Kwang-Chung & Kim, Shin. 1989. "Kinship Group and 
Patrimonial Executives in a Developing Nation: A Case 
Study of Korea". Journal of Developing Areas 24, 
October: 27-46. 
Kim, Kwang-Won., 1991, "Curtailment of National Defence 
Expenditure", Dong-A Ilbo, August, 27.1991. p. 11. 
Kim, Kyüng-Dong, 1985, Rethinking Development: Theories 
and Experiences, Seouk Seoul National University 
Press. 
_ N_, 
1976, "Political Factors in the 
Formation of the Entrepreneurial Elite in South 
Korea", Asian Survey, Vol. 16. (5) 
Kim, Seung-Kuk, 1987, "Class Formation and Labor Process 
in Korea: With Special Reference to Working Class 
Consciousness" in K. D. Kim, (ed. ), Dependency Issues 
in Korean Development, Seoul, Seoul National 
University Press, pp. 398-421. 
Kim, Seungsoo, 1989. "Political Economy of Capitalism 
and Mass Media", in Social Critics Vol. 3. December. 
Seoul. pp. 116-153. 
Kim, Tae-Hong, 1987, "Movement for Press Freedom", in 
G. H. Song (ed. ) The Populace and Freedom (In Korean), 
Achim, Seoul. 
Kim, Won-Soo, 1987, Introduction of Advertisement (in 
Korean), Kyungmunsa, Seoul. 
KOBACO, 1991, Ad Trends. (In Korean), February & June, 
Seoul. 
KOBACO, 1991, Ad. Information (in Korean), From January 
to December. Seoul. 
1n 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
KOBACO, 1991, Korean Broadcasting Annual Report, 
Appendix: Directory. May. Seoul. 
KOBACO, 1991, Monthly Report, Office of Planning and 
Coordination, KOBACO. May. Seoul. 
Koh, B. C., 1985. "The 1985 Parliamentary Election in South 
Korea", Asian Survey, XXV. 9. September. pp. 883-897. 
Kong, Chung-Ja, 1989. Marital Map among the Chaebol 
Families, [Ph. D. Thesis], Department of Sociology, 
Ewha Women's University, Seoul. 
Koo Hagen. n. d. 1989. Middle Class Politics in the New 
East Asian Capitalism: The Korean Middle Classes. 
Paper Presented at the American Sociological 
Association Meeting, San Fransico, August. 
1985, "A Critical Review on the Political 
Economy Approach of the East Asian Economic 
Development Studies", in Population and Development 
Institute (eds. ), Theory and Practice of Social 
Change, Seoul National University Press. Seoul. 
Korea Business Association, 1990, Business and Industry 
Yearbook, Seoul. 
Korea Journalism Research Institute, 1978 & 1979, Annual 
Reports, Seoul. 
Korea Journalism Research Institute, 1978, Newspaper and 
Broadcasting.. Seoul. 
Korea Journalism Research Institute, 1992. Administration 
of Newspaper Companies in the 90's (in Korean), 
Journalism Research Institute, Seoul. 
Koreaherald, 1991, "Interview with Ministers", 
17. August. 
Korean Association of Newspaper and Broadcasting 
Companies, 1987,1988,1989,1990, Annual Reports, 
Seoul. 
Korean Broadcasting Commission, 1991, '90 Annual Report. 
Seoul. 
11 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Korean Broadcasting System Institute, 1990, Monthly 
Report, June, Seoul. 
Korean Broadcasting System Institute, 1991. Report for 
the New Wave of Broadcasting Systems in Korea. Seoul. 
Korean Bureau of Statistics, 1962, Korea Yearbook. 
Seoul. 
Korean Business Association, 1980-1990, Directories of 
Korean Celebrities, Seoul. 
Korean Business Association, 1991, Annual Record of 
Korean Businesses, Seoul. 
Korean Industries Statistics, Annual Reports, From 1980, 
to 1990, KIS, Seoul. 
Krueger, A., 1984, "Trade Policies in Developing 
Countries" in R. Jones and P. Kinen (eds. ), Handbook of 
International Economics, New York, North-Holland. 
Ku, Ki-Ryoung, 1991, "Diagnosis: Advertising Business in 
Korea (in Korean)", Ad. Information. April. Seoul. 
pp. 103-109. 
Kucuk, E., 1980, "The Socio-Class Determinants of 
Militarism" in M. Thee & A. Eide, (eds. ), Problems of 
Contemporary Militarism, London, Croom Helm Ltd. 
Kuznets, Paul W. 1977, Economic Growth and Structure in 
the Republic of Korea. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
Kwak, Seoung-Young, 1989, The Condition of Origin and a 
Course of Korean Conglomerates (in Korean), KEI. 
Seoul. 
Kyung-Hyang Daily, 1990, April, 2. Seoul. 
Kyung-Hyang Daily, 1991, March, 5. Seoul. 
Lee, Duk-Hoon, 1992, "The Korean Economy: Prospects and 
Financial Reforms": East Asia, pp. 1-25. 
Lee, Jin-Ro, 1988, "Study of Growing Newspaper 
Industries After 'Rearrangement'", Journalism, 
Winter. pp. 23-51. 
19 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Lee, Kyu-Eok & Lee, Jae-Hyung, 1990, Conglomerates and 
the Concentration of the Economic Power (in Korean), 
KDI. Seoul. 
Lee, Whan-Eui, 1980, Communication Science, Korea 
University Research Institute of Mass Communication, 
Seoul. pp. 35-60. 
Lee, Young-Min, 1988, The Present Problems of Labour 
Movement in Korea, Jooksan, Seoul. 
Leger, J. M., 1994, "The Boom: How Asians Started the 
'Pacific Century' Early", Far Eastern Economic 
Review, November 24. pp. 43-50. 
Lenin, V. I., 1970, State and Revolution, Peking, Foreign 
Language Press. 
1975, Imperialism, Peking, Foreign Language 
Press. 
Li, Kuan, 1996, manuscript, Confucianism and Capitalist 
Development in the East Asian Newly Industrialised 
Societies, Department of Social Sciences, 
Loughborough University of Technology. 
Liebknecht, K., 1973, Militarism and Anti-Militarism, 
Trans. by Grahame Lock, Cambridge Rivers Press. 
Lim, Hyun-Chin &. Yang, Jong-Hae, 1987, "The State, Local 
Capitalists, and Multinationals: The Changing Nature 
of a Triple Alliance in Korea" in Kim, K. D., (ed. ), 
Dependency Issues in Korean Development, Seoul, Seoul 
National University Press, pp. 347-361. 
Lindblom, C. E., 1977, Politics and Markets, New York, 
Basic Books. 
Linder, S. B. , 1986, The Pacific Century, Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press. 
Little, I. M. D., 1981, "The Experiences and Causes of Rapid 
Labour-Intensive Development in Korea, Taiwan 
Province, Hong Kong and Singapore and the 
possibilities of Emulation" in E. Lee (ed. ), Export- 
1R 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
led Industrialisation and Development. Bangkok and 
Geneva: ILO-ARTEP. 
Luckham, A. R., 1972, "Militarism: Force, Class and 
International Conflict": IDS Bulletin, v. July. 
Lui, T-L. & Chiu S., 1993, "Industrial Restructuring and 
Labour-Market Adjustment under Positive 
Noninterventionism: the Case of Hong Kong", 
Environment and Planning A 25.63-79. 
Lynd, S., 1976, "How the Cold War Began? ", in Graebner, 
N. A. (ed. ) , The Cold War: A Conflict of Ideology and 
Power, D. C. Heath and Company, Lexingtom Mass., pp. 3- 
17. 
Magdoff H., 1970, "Militarism and Imperialism", American 
Economic Review, v. 60, May. 1970. pp. 237-246. 
Mail Economist, 1991, December, 23. Seoul. 
Mail Economist, 1992, February, 20. Seoul. 
Mail Korean Economy, 1990, December, 1. Seoul. 
Mal, 1992, February. Seoul. 
Mal, 1993, October: 35-37. Seoul. 
Mason, E. S., 1964, Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy, 
Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by 
Harper & Row, N. Y. 
Mason, E. S., et al., 1980. The Economic and Social 
Modernization of the Republic of Korea. Studies in 
the Modernization of the Republic of Korea, 1945- 
1975. Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian 
Studies, Harvard University. 
McCormick, T. J., 1989, America's Half-Century, The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. 
Meyer, J. E., 1988, "Teaching Morality in Taiwan Schools: 
the Message of the Textbooks", The China Quarterly, 
114: 267-84. 
Miliband, R, 1969, The State In Capitalist Society, New 
York, Basic Books. Inc. 
id 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
, 1977, Marxism and Politics, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
Mills, C. W., 1956, The Power Elite, New York, Oxford 
University Press 
_, 
1963, "Power, Politics and People: The 
Collected Essays" in Horowitz, I. L., (ed. ), 
C. W. Mills, New York, Oxford University Press. 
Ministry of Labour Affairs, 1987. '87 White Paper for 
Industrial Disputes, Seoul. 
Monthly Chosun, 1985. May, Seoul. 
Monthly Shin Dong-A, 1985. May, Seoul. 
Murdock, G., 1990, "Redrawing the Map of the 
Communications Industries: Concentration and 
Ownership in the Era of Privatization" in Ferguson, 
M., (ed. ), Public Communication, Sage, pp. 1-15. 
National Parliament, 1988, Inspection and Hearing for 
Press and Broadcasting, November. Seoul. 
1988. National Parliamentary 
Minute for Ministry of Culture & Information, 144th 
Assembly, October, Seoul. 
1991, Parliamentary Inspection of 
the Administration, September, Seoul. 
1991. Parliamentary Inspection for 
Ministry of Culture and Information, August. Seoul. 
Nauta, R., 1971, "Armed Forces and Ideology" in Giles, M. 
(ed. ), The Perceived Role of the Military, Rotterdam 
University Press. 
Newfarmer, R., 1978, "International Industrial 
Organisation and Development: A Survey" in 
Newfarmer, R. (ed. ), Profits, Poverty, and Progress, 
Cambridge, MIT Press. pp. 13-62. 
Nolan, P., 1990, "Assessing Economic Growth in the Asian 
NICs", Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 20 No. l. 
pp. 41-63. 
19; 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Nunn, F. M., 1975. "New Thoughts on Military Intervention 
in Latin American Politics: The Chilean Case", 
Journal of Latin American Studies, November, 1975. 
Paeng, Soon-Won, 1988, "Problems of 'Union News Agency'" 
(In Korean), Journalism, Winter, pp. 81-94. 
Palais, J. B., 1985. "Human Rights in the Republic of 
Korea". In Human Rights in Korea. New York: Asia 
Watch Committee. 
Papanek, G. 1988, "The New Asian Capitalism: An Economic 
Portrait" in P. L. Berger & H. M. Hsiao (eds. ), In 
Search of an East Asian Development Model, New 
Brunswick and Oxford: Transaction Books. 
Parenti, M., 1993, Inventing Reality, St. Martin's Press, 
New York. 
Park, Byung-Yoon, 1980. "Inside of Heavy Chemical 
Industries (in Korean)". Monthly Shin Dong-A. May. 
Park, Young-Chul, 1984. Policy Measures for Government 
Control of Access to Domestic Credit and Foreign 
Borrowing. Korean Economic Policy case 1, East-West 
Center Population Institute, Honolulu, Hawaii. 
Park, Dong-Sun, 1969. "Insolvent Enterprises", Monthly 
Chung-Ang, 1969. September pp. 176-193. 
Petras, J., 1978. Critical Perspectives on Imperialism 
and Social Class in the Third World, Monthly Review 
Press. New York and London. 
Polly, J., 1992, "Multinational Advertising Agencies", 
Monthly Ad. Journal, January, pp. 46-49, Seoul. 
Poulantzas, N., 1973, Political Power and Social Classes 
London, NLB and S&W. 
1976, The Crisis of the Dictatorship: 
Portugal, Greece, Spain, London, NLB. 
1978, Classes in Contemporary 
Capitalism, London, Verso. 
Press & Broadcasting, 1978 & 1980, Annual Reports of 
Press and Broadcasting, Seoul, Korea. 
iR 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Pye, L, 1968, Armies in the Process of the Military in 
Underdeveloped Countries, Princeton. 
Ranis, G., 1989, "The Role of Institutions in Transition 
Growth: The East Asian Newly Industrializing 
Countries", World Development, Vol. 17, No. 9. pp. 1443- 
1453. 
Recruit, 1990. "White Paper about Employment Situation 
of 1989". Recruit, January. 
Rhee, H. Y., 1988, "The Economic Problems of the Korean 
Political Economy" in I. J. Kim & Y. W. Kihl (eds. ), 
Political Changes in South Korea, N. Y., The Korean 
PWPA Inc., pp. 189-220. 
Riddell, R., 1987. Foreign Aid Reconsidered, Baltimore; 
London; The Johns Hopkins University Press. Currey. 
Robinson, M., 1991, "Perceptions of Confucianism in 
Twentieth Centry Korea" in Gilbert Rozman (ed. ), The 
East Asian Region: Confucian Heritage and Its Modern 
Adaptation, N. J., Princeton University Press. pp. 204- 
225. 
Robinson, T. W., 1987, "Korea 2000: The Political 
Component" in Seung-Joo Han & R. J. Myers (eds. ), 
Korea: The Year 2000, University Press of America, 
pp. 65-84. 
ROK Army Headquarters, 1955. A History of Army 
Developemt. Chungku Publishing Co. Taegu.. Vol. I. 
Rosenberg, M., 1957, Occupations and Values, Free Press of 
Glencoe. 
Sakong, Il, 1993, Korea in the World Economy, Washington 
DC: Institute for International Economics. 
Scott, J. &. G. Catherine, 1984, Directors of Industry: The 
British Corporate Network 1904-76, Cambridge, Polity 
Press. 
Scott, J., 1979, Corporations, Classes and Capitalism, 
London, Hutchison of London. 
17 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
, 1986, Capitalist Property and Financial Power: 
A Comparative Study of Britain, the U. S. and Japan, 
London. Wheatsheaf Books. 
, 1991, Who Rules Britain? Polity Press. 
Senghaas, D., 1980, "Militarism Dynamics in the 
Contemporary Context of Periphery Capitalism" in A. 
Eide & M. Thee, (eds. ), Problems of Contemporary 
Militarism, London, Croom and Helm Ltd. 
Shils, E., 1968, "The Military in the Political 
Development of the New States, in J. J. Johnson (ed. ), 
The Role of the Military In Underdeveloped Countries, 
Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press. 
Shin, Eui-Hang and Chin, Seung-Kwon. 1989. "Social 
Affinity Among Top Managerial Executives of Large 
Corporations in Korea" in Korea Sociological Forum 
4: 3-26. 
SIPRI, 1968,1969,1975, SIPRI Yearbook of World 
Armaments and Disarmament. 
Skjelsbaek, K., 1980, "Militarism, Its Dimensions and 
Corollaries: An Attempt at Conceptual Clarification" 
in M. Thee., A. E. (eds. ), Problems of Contemporary 
Militarism, London, Croom and Helm Ltd. 
Sklair, L., 1993, "Consumerism Drives the Global Mass 
Media System", Media Development, v. 2/1993, pp. 30- 
34. 
Smith, D. &. Smith, R., 1983, The Economics of Militarism: 
London, Pluto Press. 
Snow, D. M., 1995. The Shape of the Future: The Post-Cold 
War World, M. E. Sharpe. Armonk, N. Y. 
Sohn, Jaesouk, 1968. "Political Dominance and Political 
Failure: The Role of the Military in the Republic of 
Korea", in Henry Bienen (ed. ) The Military 
Intervenes: Case Studies in Political Development. 
Russell. Sage Foundation. New York. pp. 103-121. 
1R 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Song, Byung-Nak, 1990 The Rise Of the Korean Economy, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Steers, Richard M., Shin Yoo Keun, and Gerardo R. 
Ungson. 1989. The Chaebol: Korea's New Industrial 
Might. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Harper and Row. 
Steinberg, D. I., 1984, "On Foreign Aid and the 
Development of the Republic of Korea: the 
Effectiveness of Concessional Assistance", Paper 
prepared for the Task Force on Concessional Flows, 
Washington, (draft, mimeo) 
Suh, Jae-Jean, 1988. Capitalist Class Formation and the 
Limits of Class Power of Korea, [Ph. D. Thesis], 
Department of Sociolgy, University of Hawaii. 
Suh, Sang-Chul. 1978. Growth and Structural Changes in 
the Korean Economy, 1910-1940. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
Sundhaussen, U., 1984. "Military Withdrawal from 
Government Responsibility", Armed Forces and Society, 
10.4. Summer. 
The Economist, 1991, Asia's Emerging Economies, November 
16th. pp. 5-24. 
The First Economist, 1992, January, 13. Seoul. 
Thee, M., 1980, "Militarism and Militarisation in 
Contemporary International Relations" in A. Eide & 
M. Thee (eds. ), Problems of Contemporary Militarism, 
London, Croom and Helm Ltd. 
Tu Weiming et al, 1992, The Confucian World Observed: A 
Contemporary Discussion of Confucian Humanism in East 
Asia. Honolulu: The East-West Centre. 
Twaddle, M. 1992, Imperialism, the State and the Third 
World, British Academic Press, London. 
Union News Agency, 1988. Annual Report. Seoul. 
van Doorn, J, 1971, "Ideology and the Military" in 
M. Janowitz & J. van Doorn (eds. ), On Military 
Ideology, Rotterdam University Press. 
i4 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Vogel, E. F., 1987, "Korea in 2000: From Social Instability 
to Consensus? " in Han Sung-Joo. & Robert J. Myers, 
(eds. ), Korea: The Year 2000. University Press of 
America, pp. 49-64. 
Wade, R., 1989, "What Can Economics Learn from East 
Asian Success? ", The Annals of the American Academy, 
505. September pp. 68-79. 
1990, Governing the Market: Economic Theory 
and the Role of Government in East Asian 
Industrialization, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press. 
, 1993, "Managing Trade: Taiwan and South Korea 
as Challenges to Economics and Political Science", 
Comparative Politics, January, Vol. 25. No. 2, pp. 147- 
167. 
Wexler, P., 1991, Critical Theory Now. The Falmer Press. 
Woddis, J., 1977, Armies and Politics, London, Lawrence 
and Wishart. 
Woo, J. E., 1991, Race to the Swift: State and Finance in 
Korean Industrialisation. N. Y. : Columbia University 
Press. 
Wood, R. and Morton, K. 1977, "Has British Aid Helped Poor 
Countries? - Five African Cases", ODI Review, No. l. 
Wood, R. E., 1980, 'Foreign Aid and the Capitalist State in 
Underdeveloped Society', Politics and Society, 
Vol. 10, No. 1. 
, 1986, From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis, 
University of California Press, Berkeley, London. 
World Bank, 1987a. Annual Statistical Report. 
1993, The East Asian Miracle, Washington, 
D. C.: World Bank. 
Yi, Ki-Back, 1984. A New History of Korea. (translated 
by Edward W. Wagner and Edward J. Shultz), Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
9n 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Zeitlin, M. & R. Ratcliff, 1988. Landlords and 
Capitalists: The Dominant Class of Chile, N. J. 
Princeton University Press. 
91 
